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ABSTRACT

In his poetic exploration of the idea of Joy, Robert
Browning makes an important contribution to the development
of one of the most vital concepts in nineteenth-century
English literature, a contribution which also elucidates
the nature of his strategic place midway in the evolving
Romantic tradition between Wordsworth and Yeats.
In the traditional Christian ethos, the concept of
Joy was associated with supernatural virtue which man
struggled to attain.

With the disintegration of a viable

Christian tradition, however, the idea of Joy came to be
seen, partly through the impetus of the French Revolution,
both as an egalitarian human right and as the unique pos
session of the poetic consciousness.

Chapter I examines

Browning's idea of Joy against the background of some of
the most important touchstones of the concept from Schiller's
"Ode to Joy" to W. B. Yeats's "tragic joy," with special
emphasis given Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Arnold.

Since

The Prelude is the most important embodiment of the idea of
Joy in nineteenth-century English literature.

Chapter II is

devoted to an exploration of the complex and manifold
iv

implications which Wordsworth gives the concept of Joy.
Wordsworth carefully identifies Joy as a power which partakes
of "happiness" and "pleasure" but ultimately transcends both
of these qualities and is associated with the essential
dignity of human nature, with unity, with power and energy,
and with the universality of the poetic imagination.
Browning's earliest attempts at the formulation of his
idea of Joy are discussed in Chapter III from the standpoint
of these aspects of the Wordsworthian concept of Joy.

In

Pauline, Paracelsus, and Sordello, Browning both extends
and modifies the Romantic idea of Joy, while in Easter-Pay
and in "Saul," he incorporates the concept firmly within
the framework of his religious faith, recalling the tradi
tional relation of the idea of Joy to Christian virtue.
Browning dramatizes his concept of man's capability for Joy
in some of his finest poems, and twenty-two of the poems
of Men and Women and Dramatis Personae are examined in
Chapter IV as they demonstrate his developing poetic concern
with the idea of Joy.
In Chapter V, the relationship between Joy, energy,
and the grotesque which John Ruskin emphasizes in the chapter
on "The Nature of Gothic" in The Stones of Venice is dis
cussed as it is manifested in Book One of The Ring and the

Book.

Ruskin, following Coleridge and Wordsworth, identifies

the concept of Joy with purity, energy, and universality.
Browning extends this identification further through the
dramatization of these qualities in his characterization of
Pompilia, Caponsacchi, and the Pope.

In the final chapter,

Browning's struggle to maintain his idea of Joy is seen in
a few of the poems of the 1870's and 1880's, especially in
"Numpholeptos," La Saisiaz, and several of the poems of
Ferishtah1s Fancies.
The idea of Joy is an attempt of the nineteenthcentury literary consciousness to embody the most powerful
experience discernible by the poetic vision and to draw uponthe concept of Joy as a unifying cultural experience which
could rejuvenate a society that was being rapidly trans
formed by technological progress.

When it is identified and

traced through some of his most important poems, Robert
Browning's idea of Joy emerges as the most dynamic Victorian
attempt to transmit and transmute the Romantic legacy of
Joy-consciousness.

CHAPTER I

THE IDEA OP JOY:
ROBERT BROWNING AND THE TRADITION

The concept of Joy includes some of the most dynamic
and crucial developments in nineteenth-century literature.
Robert Browning's contribution to the idea of Joy is an
important aspect of his poetry, important because it
greatly enriches the poetic texture itself, but important
also because it indicates one facet of Browning's strategic
place in the Romantic tradition midway between Wordsworth
and Yeats.

Browning's modifications and extensions of the

idea of Joy will be more relevant if they are considered
against the background of a few of the important touchstones
of the idea in the entire Romantic tradition.
For the idea of Joy is one of the complex literary
motifs of the nineteenth century; it is a vital, protean
concept which appears with varying subtlety and complexity
in the chief Romantics and Victorians, and is modified and
metamorphosed as it enters the twentieth century in the
work of Hardy and Yeats.

One thinks of Schiller's "Ode to

Joy," most probably of its musical embodiment in Beethoven's
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Ninth Symphony; of the claim that Wordsworth makes for the
"never-failing principle of joy"; of the loss of Joy des
cribed by Coleridge in "Dejection"; of Keats's lament for
the transitory visitations of "Joy, whose hand is ever at
his lips / Bidding adieu"; of Browning's Cleon and his
"joy hunger"; of Arnold's longing for "joy whose grounds
are true"; of Meredith's exultation in "the joy of earth";
of Hardy's description of man's insatiable "appetite for
joy" as the force which drives Tess D'Urberville in the
climactic pages of that novel; or of W. B. Yeats's savage
attempt to reconcile the paradox of "tragic joy."

These

examples suggest both the importance and the scope of
nineteenth-century explorations of the idea of Joy, an
idea treated briefly by Frank Kermode in Romantic Image,
where Joy is termed a "crucial concept" for the understand
ing not only of earlier nineteenth-century literature, but
also of Symbolism and the entire modern movement in poetry
from Baudelaire to Yeats.
This brief catalogue also suggests that the importance
given Joy in the imaginative thought of poets as diverse
in their aesthetic aims as Wordsworth, Browning, and
Yeats, makes it more than a convenient synonym for
"happiness" or "pleasure," though Joy certainly includes
these connotations.

Thomas Hardy's description of Tess's

"appetite for joy" is quoted, although no source is indi
cated in the text of the novel, from Browning's poem,
Paracelsus.

Browning's phrase, as Hardy must have

recognized, is a telling one:

the metaphoric equivalence

of "hunger" and "joy" suggests the transformation of Joy
to the status of a basic human drive as powerful as man's
biological drives and more important to his total being.
Joy is one of the perennial needs of the human personality.
It is a value defined, cherished, and sought after by the
major Romantic poets.

This initial chapter should both

dispel the obvious but rather simplistic associations of
the concept of Joy and establish evidence of the rich
poetic and cultural ramifications of the Joy motif in a
few of the chief figures of the nineteenth century.
In "The Everlasting Yea" of Sartor Resartus, Thomas
Carlyle voices one of the central ideas of the Romantic
movement:

"Man's Unhappiness, as I construe, comes of

his Greatness? it is because there is an Infinite in him,
which with all his cunning he cannot quite bury under the
Finite."

Carlyle's prescription for this infinite unrest

is, paradoxically, that man should simply accept infinitude
as his necessary condition and stop his ceaseless search
for the means of happiness, "Love not Pleasure; love God.
This is the EVERLASTING YEA, wherein all contradiction is

solved; wherein whoso walks and works, it is well with him.
But the idea of the infinite possibilities of human life
which reached its apotheosis in the French Revolution
could not be stilled even by the thundering rhetoric of
Carlyle.

The quest for Joy as the means of the highest

form of happiness is a consistent theme of the first gener
ation of Romantic poets and extends through the Victorians
into modern literature.
However, from a historical perspective, Joy is a
relatively new idea.

In the traditional Christian ethos,

perfect Joy was attained in an Eternity to come, and its
most satisfactory counterpart attainable in this world was
found in a life which conformed to the Will of God.

Joy

was considered to be a habit of the soul, a virtue won
only after long struggle.

A well-known example of this

concept of Joy in literature is Chaucer's Squire.

The

keynoteof Chaucer's description of the Squire is joyous
ness, because Joy is the virtue most highly prized in
the young knight; it is a virtue which denotes purity and
innocence of soul and has to be carefully nurtured.

With

the disintegration of a viable Christian tradition, however
Joy loses its association with supernatural virtue and
eventually comes to be seen both as one of man's basic
rights and as the peculiar possession of the imaginative

consciousness of the poet.

When Carlyle admonishes man to

forget happiness and pleasure, he is attempting to refute
the contemporary assumption that they are the universal
rights of all men by reminding man of his infinite spiritual
nature, a nature which all the pleasures of the world
cannot satisfy.

Most nineteenth-century writers tacitly

assume man's infinitude; but they also assume, as the
narrator of Herman Melville's Pierre says, that Joy "is
my right as man; deprived of joy, I feel that I should
find cause for deadly feuds with things invisible."
The roots of the new importance accorded Joy can be
found in the thought of the eighteenth century.

The

epistemology of John Locke helped to inaugurate what has
been called a "crisis of consciousness" in English thought.
If sensation is the basis of reality, value has no ob
jective existence outside of the subjective experience of
the individual.

Ernest Lee Tuveson, in his study of the

Lockean tradition, notes that Locke's epistemology created
"the necessity of finding new channels for old and valued
experience, and of reconstructing on new foundations the
dignity of the soul."1

Joy is such an old and valued human

1Ernest Lee Tuveson, The Imagination as a Means of
Grace (Berkeley, 1960), p. 93.
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experience, and it is made one of the chief foundations for
man's dignity of soul.

Professor Tuveson's discussion of

Joseph Addison's essays on The Pleasures of the Imagination
provides an insight into the idea of Joy in the nineteenth
century.
Professor Tuveson explains that when Addison says
that the first discovery of Beauty "strikes the mind with
an inward joy," he is voicing a rather revolutionary idea:
Saint-Just, the utopian and apologist of the
French Revolution, once remarked that "happi
ness is an idea new to Europe." As an ideal
to be attained in this life, joy was a rela
tively new conception. The word "pleasure,"
used in
the title of the series, is a touch
stone.
The tendency has formerly been to
contrast the temporal "pleasure" with the true
and eternal "joy".. . .
In Addison's usage,
"pleasure" has taken on a spiritual value and
"joy" arises from a purely sensuous delight
God Himself has prepared for us. Another idea
has found aesthetic projection.2
A glance at the entry on Joy in the OED bears out Tuveson's
claim that Joy is a relatively new concept and indicates
its central

place in the Romantic movement.

the word Joy, "joyance,"

One form of

was introduced into the language

by Spenser, considered obsolete by Dr. Johnson, and appeared
again about 1800 in the works of Coleridge and Southey, be
coming a favorite word with writers of imaginative literature.3

2Ibid., p. 108.
30ED (Oxford, 1961), V, 612.

7
The rise of Evangelical Christianity with its emphasis on
a joyously enthusiastic and emotional religious conversion,
in addition to Locke's epistemology and Addison's aesthe
tic that Professor Tuveson cites, are all interrelated
causes for the new emphasis on Joy.

The concept of Joy

receives even more important aesthetic and intellectual
projection in the nineteenth century.
Schiller's "Ode to Joy” is the logical starting place
for a discussion of the idea of Joy.

His aesthetic ideal

of Joy had an important, demonstrable influence upon
Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Arnold, and his poem embodies
many of the facets of the new idea of Joy.

Schiller

credits Joy with the instinct to brotherhood among men.

In

its Victorian translation, the An die Freude begins with an
apostrophe to Joy as the "spark from the fire that gods
have fed":
Strong custom rends us from each other—
Thy magic all together brings;
And man in man but hails a brother,
Wherever rest thy gentle wings.^
Joy springs from nature and is also the link which binds the
disparate elements of nature into one holy bond.

Joy is

personified as an extension of the power of the Absolute:

4
J. C. F. Schiller, The Poems and Ballads of Schiller,
trans. Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton {New York, 1844), pp. 332334.
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Joy moves the dazzling wheels that roll
In the great time piece of creation;
Joy breathes on buds, and flowers they are;
Joy beckons, suns come forth from heaven.
Joy is the reward given seekers after truth, but it is also
the source of their energy; Joy smiles from "Truth's pure
and lambent fires."

Schiller identifies Joy with virtue,

faith, truth, and, finally, with the vision of the Absolute
"Through the shatter'd vaults of death / Lo, mid the
choral angels, Joy."
The story related about the inspiration of this poem
is a significant one.

Bulwer-Lytton writes that Schiller

had saved a poor theology student from an attempted suicide
and had given him enough money to tide him over for a brief
time.

When Schiller repeated the incident to guests at a

wedding party, a subscription was immediately made for the
young man, who received funds enough to enable him to com
plete his studies successfully.

Schiller, so the story

goes, as a result of the fortunate outcome of this incident
wrote the An die Freude, and consecrated it to the spirit
of humanity.5

The interesting point of this anecdote is

its emphasis upon Schiller's identification of Joy with
humanity and with humanitarian ideals, for it is Joy, not

^Ibid., p. 332.

dharity, as might be expected logically, that is made the
creative motivation for the universal advancement of man
kind.

One of the favorite ideas of the century is explicit

in this poem, for the progress of humanity is envisioned
springing naturally and joyously from the progress of the
individual.

Schiller reconciles what are later to become

the sometimes antithetical ideas of the progress of the in
dividual and the progress of society through the power of
Joy.
Schiller's concept of Joy is a part of the later
eighteenth-century identification of Joy, pleasure, happi
ness, even luxury, with the essential dignity and worth of
the individual human being, an identification which gained
important impetus from the political ideals of the French
Revolution, and which Tuveson notes in the study cited
above.

M. H. Abrams provides still another critical insight

which makes this historical relationship clear.

Abrams

writes that "pervasively in both the verse and prose of the
period,
posites,

'hope,' with its associated term,
'dejection,'

'joy,' and its op

'despondency,' and 'despair,' are used

in a special application, as shorthand for the limitless
faith in human and social possibility aroused by the
Revolution, and its reflex, the nadir of feeling caused by
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its seeming failure. . . .1,6

The "Ode to Joy" is a concrete

instance of Abrams' argument:

the leap from Schiller's ob

scure act of charity to his identification of Joy with the
progress of humanity makes for a complex relationship, which
the historical perspective of the French Revolution clarifies.
Custom, as Schiller says, "rends us from each other," but
Joy "all together brings."

Custom is related to the dead

hand of eighteenth-century absolutism; the concept of Joy
is associated with the wave of the democratic future with
its unbounded confidence in the infinite possibilities of
ordinary men and women.
Schiller's concept of Joy became a factor in English
literature chiefly through the aegis of Coleridge.

Frederic

Ewen notes that "in the aesthetics of both Coleridge and
Schiller, joy (Freude) occupies a significant place.
fact, Schiller would make the end of art sheer joy.

In
And

Coleridge seems to echo him when he affirms that 'the
proper and immediate object of poetry is the communication
of immediate pleasure.'"^

Coleridge's poem, "Dejection:

An Ode," is perhaps the most notable of his many attempts

^M. H. Abrams, "English Romanticism: The Spirit of
the Age," in Romanticism Reconsidered, ed. Northrop Frye
(New York, 1963), p.54.
7

Frederic Ewen, The Prestige of Schiller in England
(New York, 1932), pp. 73-74;
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to embody the relationship of Joy and the creative imagi
nation of the artist.
In the 1817 version of "Dejection," Coleridge des
cribes. the emotional state which he also calls "exsiccation,"
the spiritual dryness which is the result of a "stifled,
drowsy, unimpassioned grief" that finds no natural outlet.
Joy is irrevocably lost; feeling and intellect exist apart;
natural beauty is seen, intellectually realized, but not
truly felt.

Coleridge says that Joy is both the source of

man's glory and the "beauty-making power" which enables him
to reach that intellectually perceived glory.

Joy rescues

the artist from a kind of moral inertia, a dreadful sense
of the emptiness of life, a paralysis of the will.

He

addresses the Lady, who does not question the existence of
this Joy, the "strong music in the soul," because she is
pure of heart:
Joy, virtuous Lady! Joy that ne'er was given
Save to the pure, and in their purest hour,
Life, and Life's effluence, cloud at once and shower,
Joy, Lady! is the spirit and the power,
Which wedding Nature to us gives in dower
A new Earth and new Heaven.
(11. 64-69)
Purity is a necessary prerequisite of the Joy which redeems
man from his state of spiritual exsiccation, for Coleridge
envisions Joy as being a gift to the worthy.

In this respect,

Joy is somewhat analogous to the grace given man in the
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Christian pattern of redemption.

But this purity also

denotes the essential innocence that embraces the contra
dictions of life and restrains the reflective powers that
would destroy the experience of Joy.

The failure of Joy,

Coleridge says, results in the loss of the "shaping spirit
of imagination," which weds man to the outer world.
Coleridge makes other explanations of the idea of Joy,
deservedly less well known than "Dejection," but neverthe
less important.

In his Philosophical Lectures, he says

that "in joy individuality is lost."

This aspect of the

concept of Joy has an affinity with Schiller's idea of Joy
as the force that "all together brings"; Joy is the power
which reconciles opposites within the poetic imagination
as well as individuals within the body politic.

Coleridge

goes on to say that Joy "is therefore liveliest in youth,
not from any principle of organization but simply from this
that the hardships of life, that the circumstances that
have forced a man in upon his little unthinking, contempt
ible self, have lessened his power of existing universally;
it is that [Joy] only which brings about those passions."8

Q

Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Philosophical Lectures
of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Kathleen Coburn (London,
1949), p. 179.
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Joy is thus said to be that facet of the creative energy
of the artist which enables him to avoid morbid, fruitless
introspection, and to exist imaginatively in the universal
life of the world around him.

Coleridge implies in this

passage that it is next to impossible to retain the power
of Joy beyond youth, but although this is also the experi
ence embodied in "Dejection," it is not emphasized in his
other statements about Joy.

Rather, Coleridge stresses the

developing, maturing aspects of the idea of Joy and its
power to create a kind of equilibrium within the human
personality.
For example, Coleridge writes that "happiness" has
four distinct states:
We need only appeal to our own consciences to
know their distinctions, namely:
that of a
bodily [appetite], in other words a perfect
correspondence of the external stimulants to
the frame to be stimulated; the second, a
certain joyousness, [gladness, laetitiae]. .
. . as where Pythagoras discovered the pro
position that made him cry out "Eureka". .
. . The third is a speculative point which
arises from the consideration of our extreme
dependence upon external things. The fourth
I cannot otherwise express than in the words
of the liturgy as "the peace of God". . . .9

Q

Ibid., p. 141. W. B. Yeats echoes Coleridge's idea
and indicates its possible source:
"We are happy when for
everything inside us there is an equivalent something out
side us. I think it was Goethe said this."
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Coleridge here outlines a theory of the stages of the ex
perience of Joy which is completely embodied by Wordsworth
in The Prelude.

Joy is consistently imaged by both poets

as moving along a scale, or ladder, from the realm of the
purely physical to the intellectual to the meditative to the
spiritual, a development also implied by Schiller in the
"Ode to Joy."
Coleridge's son provides yet another of his father's
attempts to define the idea of Joy:

"He [Coleridge] called

it j°y, meaning thereby not mirth or high spirits, or even
happiness, but a consciousness of entire and therefore
well-being, when the emotional and intellectual faculties
are in equipoise."10

This is perhaps the clearest statement

that Coleridge provides of his concept of Joy.

I. A.

Richards, who quotes this passage, goes on to remark that
"Coleridge's use of this word here is obviously connected
with the 'deep power of joy' in 'Tintern Abbey.'"

Words

worth does indeed embody the idea of Joy in that poem, but
The Prelude is the most crucial touchstone of the idea of
Joy in the early Romantic tradition, and it will be dis
cussed at length in the next chapter.

10Quoted in I. A. Richards, Coleridge on Imagination
(Bloomington, 1960), p. 150.
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It is sufficient now to observe that in the early
nineteenth century Joy is identified as the power which
destroys individuality, advances the cause of universality
within the human realm, and even constitutes the basic
dignity of man.

Furthermore, Joy produces a state of mind

in which emotion and intellect are held in equilibrium, and
Joy is thus a condition for aesthetic production and a
source of a kind of aesthetic experience.

The concept of

Joy achieves particular prominence in the literature of
the nineteenth century, where it is made to symbolize the
transcendent power peculiar to the poet, but accessible to
all men through the poet, who is different only in degree,
as Wordsworth assures us, from other men.

A deep and en

during consciousness of Joy is the poet's hallmark, and the
poetic embodiment of Joy is his greatest contribution.

Joy

is made a supreme and universal value; but the idea of Joy
is not, therefore, a uniform concept, because the source
of value shifts repeatedly throughout the nineteenth century.
Wordsworth finds the highest Joy in the meditative realm of
nature; Browning emphasizes the Joy derived from the union
of the individual soul with another human being and with
God; while Yeats rejoices in the very suffering inherent
in the human condition.
Frank Kermode's Romantic Image is largely concerned
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with the theory of the image in the poetry of W. B. Yeats,
but he also provides an explicit identification of the Joy
motif.

Kermode traces the origin of the idea of the iso

lated artist to its beginnings in the Romantics.

The usual

idea of the modern artist is a stereotyped account in which
the artist is said to be cut off from the life of ordinary
men, suffering alienation for the sake of his vision.
Kermode identifies Joy as the power which enables the artist
to attain this vision:

"Some difference in the artist gives

him access to this— an enormous privilege, involving joy
(which acquires an almost technical sense as a necessary
concomitant of the full exercise of the mind in the act of
imagination).

But the power of joy being possible only to

a profound 'organic sensibility,' a man who experiences it
will also suffer exceptionally."^

Kermode points out that

Wordsworth had hoped to see "joy in widest commonalty spread,"
but Kermode maintains that his belief, expressed in the
Preface of 1800, that the poet is different in degree from
other men, necessarily estranges the rest of mankind from
the power of Joy, leaving the artist in isolation.

Kermode

believes that Keats'svision of Joy-in-melancholy is the
most significant expression of the idea, more imitable than

^ F r a n k Kermode, Romantic Image (New York, 1964), p. 6.
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Coleridge's "Dejection," and that it is the poet's symbolmaking power, his ability to "weld joy and pleasure to
gether in some symbolic blaze," that rescues both his Joy
and his sanity.

12

The isolated artist communicates the Joy which he
experiences to his fellows; this is his truly moral func
tion.

But Kermode points out that it must be a Joy "whose

grounds are true," and Matthew Arnold's Empedocles, for
example, rejects the Joy of the earlier Romantics because
the state of Joy which is based upon the union and inter
course of the mind with a perceived harmony in the universe
is only a momentary vision which the poet struggles to
embody in the poetic image.

But this vision is only an

illusion, it is actually false, and the poet's only re
course is, not action, but the creation of more poems
written to overcome his isolation and to recapture his Joy,
if only momentarily.13

This, for Arnold, is an impossible

solution, and Arnold's dilemma becomes the archetypal prob
lem of the modern artist.
Not all writers, however, accept this dilemma as it
is defined by Kermode.

They, like Schiller, Wordsworth

12Ibid., p. 11.
^ I b i d . , pp. 15-18.
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Coleridge, and Browning, posit Joy as the force which
promotes unity among men and universality within the poetic
imagination.

Joy is made a value both in and of itself,

and it is also the aesthetic means to the discovery of value.
Joy is at once an expressive and an instrumental experience.
Wordsworth says that "we have no sympathy but what is propa
gated by pleasure."

The poet, Wordsworth explains in the

1800 Preface, considers man as "looking upon this complex
scene of ideas and sensations, and finding everywhere ob
jects that immediately excite in him sympathies which, from
the necessities of his nature, are accompanied by an over
balance of enjoyment."^4

Alienation and isolation are

thus completely foreign to the very nature of the poet as
Wordsworth defines him.

Only in the dimension of Joy does

the poet realize the totality and the unity of human ex
perience.

The Joy created by the artist enables the reader

to enter imaginatively and sympathetically into the experi
ence of art just as the power of Joy is the instrument which
enables the artist, in Coleridge's words, to exist univer
sally in the creation of art.

^Wil l i a m Wordsworth, "Preface to Lyrical Ballads,"
Wordsworth1s Literary Criticism, ed. Nowell C. Smith (London,
1905), p. 26.
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Coleridge maintains that Joy results when emotion
and intellect exist in a state of equipoise.

This emo

tional and psychological equipoise, however, is harder
and harder to achieve as the nineteenth century advances.
The spiritual and poetic strategy of Robert Browning is
the most dynamic of the Victorian attempts to fuse subject
and object, reason and passion, emotion and intellect, the
necessary fusion which is both the power of Joy and the
result of Joy.

Browning achieves this dynamic concept of

Joy by rejecting the idea that equipoise is its necessary
condition.

He embraces the contradictions of life, its

changefulness, and its ultimate imperfection as the source
of the highest Joy.

Indeed, Browning's rejection of this

aspect of the traditional idea of Joy is an indication of
his struggle to maintain the concept.

The equipoise which

his age generally seeks is not the psychological equipoise
of the Romantics but is rather an attempt to maintain the
status quo against a rising tide of liberalism.

Browning's

flourishing poetic period, the 1850's through the 1860's,
has been called the "age of equipoise" by W. L. Burn, who
notes, however, that man's ability to experience the
noblest emotions is almost overly stressed and re-stressed
by the mid-Victorian generation.

20
Professor Burn asks, "Have we here a desire to em
phasize the uniqueness of Man as a being capable of the
noblest feelings in contrast to a society which with its
railways, steamships, telegraphs, and limited liability
companies was showing dangerous signs of becoming
mechanized and materialized?"15

Wordsworth, Coleridge, and

the other poets of the first generation of English Roman
ticism use the experience of Joy chiefly as a weapon against
a mechanistic philosophy; in turn, the Victorians employ
the idea of Joy not only against philosophical mechanists,
but also against the Utilitarian ethic and the rapidly de
veloping technology that were beginning to dominate all
areas of Victorian life.

One facet of Browning's emphasis

upon man's "capability for joy" is that Joy is a power and
an energy which gives to the soul of man unique dignity.
Browning extends and modifies the more quiescent and
meditative Wordsworthian Joy by associating Joy with energy
and work.

Here his affinity with the thought of Carlyle,

Ruskin, and Morris is evident.

If a machine can do work,

it cannot work joyously, for joyous work, as opposed to
mechanical production, is an attribute peculiar to man.

15

W. L. Burn, The Age of Equipoise; A Study of the
Mid-Victorian Generation (New York, 1965), p. 41.
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Since Joy transcends both pleasure and happiness, it in
dicates that man possesses a capacity for experience that
similarly transcends the purely physical.

Pleasure has the

potentiality of enslaving man to his natural appetites,
while Joy has a transcendent power which is potentially
liberating but which does not reject man's total humanity.
The opposition to the machine in the social theory of
Carlyle, Ruskin, and Morris rests upon the idea that
mechanization affects man's dignity of soul.

We can say

that it robs him of his Joy.
Behind this connection of Joy and work is the still
more elusive connection which nineteenth-century poets make
between energy and Joy.

This relationship has been seen

already in Schiller and in Coleridge, who identify Joy as
a manifest and uniquely human energy because it rests upon
a spiritual foundation.

Joy is thus associated with a

kind of psychic power that has a potential energy which far
surpasses the energy of the machine.

This power, however,

is available in its greatest strength to the man who
possesses an essential purity and innocence of soul.

In

The Victorian Morality of Art, Henry Ladd notes that a theory
of energy lies behind Goethe's doctrine of work, and that
Browning's will to act, as well as Carlyle's and Ruskin's
gospel of work, "hold the combination of moral purity with

physical e n e r g y . I f

it also is remembered that

Wordsworth and Coleridge stipulate purity of heart as the
necessary condition for the power of Joy, the developing
notion of Joy's relationship to power, purity, energy, and
work is more meaningful, and mid-Victorian modifications
of the idea of Joy are seen to be clearly indebted to the
earlier tradition.

The nineteenth-century idea of Joy, as

it is variously described by Coleridge, Wordsworth, Arnold,
and Browning, does not restrict the experience to a purely
aesthetic realm: it is bound up within their total vision
of life.
In a recent essay, Lionel Trilling traces the evolu
tion of attitudes towards pleasure from the Romantics to
the present.

Just as M. H. Abrams makes clear the impetus

given the concept of Joy by the optimistic social ideals
of the French Revolution, Trilling suggests that the origin
of the emphasis on pleasure in the chief Romantics can be
found in the newly perceived importance of the common man.
Before the Revolution, luxury and pleasure were largely
considered to be the rights of kings and aristocrats alone
and were, therefore, associated by the deprived common man

16

Henry Ladd, The Victorian Morality of Art (New York,
1932), p. 377.
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with dignity and with honor.

Trilling explains that as a

result of the Revolution, pleasure came to be, associated
with individual human dignity; the ability to experience
pleasure was now felt to be the rightful and noble posses
sion of peasant as well as king:
And Diderot himself, the most uncompromising
of materialists, as he was the most subtle
and delicate, could not have wanted a more cate
gorical statement of his own moral and intel
lectual theory than Wordsworth's assertion
that the grand elementary principle of pleasure
constitutes the native and naked dignity of
man, and it is by this principle that man
knows, and lives, and breathes, and moves.
Trilling traces the development of this Wordsworthian plea
sure principle through Keats to the twentieth-century
concept of the spiritual life as it is mirrored in
Dostoevsky's "underground man," who scornfully rejects the
idea of pleasure because it transforms him into a machine
like puppet at the mercy of whatever gratifies his appetite.
Trilling suggests that modern

man rejects pleasure

sense of the term, but it can be demonstrated that he

inthis
still

finds room in his concept of the spiritual condition for the
more transcendent idea of Joy.
The special mark

17

of the modern age is said to be more

Lionel Trilling, "The Fate of Pleasure," in Romanti
cism Reconsidered, p. 80.

the pursuit of meaning than the pursuit of happiness.

The

idea of Joy serves this aspect of the modern consciousness
and is made to do double duty, for Joy is traditionally
both an instrument in the artist's search for meaning, as
well as the condition transcending mere happiness that re
wards that quest.

The drama presents what is perhaps the

most accurate image of the concerns of the contemporary
consciousness, and the drama of the late nineteenth century,
as well as that of our own time, contains some of the most
notable instances of the changing motif of the "appetite
for joy."

A few examples from some selected modern plays

will suggest the more-or-less contemporaneous concern with
the idea of Joy.
Gorki's The Lower Depths embodies the equation of Joy
and work.

Satin, for example, remarks to the dregs of the

industrial system who share his misery that "when work is
pleasure, life is a joy!
slavery!"

18

When work is a duty, life is

Gorki sees the experience of Joy as a liber

ating factor in human life.

In Jean Giraudoux's Madwoman

of Chaillot, a "universal joy" is depicted that is

18

References are to Masters of Modern Drama, eds.
Haskell M. Block and Robert G. Shedd (New York, 1962) , and
to T. S. Eliot, The Complete Poems and Plays, 1909-1950
(New York, 1952), p. 208.

25
reminiscent of Wordsworth's dream of "joy in widest common
alty spread."

This state of Joy comes when the money lenders

and money changers are driven by the Madwoman into the
oblivion that awaits them beyond the trap door, and the
world is made safe again for the ordinary individual.
Giraudoux describes the scene as follows:

"Little by little,

the scene is suffused with light, faint at first, but in
creasing as if the very walls were glowing with the quiet
radiance of universal joy."

We can recognize in these

examples from Gorki and Giraudoux Joy's equation with the
spirit of humanity and with the revolutionary ideals first
advanced in the last eighteenth century.
Chekhov, Sean O'Casey, and T. S. Eliot also evidence
a concern with the idea of Joy.

Chekhov's futile, tragi

comic characters attempt to salvage the experience of Joy
from the glory of the past.

In The Cherry Orchard, for

example, the orchard itself becomes a symbol of lost Joy.
Anya tells her mother that the mortgaged orchard can be
replaced:

"We will plant a new orchard finer than this one,

you'll see it, you'll understand; and joy, quiet, deep joy
will sink into your heart, like the sun at evening, and
you'll smile, Mama!”

But Joy is an inward power, as

Coleridge insists in "Dejection," and Chekhov makes it clear
that the futility of Lyuboff's life cannot be salvaged from
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beauty seen but not truly felt.

Sean O'Casey makes as

militant a stand as does any writer against those convention
al forces which would destroy the Joy of life.

His Cock-A

Doodle-Dandy is a celebration of Joy made to counteract
"the fight made by many to drive the joy of life from the
hearts of men."

O'Casey attempts to dignify the Joy that

is rooted in man's whole-hearted acceptance of life, while
T. S. Eliot's concept of Joy in Murder in the Cathedral
emphasizes a more transcendent aspect of the idea of Joy.
In the great speech which concludes with Thomas's quiet
assertion that "human kind cannot bear very much reality,"
Joy is an integral part of the reality that man cannot
bear, for Thomas reminds the chorus:
This is one moment,
But know that another
Shall pierce you with a sudden painful joy
When the figure of God's purpose is made complete.
Eliot's Joy is the emanation of a sudden epiphany, a Joy
that contains at once the sense of completion described in
"Dejection" and Keats's vision of Joy-in-Sorrow.
But it is in Ibsen's Ghosts that the complex threads
traced thus far are knitted together, for Ibsen equates Joy
with energy, with salvation, and with work.
Regine:

Osvald says of

"I suddenly realized that she could save me; she

was so full of the joy of lifel"

His mother is startled

by this statement, "Joy of life— ?
that?"

Is there salvation in

And Osvald replies to Mrs. Alving, "That— and the

joy of work.

They're really the same thing you know."

Mrs

Alving then realizes that she has been entirely unfair to
both her dead husband and her dying son.

Ibsen makes her

see her entire life through the perspective of Joy, and she
recognizes for the first time the joyous vitality of life
that has eluded her.
These examples suggest the central place given the
concept of Joy in the contemporary consciousness and evi
dence a concern with the possibilities for Joy which
implicitly denies the assertion of Samuel Johnson's Imlac
that "human life is everywhere a state in which much is to
be endured and little to be enjoyed."

Writers in the

Romantic tradition overturn this stoic dictum, despite the
prophetic warnings of Carlyle, and assert the power of Joy
in human life, even though the demonstration often amounts
to the fact that each manifestation of Joy is also a defeat
for the man, who, after all, "cannot bear very much reality
But if Joy indicates the man's finitude, it also indicates
that he possesses a capacity for infinitude, and the defeat
of the man is the triumph of the spirit.
This paradox, the paradox of Coleridge's "Dejection"
and Arnold's Empedocles on Etna, is given further
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ramification by Arthur 0. Lovejoy's discussion of Coleridge's
poem.

Lovejoy contends that as an artist "Coleridge finds

a certain triumph in defeat; for he is able to derive, and
to impart, aesthetic pleasure from the very emotion aroused
by his inability to experience aesthetic pleasure— or at
all events, from the poetic utterance of that emotion.

The

Ode is a paradox among poems in that it not merely— like
other poems— makes melancholy enjoyable, but achieves
beauty by the description of the loss of feeling for
beauty."^-9

This is the same paradox which Frank Kermode

embodies in his discussion of Matthew Arnold in Romantic
Image, and both Arnold and Coleridge found the production
of poetry on the basis of this paradox impossible.

Both

men gradually relinquished the poetic exploration of the
Joy theme, while neither gave up the attempt to posit for
Joy in their prose writings another foundation, available
to all men alike, more akin to the universal power of Joy
described in Schiller's "Ode to Joy" and in Wordsworth's
Prelude than to the Joy of the artist in isolation.
Coleridge's attempts at the definition of his concept
of Joy have been traced from "Dejection" through the lectures
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Arthur 0. Lovejoy, "Coleridge's and Kant's Two
Worlds," in Essays in the History of Ideas (New York, 1960),
p 263.
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and the table talk.

A similarly brief look at Matthew

Arnold's contribution to the idea of Joy will be helpful
at this point, for the loss and recovery of Joy is a con
sistent concern of Arnold's work and provides both an
interesting contrast to Browning's and another touchstone
of the idea of Joy in the nineteenth century.
In Arnold's Preface to Poems (1853), the famous re
jection of Empedocles on Etna is justified largely on the
basis of Schiller's principle of Joy:
Schiller,

"'All Art,' says

'is dedicated to Joy, and there is no higher and

no more serious problem, than how to make men happy.

The

right Art is that alone, which creates the highest enjoyment.'"

2n

Empedocles provides no enjoyment, Arnold contends,

because it presents a situation "in which the suffering finds
no vent in action"; this is, of course, a statement similar to
that embodied by Coleridge in "Dejection," where he depicts
a mood in which grief finds no natural emotional outlet.
The concept of Joy continues to play an important role in
Arnold's poems through the 1867 edition, for Arnold examines
almost all of the conventional sources of Joy, and rejects
most of them.

20

Childhood, love, nature, religion— none of

‘''Matthew Arnold, Poetry and Criticism of Matthew
Arnold, ed. A. Dwight Culler (Boston, 1961), p. 204.
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these offer

the Joy which is essential to life.

In "To a Gipsy Child by the Sea-Shore," Arnold presents
the stoical sorrow of a child, unlike the child of
Wordsworth's "Intimations Ode," for "superfluity of joy"
does not remove from this child's heart its instinctive
knowledge of the inevitable pain and sorrow of life.

In

"Resignation," Arnold determines that the "general life"
of man has as its secret "not joy, but peace,"

This idea

is repeated in "Dover Beach," where the narrator sees in
the world of reality "neither joy, nor love, nor light."
Marguerite becomes an embodiment of Joy in "Parting," for
her smile tells of "the unconquer'd joy in which her spirit
dwells."

But Arnold, in "A Farewell," cannot accept "the

thousand sweet,still joys of such /
earthly life."

As hand in hand face

The love which might bring Joy is impossible

to the poet imprisoned within his own personality.

Indeed,

in "Human Life," Arnold implies that the joys of life must
be consciously repudiated by the artist, for he says that
as "we stream across the sea of life by night / The joys
which were not for our use designed" are left behind.
Finally, to cite one last example, Arnold predicts in
"Obermann Once More" that true joy will soon dawn, "one
common wave of thought and joy / Lifting mankind again."
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This must be a joy, Arnold insists, whose "grounds are
true."21
Arnold's chief preoccupation with the idea of Joy is
forecast in a letter to Clough in 1847:

"Shakespeare says

that if imagination would apprehend some joy it comprehends
some bringer of the joy:

and this latter operation which

makes palatable the bitterest or most arbitrary original
apprehensions you seem to me to despise."

22

In a later

letter to Clough, Arnold criticizes Keats and Browning, who
begin, he maintains, with "no clear idea of the world," or
in other words, no "bringer of the joy."

Arnold writes

that "as Browning is a man with a moderate gift passionately
desiring movement and fulness, and obtaining but a confused
multitudinousness, so Keats with a very high gift, is yet
also consumed by this desire:

21

and cannot produce the truly

Ibid., pp. 30, 37, 161, 75, 77, 84, 191. Warren D.
Anderson has attempted to define the Joy described in
"Obermann Once More" by tracing its meaning to Cicero and
Seneca. Anderson writes that "if we turn to the standard
Roman authorities for the Stoic definition of joy— gaudium
as opposed to the agitation that is hilaritas— we find
Cicero saying that joy is experienced 'when the mind is
stirred by reason in a calm and steady manner,' while
Seneca's definition is 'elation of the mind trusting its
good and true possessions'. . . ." Matthew Arnold and The
Classical Tradition (Ann Arbor, 1965), p. 153.
22Ibid., p. 515.

living and moving.

. . ,"23

Arnold praises Wordsworth be

cause he, unlike Browning and Keats, does apprehend the
"bringer of the joy."

In the Preface to his edition of

Wordsworth's poems, Arnold contends that the greatness of
Wordsworth's poetry lies in the "extraordinary power with
which Wordsworth feels the joy offered to us in nature, the
joy offered to us in the simple primary affections and
duties; and because of the extraordinary power with which,
in case after case, he shows us this joy and renders it so
as to make us share i t . " ^

The most important fact of

Wordsworth's power of Joy, according to Arnold, is that it
has a universal source, available to all men.

But Arnold

himself cannot accept the unity of man and the natural world
as the "bringer of the joy."
Arnold continues to explore the idea of Joy as the
force that can overcome the multitudinousness of the nine
teenth century.

His final strategy is an outgrowth of his

2^Ibid., pp. 518-519.
24

Ibid., p. 343. Arnold's emphasis on the Joy-giving
power of Wordsworth's poetry is shared by many of his con
temporaries. For example, John Stuart Mill in his Auto
biography , sees a similar merit in Wordsworth's poetry.
Mill writes that in Wordsworth's poems he "seemed to draw
from a source of inward joy, of sympathetic and imaginative
pleasure, which could be shared in by all human beings. .
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lifelong concern with the possibilities of Christianity as
the basis of a unifying cultural and spiritual experience.
In the Preface to Last Essays on Church and Religion of
1877, Arnold attempts to define his concept of Joy so that
its power will be truly universal.

He stresses the develop

ment of the whole man, the man who possesses both virtue
and virtu.

Joy is identified in this essay with the

Christian spirit of charity, purity, and self-renouncement,
three of the great natural truths which Arnold finds in
Christianity.

Christ, according to Arnold, places bliss not

in a future life but
self to others.

in self-renouncement, the giving of

This self-renouncement is

the"eternal

life" and the "joy" of Christ; this is the Joy that Christ
hoped his disciples might share.

In self-renouncement,

Arnold says, there is a "fount of joy," for "self-renounce
ment is joy. . . ."25

Christianity will survive the multi

tudinousness of the nineteenth century, Arnold says, and
it will serve as the

"bringer of the joy," because it is

based in these great natural truths.
Arnold's concern with the idea of Joy, although it is
not always specifically identified as such, is one of the
most frequently commented upon themes in modern criticism.

25Ibid., p. 509.

It is the focal point of Lionel Trilling's critical bio
graphy of Arnold, and it receives much emphasis in A.
Dwight Culler's Imaginative Reason, where Arnold's poetic
world is charted into three distinct regions, in each of
which Joy occupies a prominent position.

Culler's summary

of these regions clarifies the brief survey of Arnold's use
of the Joy motif in his poetry discussed above.

The first

stage is characterized by Culler as being "a period of
joyous energy when one lives in harmony with nature"; the
second and third regions of Arnold's poetic world begin,
Culler says, in "a period of peace in which suffering sub
sides into calm and then grows up into a new joy, a joy of
active service in the world."

Culler explains that Arnold

made truth and universality the conditions of Joy, that
"the Joy of the Romantic poets, and of childhood, and of the
children of the world had some element of illusion about it,
of a divine illusion, which is unsatisfactory to modern
man.

. . .

The faculty through which we are to find this

[recovered joy], according to Arnold, is the 'imaginative
reason.'”26
Now the "imaginative reason," as Culler demonstrates
is Arnold's term for a synthesis of feeling and intellect

A. Dwight Culler, Imaginative Reason (New Haven,
1966), pp. 4, 282.

which he felt that modern man must effect if the "confused
multitudinousness," which he associates particularly with
Browning, is to be overcome.

Arnold's concept of the

"imaginative reason" demonstrates the continuity of the
idea of Joy, for Wordsworth places the highest Joy at the
disposal of the "feeling intellect," while Coleridge main
tains that the experience of Joy results when emotion and
intellect are held in equipoise.

Furthermore, Arnold's

emphasis upon the association of purity with the concept of
Joy is also a development of the idea of Joy as it is
described by Coleridge in "Dejection" and by Wordsworth in
The Prelude.
Leon Gottfried has pointed out that there are two
apparent ironies in Arnold's position toward the idea of
Joy as it is summarized above.

In the first place,

Gottfried writes that though his loss of religious faith
separated Arnold from the more traditional sources of Joy,
he bases hope for recovered Joy upon the "great critical
effort of European thought," the very effort which had
occasioned his original loss.

Gottfried also notes, in

the second place, that Arnold was unable "to see beyond the
power of joy to the power of Vision which Wordsworth some
times attained."

Gottfried defends Arnold's position on

this second point, noting that "Arnold seemed to feel that
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Wordsworth's visionary powers were less, not more signifi
cant than his power of joy, for the former was unique and
idiosyncratic, while the latter was based on universal
emotion and was universally accessible."

27

The Romantic

idea of Joy, however, cannot be sundered in this way, for
Joy is more than "universal emotion."

The visionary power

cannot be separated from the power of Joy, as the references
to Coleridge and to Wordsworth's Preface of 1800 make clear.
Indeed, Wordsworth says that the visionary power arises in
the sympathetic Joy of the poet and that the experience of
Joy is, therefore, a kind of power.

Arnold recognizes this

aspect of the idea of Joy, but he attempts to place the
source of its power in the permanent and enduring spiritual
truths of Christianity.

The power of partial Joy is avail

able to the cultured and fully developed man, the man who
sees life "steadily" and "whole."
Like Matthew Arnold, W. B. Yeats also evidences a
concern with unity of being as an aspect of the idea of
Joy, but his concept of Joy resembles Browning's more than
it does that of Arnold.

Ezra Pound shared his "rediscovery"

of Browning with Yeats.

Yeats writes in his Autobiography
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Leon Gottfried, Matthew Arnold and the Romantics
(London, 1963), pp. 17, 60.
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that he came to view Browning as a "dangerous influence";
however, despite this disavowal, he is the modern poet who
most clearly embodies the idea of Joy which Browning trans
mitted and transmuted from the earlier Romantic tradition.
Yeats, as has been noted briefly earlier in this chapter,
echoes Coleridge in his belief that Joy manifests itself
in a kind of equilibrium, but he characteristically adds to
the condition of equilibrium its converse.

He writes that

"we are happy when for everything inside us there is an
equivalent something outside us.
said this.

I think it was Goethe

One should add the converse.

It is terrible to

desire and not possess, and terrible to possess and not
desire."

28

mic value.

Yeats maintains, therefore, that Joy is a dyna
He writes that "Joy is of the will which labours,

which overcomes obstacles, which knows triumph."29

Further

more, Yeats considers Joy to be the central emotional ex
perience of tragedy and of life itself.

In an essay on the

plays of John M. Synge, he writes:
There is in the creative joy an acceptance of
what life brings because we have understood the
beauty of what it brings, or a hatred of death

28

The Letters of W. B. Yeats, ed. Allen Wade (London,
1954), p. 810.
29

W. B. Yeats, The Autobiography of William Butler
Yeats (New York, 1963), p. 319.
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for what it takes away, which arouses within
us, through some sympathy perhaps with other
men, an energy so noble, so powerful, that
we laugh aloud and mock in the terror or
sweetness of our exaltation, at death and
oblivion.
Yeat's brief definition of creative joy encompasses in Joy
equilibrium, universality, brotherhood, energy, and power,
most of the associations of the concept which have been
traced thus far through the nineteenth century.
Yeats calls the joyous acceptance of the contradictions
and imperfections of the human condition "tragic joy."

B.

L. Reid, in his study of the Yeatsian concept of tragedy,
notes that only in man's acceptance of life as tragedy did
Yeats feel that "tragic joy" could be achieved.

Reid be

lieves that Yeats best expresses the conditions of his
concept of Joy in the last stanza of a late poem, "A
Dialogue of Self and Soul":
I am content to follow to its source
Every event in action or in thought;
Measure the lot; forgive myself the lot!
When such as I cast out remorse
So great a sweetness flows into the breast
We must laugh and we must sing,
We are blest by everything
Everything we look upon is blest. (11. 65-72)
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Quoted in B. L. Reid, William Butler Yeats: The Lyric
of Tragedy (Norman, 1961), p. 90.
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Reid points out the "rather precise echo" of Browning's
poem, "Andrea del Sarto," in the opening lines of this
passage,

31

but the equally precise echo of Wordsworth's

"Ode: Intimations of Immortality" in the closing lines of
Yeats's poem indicates in capsule form the major line of
the development of the idea of Joy from Wordsworth to
Browning to Yeats.
Browning's poetry shows a concern with the concept of
Joy as intense as that of Wordsworth or Arnold or Yeats,
but though his poetic themes have been well delineated by
critics and scholars, polemicists and apologists, their
relation to the tradition of Joy has not been explored.
Browning, like the earlier Romantics, sees Joy as both an
instrumental and expressive value.

Joy is at once the

source and the result of the

"infinite moment," for in

this crucial instant of time

when two disparate realmsare

fused, all barriers between the self and the other are
lowered, and a brief equipoise of intellect and
attained.

The experience of

feeling is

Joy is the impetus to the

constant struggle of human life which Browning envisions
extending into eternity, and the resulting Joy is an im
portant proof

human love is truly a source of

31Ibid., p. 206.

redemption from isolation within the individual personality.
Browning maintains that one of the chief values of poetry
is its demonstration of the worth of the tangible world,
the "wild joys of living," as David says in "Saul."

One of

Browning's chief poetic preoccupations is the characteri
zation of men and women who have failed or succeeded in
maintaining an idea of Joy, and one of the important motifs
of his poetry is the importance of the concept of Joy as an
aspect of the artist's creative energy.
The following chapters will demonstrate that his con
cept of Joy as a dynamic value places Robert Browning firmly
within the Wordsworthian tradition.

Like Wordsworth,

Browning sees the idea of Joy as a developing value, both
a means and an end, part and parcel of becoming, and subject
to the larger claims of reason and of love.

Browning's

characteristic uae of the grotesque and his concern with all
varieties and types of human personality are intricately
related to the traditional Romantic equation of Joy with
energy and with universality, an equation that is pervasive
in modern poetry and drama.

CHAPTER II

WORDSWORTHIAN JOY:
THE CONCEPT OP JOY IN THE PRELUDE

Continuity is difficult to trace in an era so near
our own, especially the continuity of an idea that no
longer seems particularly revolutionary.

The Joy motif

defined here has its most important expression in The
Prelude, and it is to this poem that we must turn if
Browning's contribution to the Romantic tradition of Joy
is to be fully explored.
Joy is a consistent concept in Wordsworth's poetry,
occurring almost fifty times at the most crucial points
in The Prelude alone.^

The poet's reiteration of the

word, and his insistence that Joy is "a never-failing
principle," indicate its importance for the complete

Lane Cooper et al., A Concordance to the Poems of
Wordsworth (London, 1911), p. 632. Word~counts alone“are
an unsatisfactory index of a poet's use of a concept. With
this in mind and for what it is worth, the word Joy, ac
cording to my count, occurs forty-five times in The Prelude.
This count does not include the forms enjoyment, enjoy,
jocund, rejoicing, rejoice, joyous, joyance, etc., which
are also numerous.
41
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comprehension of the philosophy of man and nature which
is unfolded as the reader follows the growth of the poet's
mind through the fourteen books of the poem.

The Prelude

is the locus classicus of the idea of Joy, and Wordsworth's
concept of Joy contains almost all of the associations which
the idea assimilated as the century advanced.
Matthew Arnold's recognition of Joy's central impor
tance in Wordsworth's poetry has been discussed in the last
chapter, and Wordsworth's use of the idea of Joy has been
often noted by critics since Arnold, without, however, any
real demonstration of its meaning and importance.

James

Benziger, for example, writes that "one can, in fact, read
a dozen individual poems and find Wordsworth everywhere
summoning man to joy:

at times joy seems his favorite

word and himself joy's greatest celebrant.

But one may

read as many other poems and find Wordsworth's mind gripped
by those facts which make joy most difficult."

2

And

Frederick A. Pottle has pointed out the power of Wordsworth's
iteration of the concept of Joy.

Pottle writes that "of

course it is the figures that convey the emotion.

No one

can make us joyful merely by using the word 'joy' or any of

2

p. 61.

James Benziger, Images of Eternity (Carbondale, 1962) ,
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its synonyms.

But there is impressive agreement among

readers of all periods that by giving a simple figure, re
inforcing it by certain devices of varied iteration, and
explicitly interpreting it, Wordsworth does evoke the
emotion of joy."

3

George Wilbur Meyer, more than any other Wordsworthian
since Matthew Arnold, has emphasized what he terms the
poet's "Philosophy of Joy."

In "The Rainbow," for example,

Meyer finds the most succinct expression of this Philosophy
of Joy.

He writes that the "subject here is the indestruc

tible continuity of human life.

All the stages of our

growth and history are joined to the other by the unifying
joy we feel in our reaction to external nature, in this
poem represented by the rainbow."4

Investigations of

Wordsworth's vocabulary, however, have not been concerned
with the meaning of his concept of Joy.

Ellen Leyburn's

study of recurrent words in The Prelude includes earth,
substantial, being, object, sense (also discussed by William
Empson in The Structure of Complex Words), form, image,
presence, intercourse, and power.

Miss Leyburn recognizes

^Frederick A. Pottle# "The Eye and The Object," in
Wordsworth: Centenary Studies Presented at Cornell and
Princeton Universities, ed. Gilbert T. Dunklin (Princeton,
1951) , p. 31.
4George Wilbur Meyer, "'Resolution and Independence':
Wordsworth's Answer to Coleridge's 'Dejection,'" TSE, II
(1950), 54.
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the importance of Wordsworth's deceptively simple diction.
She argues that "the symbol and the essence symbolized are
both present in the word.

. . .

The double intent of the

diction again reveals Wordsworth's view of God and nature:
nature as actuality and in her sensuous forms the means of
communication between God and man."

5

Joy, however, is not

included in her discussion, nor does it receive attention
in Josephine Miles'sWordsworth and the Vocabulary of Emotion.
An examination of Wordsworth's concept of Joy in The Prelude
is thus in order.
Wordsworth proposed to draw his poetic vocabulary from
a selection of the real language of men; this theory of
poetic diction presents a problem to the reader, however,
precisely because words such as Joy are quite commonplace.
Hugh Sykes Davies has noted the careful attention which must
be paid Wordsworth's diction.

Davies writes that "few of his

words draw any attention to themselves, but many of them
deserve and require close attention nevertheless, indeed
much the more because their superficial easiness fails to
give warning of their full f o r c e . P e r c e p t i v e readers of

5
Ellen D. Leyburn, "Recurrent Words in The Prelude,"
E LH, XIV (1949), 295.

g

Hugh Sykes Davies, "Wordsworth and the Empirical Philo
sophers ," in The English Mind: Studies in the English
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Wordsworth have long realized this fact.

Robert Southey,

for example, wrote to Coleridge in 1802, asking him of
Wordsworth,

"Does he not associate more feeling with parti

cular phrases, and you also with him, than those phrases
can convey to any one else?

This, I suspect."

Coleridge

replied that "Wordsworth's words always mean the whole of
their possible meaning."

7

In The Prelude, Joy's possible meanings are complex
and manifold, for Wordsworth formulates a scale of defini
tion which ranges from an ingenuous Joy to a subtler,
recondite Joy which links the human soul to nature and to
the Divine in a kind of mystic exultation; "lively jdY,"
of course, is a common synonym for exultation.

Wordsworth

associates the concept of Joy with energy, with power, with
unity, and with purity.

Joy is a universal and permanent

power of the human soul; Joy, indeed, constitutes the es
sential dignity of the human being, since it is the noblest
expression of the creative spirit of the imaginative power
of man.

In the "Prospectus" to The Recluse, Wordsworth says

Moralists Presented to Basil Willey, eds. Hugh Sykes Davies
and George Watson (Cambridge, 1964), p. 153.
7
Quoted in Josephine Miles, Wordsworth and the Vocabu
lary of Emotion (Berkeley, 1944), p. 70.
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that intent thoughts which elevate the mind take their ori
gin in emotion, but emotions such as Joy come from either
"outward circumstance," or perhaps from the autonomous move
ment of the human soul within itself, through "an impulse
to herself."

Despite the ambiguous nature of their origin,

these emotions will be the chief themes of his poetry:
Of Truth, of Grandeur, Beauty, Love, and Hope,
And melancholy Fear subdued by Faith;
Of blessed consolations in distress;
Of moral strength, and intellectual Power;
Of joy in widest commonalty spread. (11. 14-18)
Wordsworth's emphasis on "widest commonalty" as the realm
of Joy indicates the egalitarian nature of his idea of Joy,
and it also indicates the temper of the revolutionary milieu
in which he moved.
Wordsworth identifies one facet of his idea of Joy with
the intense pleasures of boyhood and early manhood.

In Book

One of The Prelude, he writes of the "vulgar joy" of the
child's activities:
Thus oft amid those fits of vulgar joy
Which, through all seasons, on a child's pursuits
Are prompt attendants, 'mid that giddy bliss
Which, like a tempest, works along the blood.®

8

William Wordsworth, The Prelude, ed. Ernest de Selinsourt. Second edition revised by Helen Darbishire (Oxford,
1959), Book I, 11. 581-584. All subsequent references to
this edition will be included in the text and will be to
the 1850 version of The Prelude, unless the 1805 version
is specified for purposes of comparison.

These "fits of vulgar joy" attend the ordinary pursuits
of a boyhood spent in a rural environment— the hunting
of birds, ice-skating, running through piles of autumn
leaves, picnicking in the midst of sunlit trees, or
imitating the call of birds.

They are the result of the

twofold function of nature which inspires in the child
both a sense of awesome beauty and a sense of mysterious
fear.

This early Joy is most often unreflective and

thoughtless; the mere sight of the sun or the moon, for
example, gives rise to the ingenuous Joy described in
Book Two:
In many a thoughtless hour, when, from excess
Of happiness, my blood appeared to flow
For its own pleasure, and I breathed with joy.
188)

(II, 186-

Wordsworth's careful differentiation of "pleasure," "happi
ness," and "joy" in this short passage indicates that the
concept of Joy partakes of both, yet finally transcends both.
The first experience of Joy is usually the result of physi
cal activity.

It is described, for instance, as resulting

in "a wantonness of heart" when Wordsworth and his friends
travel home from school on horseback,

"a joyous band . . .

We beat with thundering hoofs the level sand"

(X, 600-604) .

It is also the sentimental emotion felt by the boy as he
visits the old woman with whom he had lived while attending
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day school.
Furthermore, the thoughtless Joy of youth is lodged
deep within the memory:
— And if the vulgar joy by its own weight
Wearied itself out of the memory,
The scenes which were a witness of that joy
Remained in their substantial lineaments. (I, 597-600)
The supposedly forgotten Joys become indissolubly linked
to the scenes which inspire them, and Joy thus provides the
human being with a permanent source of imaginative sympathy.
Joy is, therefore, an integral part of the "spots of time"
theory which Wordsworth advances in Book Twelve of the poem.
The experience of Joy makes poetic creation possible, for
it is these "spots of time," or, as Wordsworth says in The
Excursion, the "spiritual power of absent things," which
are the sources of poetic creation.

Wordsworth asserts in

the "Ode: Intimations of Immortality" that not "all that is
at enmity with joy" can abolish these first affections of
the soul.
But Wordsworth also associates the early experience of
Joy with intellectual activity, especially with the reading
of imaginative literature such as The Canterbury Tales, The
Arabian Nights, or Don Quixote, three works which are singled
out for special praise because they enable the reader to
forget self and to exist imaginatively in more universal
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experience.

These three are among the "golden store of

books" described in Book Five:
And when thereafter to my father's house
The holidays returned me, there to find
That golden store of books which I had left,
What joy was mine!
(V, 477-480) ^
Wordsworth contends that physical Joy cooperates with
intellectual Joy.

The boy reared in a strenuous natural

environment for example, is more amenable to the Joy of
poetry:
Is stirred to ecstasy, as others are,
By glittering verse; but further, doth receive,
In measure only dealt out to himself,
Knowledge and increase of enduring joy
From the great Nature that exists in works
Of mighty Poets.
(V, 590-595)
This particular coupling of knowledge and Joy is a late
addition, for in the 1805 version of the poem, Wordsworth
says that such an environment enables the youth to receive
"enduring touches of great joy" (V, 617); this becomes, in
the passage cited above, "Knowledge and increase of enduring
joy."

That Wordsworth regards intellect and Joy as co

operative powers is seen, however, not only in this particular

q

In the 1805 version of the poem, Wordsworth describes
the books "open to my enjoyment," concluding, "What heart
was mine." The use of "joy" for "heart" in the final manu
script is a result of the general poetic tightening-up which
he effects in his revisions, but it also demonstrates the
sense of heart-felt sympathy which the power of Joy provides
the developing mind.

revision but also in an earlier passage in the same book,
a passage which remains the same in both versions of the
poem:

"Be these the daily strengtheners of their minds /

May books and Nature be their early joyi"

(V, 422-423).

Wordsworth thus stresses the enduring qualities of the
early Joy found through nature and through the pursuit of
imaginative literature, but he also describes, in the
nationalistic tones reminiscent of Schiller's "Ode to Joy,"
the intense Joy which arises from his love of England.

He

depicts the political and sociological fabric of the years
of his early manhood in terms of Joy:
But Europe at that time was thrilled with joy,
France standing on the top of golden hours,
And human nature seeming born again.
(VI, 339-341)
Patriotic Joy is rooted in his love of liberty and in his
recognition of the equality and brotherhood of men.

The

French people, for example, throw open their hearts to
receive the young Wordsworth and his companion, Robert Jones
Like bees they swarmed, gaudy and gay as bees;
Some vapoured in the unruliness of joy,
And with their swords flourished as if to fight
The saucy air.
(VI, 391-394)
Wordsworth describes the universal quality of the Joy which

^®In the 1805 version, "But twas a time when Europe
was rejoiced." The revision to "thrilled with joy" is,
again, a more emphatic statement of the idea of Joy.

he saw reflected in the faces around him at Calais:
bright a face is worn when joy of one /
of millions"

(VI, 348-349).

"How

Is joy for tens

To have been alive and young

in the midst of these early and hopeful days of the French
Revolution was "bliss" and "very Heaven," and Wordsworth
admonishes the present statesmen whose foreign policy tends
to the denial of the intense power of Joy in national pride
and in liberty, those politicians who tear "From the best
youth in England their dear pride /

Their joy, in

England. . ." (X, 302-303).
This nationalistic aspect of Wordsworth's idea of Joy
stems partly from his disappointment in the course of the
French Revolution.
as follows:

Coleridge had written to him in 1799

"I wish you would write a poem, in blank verse,

addressed to those, who, in consequence of the complete
failure of the French Revolution have thrown up all hopes
of the amelioration of mankind, and are sinking into an
almost epicurean selfishness, disguising the same under the
soft titles of domestic attachments.

. . .1,11

The trans

cendent power of Joy, not the power of political ideals, is
thus utilized by Wordsworth in The Prelude, as it had been

11Quoted in de Selincourt, p. 526.

52
used by the Revolutionary philosophers in its connotation
of "pleasure," to indicate the true dignity, worth, and
hope for the amelioration of the common man.
The early Joys, whose sources are childhood play,
nature, books, or patriotic pride, are necessary components
in the growth of a sensitive mind, but they are only contri
butory to a higher, more spiritual Joy which comes with
increasing experience.

In Book Eleven, Wordsworth breaks

once more into his narrative to address Coleridge directly,
wishing for his friend such communion with natural objects
as will be "sanative," providing for Coleridge "a ladder
for [his] spirit to reascend /
contentedness."

To health and joy and pure

This ladder is the same psychological scale

as that described indirectly in "Tintern Abbey."

It is an

analogue of the scala amoris of Platonic thought in that
both the ladder of Joy and the scale of love posit as their
ultimate objective a mystic and intimate union with Divine
Love, union transcending the artificial limits of time and
space.
In the first book of the poem, Wordsworth describes
the joy of youth, but points out that he will also reveal
"How other pleasures have been mine, and joys/
origin. . ." (I, 557-558).

Of subtler

Youthful exultation in nature's

beauty is thought to be excessive by those persons who do
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not understand its ministering quality:
Some called it madness— so indeed it was;
If child-like fruitfulness in passing joy,
If steady moods of thoughtfulness matured
To inspiration, sort with such a name. (Ill, 149-152)
"Passing joy" is fruitful because it leads to "thoughtful
ness matured" and finally to "inspiration," the steps up
the ladder of Joy which Wordsworth hopes that Coleridge
can also reascend.

Even simple walks through the lakeland

hills are "richly laden with good" and are remembered
"with thanks /

And gratitude, and perfect joy of heart..."

(IV, 133-135).

In Book Three, Wordsworth notes the "just

gradation" which leads to "higher things," a "permanent
possession, better fruits"

(III, 531-532).

Another Joy of "subtler origin" is that resulting from
the spirit of brotherhood, from the love of man as man.
For example, Wordsworth describes Michel Beaupuy as exist
ing in a veritable atmosphere of Joy:
A kind of radiant joy
Diffused around him, while he was intent
On works of love or freedom, or revolved
Complacently the progress of a cause.
(IX, 315-318)
Even when disillusioned by the bloody course which the
French Revolution took in the hands of the Terrorists,
Wordsworth is inspired by the individual excellence of men
like Beaupuy:
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So that disastrous period did not want
Bright sprinklings of all human excellence,
To which the silver wands of saints in Heaven,
Might point with rapturous joy.
(X, 483-486)
Joy in individual achievement indicates that universal
progress is still a possibility, and Wordsworth advances
the power of Joy as its means.
The power of Joy receives its more universal impetus
from nature.

Other Joys pass with youth, enduring in the

scenes to which they are linked in memory, but the love of
nature for itself is the step which leads to love of man
and then to the permanent union of the individual soul with
the spirit that permeates nature.

At this point in his

development, Wordsworth describes his attitude as follows:
Nature herself was, at this unripe time,
But secondary to my own pursuits
And animal activities, and all
Their trivial pleasures; and when these had drooped
And gradually expired, and Nature, prized
For her own sake, became my joy. (VIII, 342-347)
Nature, until the poet's twenty-second year, is a "passion,"
a "rapture," and an "immediate love" (in the 1805 manuscript,
an "immediate joy").
Joy in nature leads the poet to Joy in individual man.
Wordsworth credits his sister, Dorothy, with this aspect of
his development; his walks with her are described in terms
of joyousness:
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Between these sundry wanderings with a joy
Above all joys, that seemed another morn
Risen on mid noon; blest with the presence, Friend,
Of that sole Sister. . . . (VI, 196-199)
As a result of his wanderings with Dorothy, the poet begins
to see the dignity inherent in all men, even the humblest.
He is intrigued with the integrity of the men of the Lake
land farms, of shepherds, and of day laborers, all of whom
are in unconscious union with nature:

"Theirs is the

language of the heavens, the power / The thought, the image,
and the silent joys"

(XIII, 271-272).

Exultation of spirit,

joyousness, gladness, delight— these emotions come to man
through the cultivation of his response to nature,, emotions
refined and purified by experience.
In The Prelude, furthermore, the concept of Joy has
an association that is firmly rooted within the tradition
of Christian meditation.

Louis L. Martz, in his study of

the meditative style in seventeenth-century English poetry,
uses the words of Gerard Manley Hopkins to define the
meditative style:
Meditative style, then, is "current language
heightened," (G. M. Hopkins, Letters to Bridges,
p. 89] molded, to express the unique being of
an individual who has learned, by intense
mental discipline, to live his life in the
presence of divinity.
It is not only the
style of Donne, Herbert, Vaughan, Crashaw,
or Marvell:
it may also be found in Robert
Southwell, Edward Taylor, Blake, Wordsworth,
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Hopkins, Emily Dickinson, the later Yeats,
and the later Eliot.
Martz's definition contains several important ideas especi
ally pertinent to the idea of Joy in The Prelude.

In the

first place, Hopkins' definition of meditative style as
"current language heightened" is analogous to the then
revolutionary concept of the "real language of men" advo
cated by Wordsworth in his Preface of 1800.

Furthermore,

Wordsworth's purpose in The Prelude is to describe the
"growth of a poet's mind"— the manner in which the poet
has disciplined himself to the recognition of the essential
unity of man and the cosmos, or, as he says in Book Fourteen
of the poem, a history of "the discipline / And consummation
of a Poet's mind"

(XIV, 303-304).

The "presence of divinity,"

which Martz contends is the realm of the meditative poem,
is, for Wordsworth, the realm of nature.
Wordsworth shows that a joyous, sensory appreciation
■»

of nature leads man to the apprehension of the divine.

Now

techniques of Christian meditation have traditionally stressed
the importance of the five sense for fruitful religious
contemplation, contemplation that results in a new and
joyful apprehension of a revealed truth.

St. Ignatius

*2Louis L. Martz, The Poetry of Meditation (New Haven,
1954), p. 342.
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Loyola's Spiritual Exercises is perhaps the best known work,
largely because of its effect on the poetry of Hopkins, but
Martz describes still another book more analogous to the
kind of meditation found in The Prelude.

This is Richard

Baxter's The Saints Everlasting Rest (1650).

Baxter at

tempts to present in this book a style of meditation
acceptable to Protestants, but based in the meditative
practices of traditional Christianity.

The Saints Everlast

ing Rest was immensely popular and became a standard work
which greatly influenced preachers and writers, especially
those of Puritan persuasion, such as the American poet,
Edward Taylor.

Baxter's system of meditation results in

the virtue of Joy, and The Prelude encompasses a similar
kind of meditation leading to a similar result.
Consider, for example, the following exhortation to
the practice of meditation by Baxter in The Saints
Everlasting Rest;

"Sirs, if you have never tried this art,

nor lived this life of heavenly contemplation, I never
wonder that you walk uncomfortably, that you are complaining,
and live in sorrows, and know not what the Joy of the Saints
means."

13

Compare to this statement Wordsworth's many

13Ibid., p. 153.
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expressed desires that Coleridge will be able to mount the
scale of Joy; in Book Six, for example, he comments on
Coleridge's delight in natural beauty:
Speed thee well! divide
With us thy pleasure; thy returning strength
Receive it daily as a joy of ours. (VI, 247-249)
Again, in Book Eleven, cited earlier in this chapter,
Wordsworth expresses hopes for Coleridge's complete restor
ation through nature:
Thine be such converse strong and sanative,
A ladder for thy spirit to reascend
To health and joy and pure contentedness. (XI, 396-398)
After hearing Wordsworth read The Prelude in 1807, Coleridge
expressed his reaction in "To William Wordsworth," and he
concluded the poem with this line, "And when I rose, I
found myself in prayer"

(1. 112) , an indication of his

recognition of the meditative

nature of The Prelude,whose

"poetic thought" he describes

as being,

"industrious in its

joy" (1. 22).
In the traditional method of Christian meditation,
sense experience was believed to be a necessary avenue for
faith.

Baxter, for example, writes that "Faith is imperfect,

for we are renewed but in part; but sense hath its strength
according to the strength of the flesh."!4

*4Ibid., p. 171.

Wordsworth, too,
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shows that strength comes to man through sensuous appre
hension; he describes the source of a sublime Joy in Book
Two as follows;
From manifold distinctions, difference
Perceived in things, where, to the unwatchful eye,
No difference is, and hence, from the same source,
Sublimer joy. . . . (II, 299-302)
In the last book of the poem, the poet commends the power
of the fields "in balmy spring-time full of rising flowers /
And joyous creatures."

The man who has been reared in such

an environment of sensuous beauty possesses the fundamental
wellspring of Joy:
But joy to him,
Oh, joy to him who here hath sown, hath laid
Here, the foundation of his future years I (XIV, 218-220)
Wordsworth, however, alters a very important aspect
of the traditional Christian concept of Joy.

Baxter, for

example, writes that "the object of Faith is far off; we
must go as far as Heaven for our Joyes:
sense is close at H a n d . " ^

But the object of

Baxter opposes an eternal Joy

against the transitory present in order to emphasize the
power of everyday things as a means of religious meditation.
Wordsworth, however, insists that Joy can be had by all men,
here and now, through the agency of the imagination which

15Ibid., p. 171.

re-creates the transitory Joy of sensory perception.

The

experience of Joy is not deferred entirely to the hereafter.
Wordsworth refers to himself as a "Pilgrim resolute"
in Book One of the poem:
To the open fields I told
A prophecy: poetic numbers came
Spontaneously to clothe in priestly robe
A renovated spirit singled out. (I, 50-53)
Again, in the final book of the poem, he prays that he and
Coleridge might be "Prophets of Nature."

Pilgrim, Priest,

and Prophet— Wordsworth's emphasis on these sacramental
functions of the poet places The Prelude firmly within that
class of Christian spiritual quests for a kind of moral
adequacy which John Holloway had described as a "Protestant
kind of character building:

nature makes man serious,

steadfast, thoughtful, plain-living, high-minded.

Another

continuity with the antecedent Christian tradition shows in
Wordsworth's firm insistence on the primacy, over and above
the poet's feeling for nature, of man himself.
as is now recognized, is no nature poet."

16

Wordsworth,

But it is also

recognized that although Wordsworth is "no nature poet," he
is nevertheless the poet of man and nature, for the

16John Holloway, "English and Some Christian Traditions,
in The English Mind, p. 290.
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consciousness of the unity with nature is the initial step
which leads to the perception of the unity of men.
God is specifically invoked in the sixth book of the
poem as "the giver of all joy"; but God's perfect Joy comes
to man primarily through nature.

Wordsworth begins Book

Thirteen with the following explanation:
From Nature doth emotion come, and moods
Of calmness equally are Nature's gift;
This is her glory; these two attributes
Are sister horns that constitute her strength.
(XIII, 1-4)
The "emotion" of line one of this passage is probably Joy,
for throughout the poem, calm is counterpoised against
Joy as the second of nature's two chief gifts, as "emotion"
is poised against "calmness" here.

The "joyous murmur"

of the Derwent River described in Book One, for example,
is "a foretaste, a dim earnest, of the calm / That Nature
breathes among the hills and groves"

(I, 280-281).

Nature,

through the twofold ministry of the emotion of joy and the
emotion of fear, mysteriously contributes to the "calm
existence"

of the mature poet.

Thus nature brings the "joys

of subtler origin" which lead to the

perception

of unity:

An intellectual charm; that calm delight
Which, if I err not, surely must belong
To those first-born affinities that fit
Our new existence to existing things.
And, in our dawn of being, constitute
The bond of union between life and joy. (I, 553-558)
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Joy partakes of calm, as awe partakes of fear, and this
combination leads to the culmination of growth described
in Book Fourteen of the poem, the culmination which is
also the goal of Christian meditation, for the power of
Joy deepens as experience and knowledge increase:
And so the deep enthusiastic joy,
The rapture of the hallelujah sent
From all that breathes and is, was chastened, stemmed
And balanced by pathetic truth, by trust
In hopeful reason, leaning on the stay
Of Providence; and in reverence for duty. (XIV, 293-298)
The idea of Joy is balanced by man's reason and by his trust
in higher law.
The Prelude is a quest for permanence as well as a
quest for moral adequacy.

In Book Three, Wordsworth says

that even as a student at Cambridge he had looked for
"universal things."

Wordsworth discloses the discovery of

a permanent source of Joy, a source both highly individual
and universal.

The poet records the scale of contemplation

which leads to a permanent union between life and Joy, a
union for the "uneasy heart" of men, a "never-failing
principle":
Ye mountains1 thine, 0 Nature! Thou hast fed
My lofty speculations; and in thee.
For this uneasy heart of ours, I find
A never-failing principle of joy
And purest passion.
(II, 447-451)
At the opening of the poem, a breeze fans the poet's cheek,
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a breeze which is "half-conscious of the joy it brings."
In the last book of the poem, an opposite situation is
described, a mountain climb on a "breezeless summer night."
As the moon flashes out from behind some murky clouds,
the poet is made aware of yet another rung of the scale
of Joy, a step open, however, only to those endowed with
special gifts.

This vision of Mount Snowden becomes

"the emblem of a mind / That feeds upon infinity':
A mind sustained
By recognitions of transcendent power.
In sense conducting to ideal form,
In soul of more than mortal privilege.

(XIV, 74-77)

This "soul of more than mortal privilege" is marked by the
power of imagination, by the "feeling intellect":
And he whose soul hath risen
Up to the height of feeling intellect
Shall want no humbler tenderness.
(XIV, 225-227)
This power of "feeling intellect" is the highest rung of
the ladder of Joy, available only to the man whose imagin
ative consciousness envelops all the lesser stages of human
Joy.

This faculty is the special attribute of the poet.
The theme of Joy in The Prelude moves along a scale

from the vivid emotions of unthinking pleasure in early
youth, to the Joy rising from the intellectual apprehension
of the unity of man and nature, to a final joyful sense of
thanksgiving.

The poet finds in nature a source of value
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which leads to a transcendent Joy, a source thus universal
and permanent, but available in its ultimate power only to
the "feeling intellect," the possession of the man of
creative imagination.

To the man who possesses this

faculty, all creation seems to be suffused in an ambient
Joy.

The imaginative power, fed by Joy and calm, joins

life and Joy into a final mystic state of beatitude:
Wonder not
If High the transport, great the joy I felt,
Communing in this sort through earth and heaven
With every form of creature, as it looked
Towards the Uncreated with a countenance
Of adoration, with an eye of love.
One song they sang, and it was audible.
Most audible, then, when the fleshly ear,
O'ercome by humblest prelude of that strain,
Forgot her functions, and slept undisturbed. (II, 409418)
This experience of the unity of life and Joy is consistent
in Wordsworth's poetry.

In the "Ode: Intimations of Im

mortality," the shepherd boy who exists in perfect harmony
with the May morning is called a "Child of Joy," and the
poet insists that the years that bring the calmness of the
"philosophic mind" do not destroy the essential beatitude,
the "perpetual benediction," of the early experience of Joy.
The continuity of his thought is also demonstrated by the
following lines from "Tintern Abbey," where Joy and calm
are said to yield the power of the perception of unity:

65
We are laid asleep
In body and become a living soul:
While with an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy
We see into the life of things.
{11. 46-50)
In The Excursion, the poet is struck by the sight of the
rising sun and describes a feeling in which his "spirit
was entranced / With joy exalted to beatitude"

(IV, 118-19).

Thus The Prelude is, in large part, Wordsworth's fullest
exploration of his lifelong concern with the ascent of the
ladder of Joy, the scale described by Coleridge in The
Philosophical Lectures as culminating in the perfect peace
of God.
Besides constituting a psychological and spiritual
ladder for the individual soul, Joy is identified as the
power which,unifies man with nature and man with man.
Schiller and Coleridge also stress this unifying function
of the idea of Joy.

Wordsworth attributes the greatest Joy

expressed in the 1805 manuscript of The Prelude to his
seventeenth year, when, from the experience of the sympa
thetic social principle of life, or from a kind of
revelation (again, as in The Recluse, the ultimate source
of Joy is relegated to this twofold alternative), he feels
a "bliss ineffable":
joy."

"I saw one life, and felt that it was

The highest Joy is a result of union with other men
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and communion with God.

This experience of the unity of

life, described in Book Eight, has its most powerful mani
festation when Wordsworth lingers among the crowds on
London streets, and feels "union and communion" with all
humanity.

In the 1805 version of the poem, Wordsworth says

that the experience of unity leads to the Joy of selfknowledge :
When strongly breath'd upon
By this sensation, whencesoe'er it comes
Of union or communion doth the soul
Rejoice as in her highest joy:
for there,
There chiefly, hath she feeling whence she is
And passing through all Nature rests with God.
831-836)

(VIII,

The concept of the soul rejoicing "as in her highest joy"
is given even more emphatic expression in the final version
of this passage:
The soul when smitten thus
By a sublime idea, whencesoe'er
Vouchsafed for union or communion, feeds
Oh the pure bliss, and takes her rest with God.
672-675)

(VII,

The union and communion which is manifested in Joy is thus
a "sublime idea."
The experience of Joy leads not only to the perception
of unity within the cosmos, but also to a sense of integrity
within the human soul itself and a sense of identity with
the divinity which pervades all things.

This twofold sense

of the probity of the individual human soul and of generic
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human nature receives its chief expression in Book Eight,
as is seen above, but earlier, in the 1805 version of this
book, Wordsworth explains that he was endowed with a capaious and ample mind which enabled the experiences of nature
and of intellect to exert upon his total consciousness the
following perception:
The Human nature unto which I felt
That I belong'd, and which I lov'd and revernc'd
Was not a punctual Presence, but a Spirit
Living in time and space, and far diffus'd.
In this my joy, in this my dignity
Consisted. . . . (VIII, 761-766)
The Joy of God's presence creates a consciousness of human
dignity which transcends all human compacts, a sense of
integrity and worth at once highly individual and universal.
Like Coleridge in "Dejection," Wordsworth also main
tains that purity of soul is a necessary concomitant for
Joy.

In Book One, for example, the "joys of subtler origin"

are connected with "hallowed and pure motions of the sense,"
and in Book Two, "sublimer joy" results from moments of
vision which are not only "kindred to [the] purer mind,"
but also indicative of the sublime dignity of the soul.

This

purity is the innocence that accepts the complexities of
human experience, content to bear these complexities as
"the burthen of the mystery," but it is also indicative of
the traditional Christian concept of Joy as a virtue related
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to moral purity and innocence.
Joy is also associated in The Prelude, as it is to
be throughout the nineteenth century, with energy and with
power.

In the opening lines of the poem, energy is the

"gift" that consecrates the Joy of leisure time, the
coming liberty, that the poet anticipates.

In Book Five,

after setting up his theory of excellence in education,
Wordsworth makes an even more explicit connection of Joy
with power:
May books and Nature be their early joyI
And knowledge, rightly honoured with that name—
Knowledge not purchased by the loss of powerl
(V, 423425)
The "deep power of joy" must not be enervated by the identi
fication of knowledge with the analytical reason alone.
Furthermore, in Book Two of the poem, Wordsworth carefully
examines the reciprocal nature of the give-and-take between
nature and mind.

The child perceives an active universe

through the impetus of Joy:
For feeling has to him imparted power
That through the growing faculties of sense
Doth like an agent of the one great Mind
Create, creator and receiver both.
(II, 255-258)
In the 1805 manuscript, the growing faculties of sense which
impart this spiritual power are specifically enumerated:
grief, exultation, fear, and joy (II, 271).
In the concluding book of the poem, when Wordsworth
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formulates the effect that Mount Snowden had upon him and
begins his description of the imagination and the "higher
mind," he once again elucidates the contribution Of "the
principle of joy," for the power of love itself largely
results from the power of Joy in beauty:
To fear and love,
To love as prime and chief, for there fear ends,
Be this ascribed; to early intercourse
In presence of sublime or beautiful forms,
With the adverse principles of pain and joy— . (XIV, 162166)
R. D. Havens has discussed Wordsworth's own designation of
The Prelude as a poem which chiefly describes the growth of
power, and in his explanation of "the ministry of fear,"
Havens writes that "fear is an emotion called forth by the
presence or the thought of power.

Even the joy which is

often derived from the contemplation of power partakes (as
most of the keener pleasures have in them ar element of
pain) to some extent of fear."

17

Havens uses the passage

quoted above to reinforce the chief argument of this chapter
of his book, the explanation of Wordsworth's idea of the
contribution of the emotion of fear to the imagination and
the soul of man.

Havens omits in his quotation, however,

Line 163 of this passage, "To love as prime and chief, for

17
p. 47.

R. D. Havens, The Mind of a Poet (Baltimore, 1941),
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there fear ends."

This line would seem to be the real core

of the passage, for Wordsworth specifically says that fear
is obliterated by the power of love.

Furthermore, Joy is

not only "derived from the contemplation of power," as
Havens says, but Joy i£ power, a power identified in this
same passage as partaking of beauty itself.

Like Coleridge,

Wordsworth maintains that Joy has intrinsic expressive
value, but also that Joy is an instrumental value which
leads to the perception of beauty and of love.
Wordsworth's equation of Joy with power can best be
demonstrated through a comparison of the two versions of a
passage in Book Three of the poem.

The 1805 manuscript

reads as follows:
Youth should be aw'd, possess'd, as with a sense
Religious, of what holy joy there is
In knowledge.
(Ill, 395-397)
In the revised manuscript, the idea of Joy is stated more
obliquely:
Youth should be awed, religiously possessed
With a conviction of the power that waits
On knowledge.
(Ill, 390-392)
"Holy joy" is thus revised to "a conviction of power" in
the final version of the poem, indicating Wordsworth's
concept of the symbiotic relationship between Joy and power.
Still another example of this equation is found in Book Two,
where the assertion of the "sublimer joy" found in the
"manifold distinctions" of nature is made possible through
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the "most watchful power of love," through "the visionary
power."

Matthew Arnold's attempt to unite the "sublimer

joy" with "the visionary power" found in the natural truth
of Christianity is a development of this aspect of Words
worth's idea of Joy.
The idea of Joy is identified with the imagination
in Book Six of The Prelude.

In the manuscript of 1805,

Wordsworth says that the imagination reveals to the soul
that its destiny "is with infinitude, and only there."
Possessing this knowledge, the soul can rest content with
no other outward sign of its fate:
That may attest its prowess, blest in thoughts
That are their own perfection and reward
Strong in itself, and the access of joy
Which hides it like the overflowing Nile.
(VI, 545548)
This magnificent image of "the access of joy" flowing
round the soul as the Nile overflows its banks is revised
to "beatitude" in the 1805 manuscript.

In many of his

revisions, Wordsworth gives his poem a more Christian
spirit, and this is an example of that tendency.

The re

vision of "access of joy" to "beatitude," however, is also
another example of the presence of the traditional implica
tions of the idea of Joy, for the Christian concept of Joy
includes a final state of beatitude, as the passages
previously examined in Baxter's The Saints Everlasting Rest
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demonstrate.

Wordsworth's idea of Joy draws upon a cul

tural source that strengthens its power and appeal.
Wordsworth refuses to define the ultimate source of
Joy in The Prelude, other than to maintain that it arises
from union and communion with all things.

In a sonnet

written between 1812 and 1815, "Surprised by Joy," the
poet seems to imply that Joy is a gift or revelation, the
result of what James Joyce calls an epiphany? this is much
the same idea which Coleridge expresses in "Dejection."
Wordsworth's poetry is true to the complexities of the
human condition, and the experience of Joy recorded in The
Prelude cannot be reduced to formula, aesthetic or spiri
tual.

This is the ultimate power of the idea of Joy.

If

all aspects of human experience could be summarized in
convenient equations or in the language of Blue Books, as
many nineteenth-century Positivists thought, the nature of
man itself becomes little more than another problem await
ing final solution.

Wordsworth refuses to accept such a

reading of human life.

Joy's source thus remains deep

within the consciousness, but Wordsworth's uniquely person
al exploration of his own consciousness demonstrates that
dignity of soul, unity, power, energy, and purity accrue
to man through and with the power of Joy.

CHAPTER III

WORDSWORTH, BROWNING, AND "KINDRED JOY":
THE JOY MOTIF IN BROWNING'S POETRY, 1833-1850

Wordsworth says in Book Four of The Excursion that
man who communes with natural forms will be led to find
"kindred joy" in his fellow men:
— Needs must feel
The joy of that pure principle of love
So deeply, that, unsatisfied with aught
Less pure and exquisite, he cannot choose
But seek for objects of a kindred love
In fellow-natures and a kindred joy. (IV, 1212-1217)
Wordsworth uses a phrase in this passage that appeals to
other Romantic poets as well.

Shelley says in The Defence

of Poetry that poetry must "bear news of kindred joy."

The

"kindred joy" of Wordsworth and Shelley is embodied by
Browning in his poetic characters.

The source of Joy moves

from Wordsworth's meditative realm of nature to Browning's
world of men and women, but Browning continues to employ
the essentials of the Romantic idea of Joy.
Browning, together with Tennyson and Arnold, attempted
to avoid the introspection which marked, and, they felt
marred, the poetry of the earlier Romantics.
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The search for

a more objective poetic form stems at least partly from the
fact that The Prelude was not a part of their inheritance
from the earlier tradition, for The Prelude was not pub
lished in its entirety until after Wordsworth's death in
1850, a fact which Morse Peckham has called a tragedy for
the subsequent course of English literature.

Browning,

for example, was thirty-eight years old in 1850 and had
been publishing his poetry since 1833:

the poetry he com

posed from 1833 to 1850 reworks many of the same psycho
logical and emotional problems which Wordsworth explores
in The Prelude without the consummate artistry of Words
worth's poetic introspection.

Tennyson's major poem, In

Memoriam, was published the same year as The Prelude, and
Arnold, who later claims that Wordsworth's true genius lay
in his shorter poems, was, judging from the entries in his
Note-Books, chiefly impressed by the more didactic passages
of The Prelude.

Herbert Lindenberger's analysis of the

Victorian reaction to the poem makes the following summation
The poor reception of The Prelude in 1850 is
rooted in causes more fundamental than its
generic strangeness.
In the half century be
tween its composition and publication England
had passed through political, technological,
and social changes far vaster in scale than
during any comparable period in her history.
...
To an age preparing to demonstrate its
progress and cosmopolitanism at the Great
Exhibition Wordsworth's world must have seemed

quaint and provincial. Yet no review, not even
the Examiner, was willing to recommend it as a
period-piece— it was obviously too introspec
tive to stand next to such vivid reconstructions
as A Tale of Two Cities and The French Revolution.!
Too introspective— this is the heart of the matter,
for it is introspection which plagues Browning in Pauline,
Tennyson in poems like "The Palace of Art," and Arnold in
Empedocles on Etna.

Browning's Pauline is the poem which

elicited John Stuart Mill's

now famous comment that the

author of Pauline is "possessed with a

more intense and

morbid self-consciousness than I ever knew before in any
sane human being."

As William Clyde DeVane points out,

Pauline is Browning's autobiography to his twentieth year,
his Prelude and Sartor Resartus, as the late Parleyings
are a more objective autobiography of his own mind.

Al

though Browning certainly changed the form of his intro
spection, the Wordsworthian

impulse to explore the mind of

man remains dominant in his

concept of poetry.J. Hillis

Miller utilizes a striking phrase in describing Browning's
characteristic poetic method as being "the introspection

^■Herbert Lindenberger, "The Reception of The Prelude,
BNYPL, LXIV (April, 1960), 206.
2

Quoted in William Clyde DeVane, A Browning Handbook
(New York, 1955), p. 46.
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of others."

3

Browning's idea of Joy is clarified if it is ex
plored as it developed within the Wordsworthian-Romantic
tradition, although Browning was probably as much influ
enced by the emphasis on Joy which pervaded the Zeitgeist
as he was by a detailed knowledge of Wordsworth's poetry.
Browning became personally acquainted with Wordsworth when
the latter had assumed the rather aloof stance of the
Laureateship; he attacked Wordsworth's political conser
vatism in "The Lost Leader," an attack which he later
regretted, and he assumed an important position in the
London Wordsworth society in his later years, an uncharac
teristic public act.

For his part, Wordsworth (and his

position is not unique) found Browning's early poetry
obscure; in a rather rare flash of humor, he writes at the
time of the marriage of the Brownings that it is probably
a very good match since both are unintelligible to anyone
else.
Elizabeth Barrett's letters show far more veneration
for the elderly Wordsworth than do Browning's, at least
partly because Wordsworth was a personal friend of her

J. Hillis Miller, The Disappearance of God (Cambridge,
1963), p. 103.

77
cousin, John Kenyon.

Indeed, Elizabeth Barrett singles

out a statement by an obscure Victorian critic named Mr.
Gurney which has been used again and again to contrast
the two poets.

She writes, "I have just been looking at a

preface of some poems by some Mr. Gurney where he speaks of
'the reflective wisdom of Wordsworth and the profound
psychological utterances of a Browning'.

. . .

The

"reflective wisdom" of the Wordsworthian-Romantic tradition
has often been played off against Browning's "psychological
utterances" by critics since Mr. Gurney, but to do so dis
torts not only the genius of both Wordsworth and Browning,
but also the character of English Romanticism as well.
Like Arnold, Ruskin, Mill, George Eliot, and other Victorians,
Browning had to come to terms with the Wordsworthian tradi
tion which dominated his era.

He evolved a poetic theory

that is strikingly similar to that of Wordsworth.

In their

approach to the basic principles of poetic creation, to the
dramatic possibilities of lyric form, to the importance
of isolated moments of time, to the nature of poetic truth,
and to the dramatic characterization that "makes a case,"
Browning and Wordsworth have analogous positions.
One of Browning's few extended prose comments about

4
The Letters of Robert Browning and Elizabeth Barrett
Barrett (New York, 1899), I, 73.

his concept of poetry occurs in 1855 as a result of John
Ruskin's charge of obscurity.

Browning replies to Ruskini

"I know that I don't make out my conception in my language,
all poetry being a putting the infinite within the
finite."

5

This statement is comparable to Wordsworth's

much expressed concern with the inadequacy of the poet's
language when dealing with the "fallings from us, vanishings"
that characterize the Romantic sense of infinity.

Browning

even employs the metaphor of a mountain climb, the usual
Romantic symbol of infinity, in his explanation to Ruskin
of the manner in which his poetry should be read:

he ad

vises Ruskin to make the mental leaps that his diction
sometimes requires without poking his alpenstock into every
nook and gorge.

Wordsworth, to single out one example,

explained to Walter Savage Landor, Browning's close friend,
that "even in poetry [it] is the imaginative only, viz., that
which . . . turns upon infinity, that powerfully affects
me . . . passages where things are lost in each other, and
limits vanish, and aspirations are raised."6

5

Furthermore,

E. T. Cook, The Life of John Ruskin (London, 1912) , I,

461.
6Quoted in Havens, p. 240.
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Browning's idea of the basic principle of aesthetic pro
duction is similar to that expressed by Wordsworth in the
Preface to Lyrical Ballads.

In a letter written to Elizabeth

Barrett in 1845, Browning saysj

"'Reflection' is exactly

what it [the creative process] names itself— a re-presenta
tion, in scattered rays from every angle of incidence, of
what first of all became present in a great light, a whole
one."

7

Browning's idea of poetic re-presentation of an

experience which first flashes upon the poetic imagination
as a whole is essentially the Wordsworthian concept of
emotion that is recollected in tranquillity until a re
action causes the tranquillity to disappear, and a kindred
emotion comes into existence.

Browning's use of "re

presentation" and "reflection" as names for the creative
process is analogous to Wordsworth's use of "recollection"
and "reaction," both pairs of words implying the active mind
of the poet engaged in the re-creation of experience.
Browning's use of the dramatic monologue and the
dramatic lyric are anticipated by Wordsworth.

Both poets

wrote plays and were interested in the dramatic possibilities
of lyric form, possibilities called forth by the poetic

7
The Letters of Robert Browning and Elizabeth Barrett
Barrett, I, 98.
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exploration of the human mind.

Wordsworth gives one ex

pression of his idea of the dramatic principle of poetry
in a letter to Coleridge in 1808:

"If the Poet is to be

predominant over the Dramatist, — then let him see if there
are no victories in the world of spirit, no changes, no
commotions, no revolutions there, no fluxes and refluxes
O

of the thoughts."

Browning's Paracelsus, a forecast of

his poetic career, is jest such a drama of "the world of
spirit" as Wordsworth describes in this letter.

In his

Preface to the poem, Browning explains that it is an at
tempt "to display somewhat minutely the mood itself in its
rise and progress" without the usual machinery of the drama.
From this early base, Browning slowly evolved the dramatic
monologue as his most successful poetic medium.
Browning is also in the Wordsworthian tradition in
his utilization of a moment of historical or personal
crisis as the occasion of his dramatic monologues.

Hugh

Sykes Davies, in his discussion of Wordsworth's kinship
with some of the theories of Freud, contrasts their stress
on decisive moments with writers in the empiricist tradition
who employ the stream-of-consciousness technique as the
most satisfactory method for depicting the flux of the

g

Quoted in Miles, Wordsworth and the Vocabulary of
Emotion, p. 148.
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moments that constitutes reality, each moment receiving as
much emphasis as the next.

In contrast to this latter

technique, Davies writes that the Wordsworthian tradition
is marked by the following traits:
A writer inclined to agree with Wordsworth and
and Freud will need to find the means of des
cribing the more crucially formative moments
and impulses of his own mind, and the minds he
wishes to represent. The unselectiveness, the
evenness of the "stream of consciousness" may
serve him occasionally for preparatory and ex
planatory passages of experience, for those in
which the climactic events are prepared and
presaged; but for the climactic events them
selves, for the crucial "spots of time," his
technique will need to be more traditional, for
it cannot but select, shape and pose almost in
isolation those moments which were so highly
selected, so specially shaped and isolated in
experience.®
The concept of time which underlies Browning's choice of
climactic moments for his dramatic monologues is analogous
to Wordsworth's.

Browning shapes the material of his poems

into carefully detailed, artistic patterns through the use
of traditional poetic techniques so that the crucial nature
of the moment itself becomes the main aesthetic goal.
Browning, like Wordsworth, believes that certain moments of
time are stamped with the special mark of infinitude which
yields a sudden revelation of Joy.

His concept of the

climactic "infinite moment" thus occupies as central a

9

Davies, p. 171.
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position in his poetic theory as do the "spots of time" in
the Wordsworthian aesthetic.
Wordsworth and Browning, furthermore, have comparable
concepts of the nature of poetic truth.

Aubrey de Vere,

for example, recollects that Wordsworth often spoke of the
meaning of "truth" as follows:

"Truth in its largest sense,

as a thing at once real and ideal, a truth including exact
and accurate detail, and yet everywhere subordinating mere
detail to the spirit of the whole— this, he affirmed, was
the soul and essence not only of descriptive poetry, but of
all poetry."^®

This Wordsworthian concept of truth is

similar to Browning's; for example, he insists that he has
presented truth in The Ring and the Book, although he has
subordinated some details of his sources "to the spirit of
the whole."

Like Wordsworth, however, he maintains that

this is not a falsification of essential truth.
Browning is also firmly within the Wordsworthian
tradition in his emphasis upon man's imaginative apprehen
sion of truth, an analogue of the previous point.

As W. C.

DeVane points out, "Man is distinguished from the rest of
creation by the mind— which to Browning means not the
intellect, but the emotions or the imagination— and it is

10Quoted in Havens, p. 248.
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through this faculty that he attains contact with God. . . .
He does not want intellectual comprehension; he wants to
experience through his emotions that he has a kinship with
God."^

Wordsworth demonstrates in The Prelude that Joy is

the wellspring of this power of the emotional and moral
consciousness of the presence of divinity, and Browning
continues this Romantic tradition.
Like Wordsworth, Browning is attracted to the dramatic
characterization of the somewhat disreputable character:
his Victorian admirers were shocked by his apparent endorse
ment of the lovers in "The Statue and the Bust," of Bishop
Blougram, or of Don Juan in Fifine at the Fair.

Wordsworth's

contemporaries displayed a similar attitude, as the following
remarks by R. D. Havens demonstrates:
His tolerance of sexual irregularities shocked Miss
Fenwick, and his apparent indifference to lying in
"Beggars" and its sequel "Where Are They Now?"r to
stealing in "The Two Thieves" and "The Farmer of
Tylsbury Vale," and to drunkenness in "The Waggoner"
may have shocked others.
In these poems, he in
tended to point out that, reprehensible as such
sins are, that is not the whole story— as Godwin
might have supposed. Where the reason saw only
lying, thieving, and riot, the heart and the
aesthetic sense saw beauty, joy, youthful exuber
ance, kindness, or the sheer delight of living
and these are so precious that we must prize them
wherever they appear and must make the best of
their possessors. ^

^ W . C. DeVane, Browning1s Parleyings (New Haven, 1927),
p. 48.
12

Havens, p. 147.
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This explanation of Wordsworth's aims is much the same as
that employed by modern Browning apologists, and if Miss
Fenwick sounds like many of Browning's Victorian admirers,
we forget that Wordsworth lived his last twenty or so years
in the Victorian era.
Thus the critical impulse, dominant from the time of
Elizabeth Barrett's Mr. Gurney, which relegates "reflective
wisdom" to Wordsworth and "psychological utterances" to
Browning is misleading and simplistic.

Wordsworth is

deeply interested in psychological processes in The Prelude
and The Excursion; indeed, The Prelude is poetic "depth
psychology" at its finest.

He analyzes states of mind in

the Lyrical Ballads, and he creates a cast of characters
as grotesque as that of Browning;

Betty Foy, Martha Ray,

the Cumberland Begger, and Peter Bell.

Certainly Browning's

departures from the earlier tradition must be recognized
and the relationship not overstated.

Browning's early

poetic career, however, can be seen as an attempt to come
to grips, as it were, with the best of the Wordsworthian
tradition, as an effort to unite the psychological utter
ances of the "objective poet" with the reflective wisdom
of the "subjective poet" into the "whole poet," whom he
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describes in the Essay on Shelley.^

Browning's concept

of kindred Joy contains three of the major elements which
dominate the Wordsworthian-Romantic idea of Joy.

Joy re

sults from the harmony of soul and body, from the kinship
of man with man, and from the unity of God and man.
Pauline. Paracelsus, and Sordello are Browning's
earliest attempts at the formulation of the possibilities
of the power of Joy in human life and are comparable in
his poetic career to The Prelude in Wordsworth's.

Like

Wordsworth, Browning explores his own mind in order to
establish the nature of his moral and aesthetic beliefs,
and he examines the necessary conditions for the idea of
Joy as thoroughly as does Wordsworth in The Prelude.

The

speaker of Pauline voices one of the central themes of the
three poems when the realization of his own mortality
flashes upon him:

"I cannot be immortal, taste all joy."14

Thomas J. Collins has recently summarized the criti
cal confusion surrounding this essay. His own position is
that Browning converts Shelley into a "'whole poet' who
possesses both objective and subjective powers." However,
Collins maintains that Browning "is not really talking about
Shelley at all, but projecting into the name and purpose of
Shelley the ideals and aspirations which he himself had as
similated by 1851," in Robert Browning's Moral-Aesthetic
Theory, 1833-1850 (Lincoln, 1967), p. 114 .
14

Robert Browning, Pauline, in The Works of Robert
Browning, ed. F. G. Kenyon(London, 1912), I, l.~81CK All
subsequent references to this edition will be included in
the text.
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This statement is more than the adolescent awakening of
Robert Browning.

It is the chief moral and aesthetic prob

lem of the artist as Browning sees him, for Browning
maintains throughout his career that the artist must
develop a deep and humble consciousness of the limits of
his own consciousness.

The artist has unique powers which

impose unique responsibilities; he, more than other men,
must have, as Paul Tillich has phrased it for twentiethcentury man, the "courage to accept his finiteness."
Browning struggles with this problem from the time of the
publication of Pauline in 1833, to the completion of
Sordello in 1840.
The moral-aesthetic resolution of these three poems
centers, as Thomas J. Collins observes, upon the regenera
tive experience of the central figure in each poem.

Collins

points out that through this regenerative experience, the
poet discovers the following:
Infinites are unattainable to man in his
present state of imperfection; imperfection
qualified by the necessity and inevitability
of progress, is the law of life; progress,
through imperfection, depends on the recog
nition that the flesh is not a "carnal
mesh,” but a temporal element which can
contribute to man's ultimate perfections,
and finally, God rejoices and resides in
all aspects of his creation even to the
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extent of allowing man, in his weakness,
to reflect his grandeur. ^
A central perception in Browning's early poetry, in other
words, is that the poet must both nurture and discipline
his consciousness to the perception of the Joy immanent
in the world around him.
In Pauline, however, Browning does not effect this
resolution in his poet-hero.

The speaker of the poem

attempts to define the character of his past and present
life for the ever-patient Pauline, and Joy occupies a
central place in each stage of the narrative.

Browning's

speaker dreams of a Shelleyan Utopia in which "Men were
to be as gods and earth as heaven."

This dream, which

will encompass all Joy, is to be realized through the
study of "real life":
Mankind, its cares, hopes, fears, its woes and joys;
And, as I pondered on their ways, I sought
How best life's end might be attained— an end
Comprising every joy. I deeply mused.
(11. 444-447)
His Utopian dream is soon shattered, however, by the
exigencies of life in the world.
The next phase of his quest takes the speaker of the
poem to the world of nature.

Here, in a setting reminiscent

of Wordsworth's "Tintern Abbey," he finds a clump of trees

15Collins, p. 43.
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set atop a hill, overlooking cottages and hedgerows.

This

closed-in natural setting affords security, but unlike
Wordsworth in "Tintern Abbey," Browning's speaker has no
experience of "the deep power of joy":
The bushes close and clasp above and keep
Thought in— I am concentrated— I feel;
But my soul saddens when it looks beyond:
I cannot be immortal, taste all joy.
(11. 807-810)
The consciousness of the existence of Joy only reminds him
of his own finitude, a fact which he is unable to accept
at this point in his development.

The speaker of the poem

tells Pauline that he will "look within no more"

(1. 937),

a determination that indicates that Browning, like Coleridge,
sees the power of Joy as the primary condition for the
avoidance of morbid introspection.
The speaker of Pauline, despairing because the power
of Joy seems to be inextricably tied to youth, says that
he walks a kind of spiritual tightrope:
1 knew while youth and health so lifted me
That spite of all life's nothingness, no grief
Came nigh me, I must ever be light-hearted;
And that this knowledge was the only veil
Betwixt joy and despair:
so if age
Came, I should be left— a wreck linked to a soul.
492-497)

(11.

The force which is to be the redeeming factor in his life
is his escape with Pauline to a primitive world, where they
will experience "perfect joy."

The speaker of the poem
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concludes, "No less I make an end in perfect joy" (1. 994),
and this phrase is used as a refrain in the last section of
the poem.

If his dream of love fades, he will, nonetheless,

"end in perfect joy"; if a higher goal arises only to elude
his grasp, he will, again, "end in perfect joy."
Browning, however, does not concretely embody this
perfect Joy within the speaker's experience.

The assertion

of Joy in Pauline is thus weak and unconvincing, although
the poem does demonstrate that Browning recognizes the
experience of Joy to be a central value in the development
of the poetic mind.

The speaker of the poem identifies

his "first free joy" (1. 103) with the realization of his
poetic powers.

He is unable, however, to bridle this

imaginative energy into an achievement of Joy:
I envy— how I envy him whose soul
Turns its whole energies to some one end,
To elevate an aim, pursue success
However mean! So, my still baffled hope
Seeks out abstractions.
I would have one joy,
But one in life, so it were wholly mine,
One rapture all my soul could fill.
(11. 604-610)
These "struggling aims” end in the assertion of "perfect
joy," but this Joy is actually only another abstraction of
an obscure and frightening reality that the speaker of the
poem, and Browning himself, cannot now face with mature
composure and ready acceptance.
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In Paracelsus, published in 1835, two years after
Pauline, Browning again attempts to define the place of
Joy in the aesthetic and moral realms, this time more
successfully.

As the poem opens, Paracelsus refuses to

admit the central importance of Joy to the human soul.
When rebuked by Festus, his oldest friend, for his intel
lectual pride,
of

Paracelsus replies that he isindeed

the "simple joy," of "all the joys" thathe

aware

must re

nounce in order to carry out his plan to pursue perfect
knowledge.

He argues that Festus does not understand his

dedication to intellectual pursuits:
When Festus learns
That every common pleasure ofthe world
Affects me as himself; that I have just
As varied appetite for joy derived
From common things? a stake in life, in short,
Like his;
a stake which rash
pursuit
of aims
That life
affords not, would
as soon
destroy.

(I,89-95)

Paracelsus, despite the warnings of Festus, does not believe
that his arduous course necessitates the quenching of his
"appetite for joy."
fice to make"

He proudly longs for some "real sacri

for his goal; he declares that Festus's "friends

the sages threw their
with keeping mine"

joys away, / While I must be content

(I, 658-659).

He will undertake the

quest for perfect knowledge alone, confident that he will
attain perfect Joy from perfect knowledge.
In the second canto of the poem, Paracelsus has failed
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in the search for perfect knowledge that he began fourteen
years before.

He realizes that his quest has been futile,

partly because he has neglected his own need of Joy:
It has been monstrous: yet, till late, my course
So ardently engrossed me, that delight,
A pausing and relecting joy, 't is plain.
Could find no place in it.
(II, 269-272)
He hopes that the God "who clothes summer" can also renew
him.

Aprile, the Shelleyan poet, enters the poem at this

point and identifies himself as one who aspired to infinite
love, as Paracelsus has sought to achieve infinite knowledge.
Aprile declares to Paracelsus that his own failure lay in
the rejection of Joy*
— Because I could not curb
My yearnings to possess at once the full
Enjoyment, but neglected all the means
Of realizing even the frailest joy.
(II, 388-391)
Paracelsus, however, distorts this counsel into a determin
ation to seek, as Aprile has futilely sought, perfect love.
Again his quest is unsuccessful.

He explains to Festus,

in Canto Three of the poem, that his search for infinite
love has been in vain because he has made Joy only an
auxiliary and peripheral part of his life:
That 't was ray purpose to find joy or grief
Solely in the fulfillment of my plan
Or plot or whatsoe'er it was; rejoicing
Alone as it proceeded prosperously,
Sorrowing then only when mischance retarded
Its progress.
(II, 264-269)
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Paracelsus, however, refuses to act upon the basis of this
insight.

He has not yet advanced beyond his initial posi

tion because he still ignores the power of Joy in human
life.
In Canto Four, Paracelsus desperately resorts to
wine drinking in an effort to deaden his sensibilities,
and to cynicism in an attempt to justify the causes of his
failure.

Festus stresses the necessity of the experience

of Joy, but Paracelsus drunkenly replies to him:
Aprile was a poet, I make songs—
'T is the very augury of success I wantl
Why should I not be joyous now as then? (IV, 225-227)
Festus angrily tells Paracelsus that he has destroyed his
capacity for Joy:
Joyous! and how? and what remains for joy?
You have declared the ends (which I am sick
Of naming) are impracticable.
(IV, 228-230)
But Paracelsus tenaciously holds to the belief that he can
successfully yoke together his double aim:
know and to enjoy at once"

(IV, 240).

"I seek to

He slowly regains

his power of reason as this canto advances, but he declares
again to Festus that he will maintain his original goal:
I told you once, I cannot now enjoy.
Unless I deem my knowledge gains through joy;
Nor can I know, but straight warm tears reveal
My need of linking joy to knowledge:
So, on I drive, enjoying all I can.
And knowing all I can.
(IV, 360-365)
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Festus offers Arnoldian advice:
Forswear the future; look for joy no more.
But wait death's summons aimd holy sights,
And trust me for the event— peace, if not joy. (IV,
530-532)
Paracelsus, however, refuses to forego the Joy that is the
highest fruit of love and knowledge.
In the fifth and final canto of the poem, which
Browning entitles "Paracelsus Attains,” the true nature
of the Joy that has eluded him is recognized and defined
by Paracelsus.

Man must struggle, he says, with the forces

of nature that determine the conditions of his humanity
if he is to obtain the Joy that dignifies his soul:
And grappling Nature, so prevail on her
To fill the creature full she dared thus frame
Hungry for joy; and, bravely tyrannous,
Grow in demand, still craving more and more,
And make each joy conceded prove a pledge
Of other joy to follow— . (V, 607-612)
In this speech, Paracelsus recalls his original metaphor:
the "appetite for joy" is the distinguishing mark of the
human soul.

Joy is the missing link between God and man,

and man's hunger for Joy propels his soul to an over
whelming consciousness of his immortal destiny.
ledge marks the end of his lifelong search:

This know

now Paracelsus

perceives the relationship between life and Joy, a perception
that partakes of perfect knowledge:
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What life is— how God tastes an infinite joy
In infinite ways— one everlasting bliss,
From whom all being emanates, all power
Proceeds;
in whom is life forevermore,
Yet whom existence in its lowest form
Includes; where dwells enjoyment there is he.
648)

(V, 643-

Browning's Paracelsus, like Schiller, Wordsworth, and
Coleridge, identifies infinite Joy with God Himself, and
extends this identification to include all aspects of
creation.

Paracelsus dies, but he has attained the know

ledge that the present, with its "distinct and trembling
beauty," is mankind's proper realm:
But thou shalt painfully attain to joy
While hope and fear and love shall keep thee manl
836-837)

(V,

This knowledge is the highest wisdom in Browning's poetic
universe, and it becomes the leading principle of his idea
of Joy throughout his career.
Sordello has acquired the dubious distinction of being
the most obscure poem of the nineteenth century.

It is,

in many respects, an inchoate work, but Browning, nonethe
less, effects in this poem some of his most meaningful,
early statements of the idea of Joy.

In Book One, Sordello,

now living in retirement, ponders the proper sphere of the
poet in society, the nature of his creative powers, and
the source of his "peculiar joy":
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They are fain invest
The lifeless thing with life from their own soul,
Availing it to purpose, to control,
To dwell distinct and have peculiar joy
And separate interests that may employ
That beauty fitly, for its proper sake.
(I, 490-495)
The poet derives "peculiar joy" from the contemplation of
beauty for beauty's sake, but other men desire a share in
his Joy.

The poet is described as a man who is diverted

by his artistic powers from the natural course pursued by
ordinary men, and is both blessed and cursed by his experi
ence of Joy:
Of joys— contrive some yet amid the dearth.
Vary and render them, it may be, worth
Most we forego. Suppose Sordello hence
Selfish enough, without a moral sense
However feeble; what informed the boy
Others desired a portion in his joy?
(I, 681-686)
The narrator of Sordello here reiterates the conflict which
Browning has also explored in Pauline and Paracelsus:

can

the poet really bridle his creative power of Joy into a Joy
in which all men can share?

Like Wordsworth in The Prelude,

Browning answers this central question by envisioning Joy
as a ladder.

All men must attempt the climb, but the highest

rung on this metaphoric ladder of Joy is available, however,
only to the man endowed with the power of imagination.
mastery of the poet's craft, for example, is onerung on
the ladder of Joy:

The
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Sordello could explore
By means of it, however, one step more
In joy; and, mastering the round at length
Learn how to live in weakness as in strength.
280)

(II, 277-

At this point in his development, however, Sordello is
convinced that his imaginative powers only doom him to a
life of isolation, a life of "tasting joys by proxy"

(I,

728) .
Sordello thinks that the artist must remain aloof from
the Joy of ordinary men, and that he must renounce the idea
of Joy completely:
He caught himself shamefully hankering
After the obvious petty joys that spring
From true life, fain relinquish pedestal
And condescend with pleasures— one and all
To be renounced, no doubt; for, thus to chain
Himself to single joys and so refrain
From tasting their quintessence, frustrates, sure,
His prime design; each joy must he abjure
Even for love of it.
(II, 547-555)
In this passage, Browning embodies Sordello's inner conflict
between Man and Poet in terms of Joy.

The man-portion of

Sordello demands Joy; the poet-portion, however, feels that
Joy must be held in abeyance in order to intensify its
power, in order to taste its "quintessence":
His constant faith (the Poet-halffe to wit—
That waiving any compromise between
No joy and all joy kept the hunger keen
Beyond most methods)— . (II, 664-667)
Sordello, like Paracelsus, wonders if he must "leap o'er
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paltry joys," or if he can "enjoy like men."

This conflict

is resolved in the sixth book of the poem.
Sordello has failed to perceive, the narrator of the
poem says, that the artist's Joy results from struggle the
dies with attainment:
For what is Joy?— to heave
Up one obstruction more, and common leave
What was peculiar, by such act destroy
Itself; a partial death is every joy.
(VI, 261-264)
Joy must be wrenched from sorrow.

Mankind desires and

deserves a "portion" of the poet's "peculiar joy," and the
poet must leave the realm of "peculiar joy" for the realm
of universal Joy.

Legitimate sympathy for mankind and

humanitarian ideals, however, must not be allowed to en
croach upon his creative Joy:
Why should sympathy command you quit
The course that makes your joy, nor will remit
Their woe? Would all arrive at joy?
(VI, 307-309)
Like Matthew Arnold, Browning sees that man has "such need
of joy," and he maintains that the Joy-giving potentiality
of poetry is as powerful as is direct and immediate action,
that poetry is, indeed, an expressive embodiment of Joy's
intrinsic value and instrumentally effective as a weapon
against isolation and alienation.

But he does not arrive

at this resolution without further exploration of the prob
lem of the poet's Joy versus mankind's Joy.
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In a phrase that recalls Wordsworth's "deep power of
joy," the narrator of Sordello elaborates this conflict.
The poet's imaginative, creative energy is potentially
"gigantic with its power of joy":
His time of action for, against, or with
Our world (I labor to extract the pith
Of this his problem) grew, that even-tide,
Gigantic with its power of joy, beside
The world's eternity of impotence
To profit through at his whole joy's expense.
326)

(VI, 321-

Can "all arrive at joy," and can the artist function for,
with, or against "the world's eternity of impotence" with
out forfeiting his idea of Joy?

Browning's own faltering

attempt to comprehend the nature of the poet's power of Joy
is evident in the syntax of this passage,

Robert Preyer

has commented that poems such as Sordello reveal much of
interest about the early Victorian milieu.

Preyer says

that "it is as though the authors have been stunned by the
inhumanity of both Tory repression and middle class indus
trialism.

They can conceive of no joy or dignity or meaning

in the toil such a society offered its victims.

Hence they

stand aloof, become revolutionary, or fill the void with
some magical dream of poetry."16

16

Robert Preyer, "A Reading of the Early Narratives,"
in The Browning Critics, eds. Boyd Litzinger and K. L.
Knickerbocker (Lexington, 1965), p. 363.
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Aloofness, revolutionary action, or pure poetry—
Browning utilizes none of the three alternatives which
Preyer mentions in the final resolution of the conflict
which centers in the concept of Joy.

Sordello does not

realize, the narrator of the poem says, that the poet must,
as a first step up the ladder of Joy, "fit to the finite his
infinity."

Before he can be effective in the world of men,

the poet must define his goals and accept the necessity of
his own limitations.

Such acceptance sharpens the Joy.

Browning's most succinct definition of the idea of Joy in
these early poems occurs at this point in Sordello:
Soul on Matter being thrust,
Joy comes when so much Soul is wreaked in Time
On Matter, — let the Soul’s attempt sublime
Matter beyond the scheme and so prevent
By more or less that deed's accomplishment
And Sorrow follows: Sorrow how avoid?
(VI, 492-497)
Joy is not a static entity which the poet contemplates, nor
is it a perfect, changeless goal towards which he climbs.
Joy results from a conflict between the temporal and the
eternal.

The poet, no less than any other man, cannot abjure

the struggle; he cannot live in isolation in an attempt to
save his power of Joy from its inevitable defeat by Time and
Matter, for Time and Matter, paradoxically, are the dynamic
forces which produce Joy.
Although the soul of man is immortal and "permanent,"

while his body is finite and "temporal," the narrator of
Sordello reconciles this apparent dualism through

the idea

of Joy:
Hence, the soul permanent, the body not,—
Scarcely its minute for enjoying here,—
The soul must needs instruct her weak compeer,
Run o'er its capabilities and wring
A joy thence, she held worth experiencing:
Which, far from half discovered even, — lo,
The minute gone, the body's power letgo
Apportioned to that joy's acquirement!
(VI, 514-521)
The soul, therefore, according to its "capabilities,"
determines the nature of Joy from an infinite perspective,
but works through the finite "minute" of the body:

it is

in this sense that all men "attain to joy."
Browning both extends and modifies the Romantic idea
of Joy in his early poetry.

He associates Joy, as did the

earlier tradition, with aesthetic creation, with purity,
and with psychic energy.

He emphasizes, however, the

struggle for Joy, the Joy resulting when "Soul is wreaked
in Time on Matter," as he says in Sordello, far more than
do Wordsworth and Coleridge, who stress its developing and
revelatory nature.

In this emphasis upon the importance of

the human will in the drive for Joy, Browning looks forward
to Yeats.

Furthermore, Browning views man's infinite

"appetite for joy" as the central paradox of life, a para
dox which Wordsworth accepts as "the burthen of the mystery.
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Browning insists, however, in these early poems and through
out his career, that man's hunger for Joy is a direct
manifestation of his hunger for God.

The artist, therefore,

must accept Joy in a partial, incomplete, and limited guise,
mainly through his recognition of its manifestation in other
human beings and its source in God Himself.
Two aspects of the Christian tradition of Joy are
evidenced in the Victorian idea of Joy, and, contradictory
as it may seem, bothwould seem to have their origin in the
Evangelical Christianity which pervaded the early Victorian
milieu.

G. M. Young describes the impetus given a more

liberal Christian tradition by the narrower Evangelicalism
in the following statement:

"On one of its sides, Victorian

history is the story of the English mind employing the
energy imparted by Evangelical conviction to rid itself of
the restraints which Evangelicalism had laid on the senses
and intellect; on amusement, enjoyment, art; on curiosity,
on criticism, on science."17

Matthew Arnold and Thomas

Carlyle employ what is basically an Evangelical emphasis on
"restraint" and "self-renouncement" as the condition of the
idea of Joy; the asceticism of the Christian tradition is

17

G. M. Young, Victorian England:
(New York, 1964), p. 5.
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implicit in this concept.

Browning, on the other hand,

does not advocate a nineteenth-century version of the Land
of Cockaigne, but he is attracted to the equally Christian
idea of Joy as a positive value which man must struggle to
attain.

Like the earlier Romantics, Browning identifies the

capacity for Joy as the distinguishing characteristic of
the soul and the source of its essential dignity.

By en

dowing his idea of Joy with a spiritual basis and by insisting upon the divine origin of man's "appetite for joy,"
Browning cuts the ground from under the restraint imposed
by Evangelicalism, as Young indicates, and restores to the
joyous life of man in the world a new rationale, not
Evangelical, but possessing the energetic fervor of Evangeli
calism.
Wordsworth says in The Excursion

that the power of

Joy results in "kindred joy," but he does not employ other
human beings as the primary source of Joy as does Browning.
In Sordello, Browning maintains that what he calls an "outsoul," another human being who recognizes and is attuned to
one's uniquely individual needs i6 a necessary concomitant
for Joy, and the concept of the out-soul is employed as a
structural and thematic device in his early poems.

Pauline

is the out-soul of the narrator of that poem; Paracelsus
learns before his death that he has misconstrued the

-
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counsel of his out-soul, Aprile; and Palma, though
Sordello fails to recognize her, is meant to be his outsoul.

The function of this kindred soul is explained in

Sordello:
How dared I let expand the force
Within me, till some out-soul, whose resource
It grew for, should direct it? Every law
Of life, its every fitness, every flaw,
Must One determine whose corporeal shape
Would be no other than the prime escape
And revelation to me of a Will
Orb-like o'ershrouded and inscrutable.
(Ill, 319326)
The out-soul guarantees that spiritual power will be fruit
fully directed; it is a manifestation of God's Joy to His
finite creatures.

Browning's belief in the Incarnation is

yet another aspect of his theory of the out-soul, for Christ
is the central signification of God's love for, and guidance
of, man.
Kindred Joy thus moves on two planes:

Joy is mani

fested imperfectly in union with the human out-soul, and
perfectly in union with Christ, the divine out-soul.
Browning, therefore, incorporates the idea of Joy closely
within his Christian faith.

Pauline, Paracelsus, and

Sordello contain the seeds of this developing idea of kindred
Joy, but it comes to fruition in Christmas-Eve and EasterPay and in "Saul."
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Christmas-Eve is a less crucial exploration of the
idea of Joy than is Easter-Pay,

In the former poem,

Browning, speaking in his own person, identifies Joy with
the vision of Christ which enraptures him as he leaves the
Dissenters’ chapel.

His pulses "leap for joy / Of the

golden thought without alloy"
nation of Christ.

(11. 448-449)— the Incar

Browning's dream takes him to St. Peter's

in Rome and to a lecture room in Germany.

He rejoices in

the richness of the Roman Catholic Christmas service, but
rejects bothit and the rationalism of the German professor
in favor of the unaesthetic, but nevertheless humble and
sincere, worship of the Dissenters, who seem to him to
encompass more fully the Joy of Christian love.

18

Easter-Pay is more directly and explicitly concerned
with the idea of Joy.

Browning voices the troubled opinions

of an unnamed friend, an objectification of his own doubts
about his Christian faith.

This dialogue looks forward to

a similar debate between Reason and Fancy in La Saisiaz.

Browning's visionary resolution of this religious
conflict in favor of his own early religious training is
anticipated by Wordsworth.
R. D. Havens notes that in The
Excursion, "the restoration of the Solitary was to have
been accomplished not by reasoning but by the sight of 'a
religious ceremony . . . which, by recalling to his mind the
days of his early childhood. . . might have dissolved his
heart into tenderness,'" p. 148.
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The friend wonders if he should reject the "joys of sense"
for "God's eternity of joy":
As sorrows and privations take
The place of joy— the thing that seems
Mere misery, under human schemes,
Becomes, regarded by the light
Of love, as very near, or quite
As good a gift as joy before.
(11. 216-221)
Browning, however, replies that the renunciation of Joy is
not required for fullness of Christian life.

Did Christ

take human form, he asks, "only to give our joys a zest /
And prove our sorrows for the best?"

(11. 239-240).

He

maintains that the power of Joy is intended for man's use
in the present.

He recounts a visionary experience in which

Christ himself speaks and explains the nature of human Joy:
'Here the probation was for thee,
To show thy soul the earthly mixed
With heavenly, it must choose betwixt.
The earthly joys lay palpable,—
A taint, in each, distinct as well;
The heavenly flitted, faint and rare,
Above them, but as truly were
Taintless, so, in their nature, best.' (11. 671-678)
This earthly Joy, Christ says, is an imperfect indication
of the perfection of eternity.

Browning, like his own

Paracelsus, at first maintains that he will seize perfection
now, in nature, in art, and in knowledge.

He will break the

chain that binds him to the imperfection of the human realm:

106
Should the whirl slacken there, then verse,
Fining to music, shall asperse
Fresh and fresh fire-dew, till I strain
Intoxicate, half-break my chainI
Not joyless, though more favoured feet
Stand calm, where I want wings to beat
The floor. At least earth's bond is broke!
889)

(11. 883-

This image of the chain that binds man to earth will also
be employed in La Saisiaz, where Browning will again demon
strate that man's attempt to escape his link to earth does
not result in Joy.

In Easter-Pay, the vision of Christ

brings the poet to the perception of the most important
aspect of his concept of Joy:

human Joy is imperfect, but

it is a promise that man possesses a capability for infinite
Joy which will be fulfilled in eternity.
Browning extends this idea in "Saul."

David attempts

to awaken Saul from his despair through a poetic catalogue
of the Joy around him.

Saul, however, like Coleridge in

"Dejection," is experiencing a condition of spiritual
exsiccation, and the naturalistic catalogue of the "wild
joys of living" fails to inspirit him.

David asserts the

goodness of life:
How good is man's life, the mere living!
how fit to employ
All the heart and the soul and the senses,
for ever in joy!
(11. 78-79)
This consideration has only a slight effect upon Saul, and
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Browning broke the poem off at this point in 1845.

After

the religious experiences embodied in Christmas-Eve and
Easter-Pay in 1850, he had resolved the conflict of the
reality of the imperfection of human Joy with man's desire
for infinite Joy through the mystery of the Incarnation.
He then continued "Saul" to its culmination in David's
prophetic vision of Christ's entry into human history.
The fact that God so dignified human nature by assuming
its form indicates that the Joy of the tangible universe
is not to be rejected, but that man lives in perfect Joy
only through and with the Joy of Christ.

Browning joins the

"reflective wisdom" of the subjective poet with the "psy
chological utterances" of the objective poet in his
characterization of David.
prophet.

David is poet, priest, and

Wordsworth had stressed these overlapping poetic

roles in The Prelude, and he too associates these sacra
mental poetic functions with the idea of Joy.
David, as Saul's human out-soul in this poem, brings
the king to a recognition of the human Joy that leads to
divine Joy.

"Saul" is thus Browning's fullest early ex

pression of the idea of kindred Joy, for the human out-soul
reveals to Saul the Incarnation and Christ's role as the
divine out-soul.

The despairing lament of the speaker of

Pauline, "I cannot be immortal, taste all joy," is, therefore,
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ultimately resolved by David, who assures Saul, suffering
from a comparable despair, that man is immortal, and that
he will taste all Joy through the power of the incarnation.
The two planes of kindred Joy, the struggle to achieve
communion with the human out-soul and the divine out-soul,
become o n e

of Browning's major poetic concerns.

Browning demonstrates that the power of Joy is essenti
al to the artist, that it is possible to all men, amid he
indicates the manner in which it is to be experienced.
Browning's evaluation of man's "capability for joy" is not
unlike John Ruskin's.

In an Oxford lecture of 1870, Ruskin

defines the idea of Joy as follows:
You must first have the right moral state
or you cannot have art. . . . For instance,
take the art of singing, and the simplest
perfect master of it— the skylark. From
him you may learn what it is to sing for joy.
You must get the moral state first, the
pure gladness, then give it finished ex
pression, and it is perfected in itself
and made communicable to others capable of
such joy.
The "pure gladness" of Joy is the "right moral state" if
the poet is to overcome the stance of alienation and
communicate

to others what Shelley calls the "news of

kindred joy."

19

Like other poets of the Romantic tradition,

John Ruskin, The Literary Criticism of John Ruskin,
ed. Harold Bloom (New York, 1965), p. xvii.
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especially Wordsworth and Shelley, whose joyous skylarks
Ruskin includes in this passage, Browning makes Joy the
primary moral state for the poetic consciousness, and he
defines and masters his own capability for Joy before
writing his finest poetry.

CHAPTER IV

"CAPABILITY FOR JOY”:
MEN AND WOMEN AND DRAMATIS PERSONAE

The idea of kindred Joy which Browning evolved from
1833 to 1850 emphasizes the Joy resulting from the strug
gle of the human soul to achieve communion with other
human beings and with God.

Wordsworth, as has been seen,

emphasizes union and communion as the source and result of
Joy, the loss of a burdensome isolation achieved through
the contemplation of the organic unity of the individual
soul with the outer world.

Browning, however, is more

interested in the idea of union and communion between
human beings as the source of the most intense Joy, and
there is no more striking evidence of the vigor with which
Browning contributed to the developing nineteenth-century
concept of Joy than in the poems written between 1850 and
1864, especially the poems that comprise Men and Women and
Dramatis Personae.
The reason for Browning's overriding concern with all
types of human personality lies both in his own poetic aims
and in the changing concept of nature.
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Josephine Miles

provides striking statistical evidence of this change.

She

notes that the most common metaphor for nature in the
poetry of the eighteenth century is "face," while Wordsworth
and the other poets of his generation employ the word
"breath," indicating the living, moving spirit of the
natural world.

By mid-century, however, the dominating

metaphor for nature is "pulse."

This concept of nature's

"pulse," Miss Miles points out, "is stronger [and] also sets
nature more strongly apart as its own organism instrinsic
to its own spirit."

Miss Miles notes that through the

1840's, the standard usage of what John Ruskin called
pathetic fallacy, the communication between the creative
energy of the human imagination and images of the outer
world, is once in every fifty or sixty lines of English
poetry.

After the 18401s, perhaps because man became more

and more estranged from the natural world, the use of
pathetic fallacy is reduced to once in every hundred or
more lines of poetry.

In Browning's poetry, however, the

reduction of pathetic fallacy as a source of poetic imagery
is even more strikingly dramatic.

Miss Miles, who uses the

poems of Men and Women as the basis of her computation,
writes that "Browning's frequency is once in two hundred
and eighty lines, more than a halving again of a device
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already halved."

She concludes that for Robert Browning,

the "pattern of the world was an outward pattern.

He

described not scene plus emotion from it, but scene plus
people in it. . . .nl

This is a succinct summation of one

of the basic poetic differences between Wordsworth and
Browning.

People are Browning's main interest, and it is

in his men and women that he incorporates his idea of Joy.
However, inherent differences in personality and in
poetic aims, in addition to the changing concept of nature,
should not be ignored.

Browning naturally enjoys the

diversity of human personality as Wordsworth instinctively
enjoys the diversity of the natural world.

Wordsworth,

moreover, attempts to find the permanent and universal
truths that unite men, but the actuality of the hustle and
bustle of men in large numbers bemuses and agitates him.
In The Prelude, he describes the "huge fermenting mass of
human-kind" which pours through the streets of London:
How oft, amid those overflowing streets,
%
Have I gone forward with the crowd and said
Unto myself, 'The face of every one
That passes by me is a mystery!' (VII, 626-629)
He then remembers having once seen a blind Beggar, who
carried a placard telling his name, his birthplace, and the

"^Josephine Miles, Pathetic Fallacy in the Nineteenth
Century (Berkeley, 1942), pp. 224, 227, 228.
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cause of his blindness.

Wordsworth concludes that the

Beggar's printed card signifies that these bare facts are
really all that man can know of man:
This label seemed of the utmost we can know,
Both of ourselves and of the universe?
And, on the shape of that unmoving man.
His steadfast face and sightless eyes, I gazed,
As if admonished from another world. (VII, 645-649)
Wordsworth thus emphasizes the "mystery" inherent in the
lives of other human beings, and he feels that divinity
itself admonishes him for his attempt to solve that mystery.
Browning, on the other hand, says that thepoet

is a

divinely appointed emissary, whose task is to delveinto
the mysteries of human personality.

In "How It Strikes a

Contemporary," he describes a poet whose business it is to
examine the variety of the human types found in the crowded
streets of Spain— the cobbler, the coffee-roaster, the
book-vendor:
He took such cognizance of men and things,
If any beat a horse, you felt he saw;
If any cursed a woman, he took note;
Yet stared at nobody,— you stared at him.
And found, less to your pleasure than surprise,
He seemed to know you and expect as much. (11. 30-35)
Browning's poet knows men and what to expect of them.

He

is the "recording chief-inquisitor" of the town, reporting
his findings to God; he is the general-in-chief of the "whole
campaign of the world's life and death."

The poet is an
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active citizen of the world, recording the outward show of
human life and indicating the inner springs of men's actions.
This tangible world of men and women— rogues, saints,
artists, poets, lovers— is the chief source of Joy in
Browning's poetry, and, like the poet in "How It Strikes
a Contemporary," he records their communion with each other
and with God.
Browning is as precise as is Wordsworth in his use of
the word "Joy."

The poetry itself is the ultimate proof

of that precision, but his letters also give ample evidence
of his careful use of the term.

In a letter written in

1846, for example, he speaks of the "joy's essence" in
contrast to "the mere vulgar happiness."

In another letter,

he writes of his feeling of "deep joy," adding, "I know
and use to analyse my own feelings, and be sober in giving
distinctive names to their varieties; this is deep joy."
Furthermore, Browning writes in still another letter of
the Joy that resists the flux of time, referring to Keats's
idea of Joy in the "Ode on Melancholy":

"Now Keats speaks

of 'Beauty, that must die— and Joy whose hand is ever at
his lips bidding farewell'

[sic]. . . . There is a Beauty

that will not die, a Joy that bids no farewell. . . .

2

The Letters of Robert Browning and Elizabeth Barrett
Barrett, I, 460, 279, 388.
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A large number of the poems of Men and Women and Dramatis
Personae are concerned with the exploration of the Joy
that bids no farewell.

This is the Joy that manifests

itself in the discovery of the human out-soul as a first
step to the discovery of the divine out-soul, the charac
teristic progression of the experience of Joy in Browning's
poetry, a progression which has already been seen in "Saul."
In "One Word More," the concluding poem of the Men
and Women volume, Browning includes special mention of
"Cleon" and In a Balcony.

These two poems are among his

own favorites, and they include some of his most important
embodiments of his concept of Joy.

In a Balcony was first

published in the 1855 edition of Men and Women, but in
1868 Browning had the poem placed between Men and Women
and Dramatis Personae.

This final placement of the poem

serves to link the two volumes, for In a Balcony contains
many of the themes which Browning explores in both volumes.
In this poem. Browning differentiates love as it is experi
enced by men and by women, the decay of love, the loss of
the "good minute" because of failure to declare love, the
man's Joy versus the artist's sorrow, and the power of Joy,
that results when communion between out-souls is complete.
The Queen is the tragic figure of In a Balcony.

She

believes that the capacity for Joy is to be found only in
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youth.

She watches Constance and Norbert and ponders her

own predicament:
My flower of youth, my woman's self that was,
My happiest woman's self that might have been!
These two shall have their joy and leave me here.
458-460)

(11.

When Norbert appears before the Queen, to ask her for the
hand of her cousin and a member of her court, Constance,
the Queen mistakenly believes that the devotion that he
declares for Constance is love for her.

The power of love

manifests itself in Joy, and the experience of Joy has the
power to restore her wasted youth:
Am I so old? This hair was early grey;
But joy ere now has brought hair brown again.
And joy will bring the cheek's red back, I feel.
481-483)

(11.

Joy's power could rejuvenate the aged Queen, but her belief
in Norbert's love, the one moment of Joy in her life, is
the result of a grotesque misunderstanding.
Constance stands between the Queen and her prime
minister.

She has attempted to convince Norbert that he

should defer the announcement of their love until the Queen
has permanently rewarded him for his statesmanship.
Norbert, however, is impetuous; he would attempt to win
Constance at any cost:
But just to obtain her! heap earth's woes in one
And bear them— make a pile of all earth's joys

And spurn them, as they help or help not thisi
Only obtain her! . . . (11. 158-161)
Constance is eventually won over to his position, but she
feels her own way to be the wiser course of action:
Meaning to give a treasure, I might dole
Coin after coin out (each, as that were all,
With a new largess still at each despair)
And force you keep in sight the deed, preserve
Exhaustless till the end my part and yours,
My giving and your taking; both our joys
Dying together.
Is it the wiser way?
(11. 611-617)
This is indeed the wiser way, but it results in the death
of Joy.

Constance thus chooses Norbert*s simpler course

and gives all of her love at once.
The moment when love is declared should be a moment
when "joy explodes," but for the Queen this moment is
destroyed.

She overhears Norbert's declaration of love for

Constance, and the poem ends with the measured step of the
palace guard advancing towards the lovers on the balcony.
This ending is somewhat lame, and only Browning's state
ments outside of the poem itself resolve the basic ambiguity
does the guard advance to seize the prime minister or does
it come to announce the Queen's suicide?

Browning advances

the latter interpretation, and the ambiguity turns on the
intense Joy of the Queen.

A friend, who heard Browning read

the poem, thought that "the step of the guard should be
heard coming to take Norbert to his doom, as, with a nature
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like the queen's, who had known only one hour of joy in
her sterile life, vengeance swift and terrible would follow
on the sudden destruction of her happiness.”

Browning,

however, says that he means quite the opposite of this
interpretation.

He says that "the queen had a large and

passionate temperament, which had only been touched and
brought into intense life.
knife in her heart."

3

She would have died as by a

The Queen's intense awareness of

life, which is the fruit of the experience of Joy, would
not lead to the death and destruction of the agent of that
Joy, but rather to the destruction of her own life, which,
once having tasted Joy, is meaningless without the con
tinuance of it.

The promise of Joy which remains unful

filled is destructive.

Past Joy must lead to present Joy

if the consciousness of the power of Joy is to retain via
bility in human experience.
The conflict in many of Browning's lyrics centers
on past Joy and present Joy.

Joy is often associated, in

a way analogous to the Joy that Wordsworth attaches to the
"spots of time," with scenes from the past.

Browning,

however, more often utilizes the historical sense of the

Quoted in DeVane, A Browning Handbook, p. 253.
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past, while Wordsworth uses the personal sense of the past.
In "Love Among the Ruins," for example, the speaker of the
poem reconstructs the scene before him as it might have
existed in the past and contrasts that scene with its
living counterpart in the present.

He considers the "plenty

and perfection" of the past, and thinks of the human
passions associated with that glorious time:
And such plenty and perfection, see, of grass
Never was I
Such a carpet as, this summer-time, o'erspreads
And embeds
Every vestige of the city, guessed alone.
Stock or stone—
Where a multitude of men breathed joy and woe
Long ago. (11. 26-32)
The speaker of the poem prefers the less grandiose Joy of
the present, the Joy resulting from the love of the girl
with the yellow hair who waits for him where kings once
stood.

He concludes, therefore, unlike the earlier Romantic

poets, who cherish the Joy of the past associated with such
cities as Venice or Rome, that this present Joy is supreme:
"Love is best."
In "By the Fire-Side," Browning again contrasts the
Joy of the past with the Joy of the present.

The speaker

of the poem considers the ruined chapel of the Alpine gorge
which he and Leonor had visited in their youth:
And all day long a bird sings there,
And a stray sheep drinks at the pond at times;
The place is silent and aware;
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It has had its scenes, its joys and crimes,
But that is its own affair.
(11. 96-100)
As they walk about this scene permeated with

the sense of

the Joy of the past, present Joy comes, the "moment, one
and infinite" when content is quickened to bliss.

In "Two

in the Campagna," an opposite result is described.
as in the description of the Alpine gorge in

Again,

"By theFire-

Side," past Joy suffuses the scene:
The champaign with its endless fleece
Of feathery grasses everywhere!
Silence and passion, joy and peace,
An everlasting wash of air—
Rome's ghost since her decease.
(11. 21-25)
The sense of Joy attached to the past makes the speaker of
this poem desire a share of Joy in the present.

But he is

unable to achieve the desired communion, the "good minute
goes," and he is left to ponder the paradox of "Infinite
passion, and the pain / Of finite hearts that yearn."
A

Finally, in "Dis Aliter Visum; or, Le Byron de nos
Jours," another poem which contrasts with the joyful moment
of union described in "By the Fire-Side," the woman who is
the speaker of the poem chides her would-be lover of ten
years before.

They did not seize the moment.

The Joy of

the old Norman ruin which they explored together led to no
present Joy:
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Was there nought better than to enjoy?
No feat which, done, would make time break,
And let us pent-up creatures through
Into eternity, our due?
No forcing earth teach heaven's employ? (11. 116-120)
The speaker concludes that they failed to gain the present
Joy of love, "the sole spark from God's life," and their
lives are now inwardly sterile and empty, though outwardly
successful and prominent.

The "good minute" of "Two in the

Campagna" is the moment when, as Constance says in In a
Balcony," "joy explodes."

The experience of Joy, however,

cannot be maintained at such a level of intensity.
The Queen of In a Balcony declares that the Joy of
the soul transmits its power to the beauty of the body.
Browning incorporates this aspect of Joy into "Fra Lippo
Lippi" and "any Wife to Any Husband."

Lippi says that art

should deal not just with outward form, but also with the
human soul:
Why can't a painter lift each foot in turn.
Left foot and right foot, go a double step,
Make his flesh liker and his soul more like,
Both in their order? . . . (11. 205-208)
The Prior's niece, Lippi says, has a beautiful face, but it
is not so beautiful that the artist should overlook the
source of the beauty:
You can't discover if it means
Sorrow or joy? w o n ’t beauty go
Suppose I've made her eyes all
Can't I take breath and try to
And then add soul and heighten
214)

hope, fear,
with these?
right and blue.
add life's flash,
them threefold? (11. 210-

Lippi says that the artist and the lover should be moved
not so much by beauty as by that soul-power which is the
creator of beauty.

This is also the conclusion of the

aging wife, who, as the speaker of "Any Wife to Any Husband,
analyzes the cause of the death of love.

The loss of

physical beauty is perhaps one reason for love's decay:
Oh, I should fade— 't is willed so! Might I save,
Gladly I would, whatever beauty gave
Joy to thy sense, for that was precious too.
It is not to be granted. But the soul
Whence the love comes, all ravage leavesthat whole;
Vainly the flesh fades; soul makes all things new.
13-18)

(11

The Joy to which love gives birth could make "all things
new," but this love is now dead.

Browning, as in "Dis

Aliter Visum," images human love as a spark from God's
"fire of fires," a spark which, in this poem, the married
couple has let die.
The highest Joy is not a static entity which the poet
contemplates or the lover seizes once and for all. It

is

touched by the same imperfection which touches all human
things; in its imperfection is its life.

The speaker of

"Old Pictures in Florence" says that "what's come to
perfection perishes."

The Joy that is static is worthless:

Shall Man, such step within his endeavor,
Man's face, have no more play and action
Than joy which is crystallized for ever,
Or grief, an eternal petrifaction?
(11.

141-144)
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The Joy "crystallized for ever" is false to the facts of
human existence.

The speaker of the poem praises the

early painters, who, scorning the artificial perfection
of Greek art, became the "self-acquainters" of mankind:
Make new hopes shine through the flesh they fray,
New fears aggrandize the rags and tatters:
To bring the invisible full into play!
Let the visible go to the dogs— what matters?
(11. 149152)
The speaker of "Old Pictures in Florence” rejoices in
change as does Fra Lippo Lippi.
The speaker of "James Lee's Wife" comes to a comparable
perception.

She hears the moaning of the wind, which seems

to say to those who listen:
'Here is the change beginning, here the lines
Circumscribe beauty, set to bliss
The limit time assigns.' (11. 209-211)
Changeless beauty and changeless love are impossible;

the

speaker realizes that change should be a cause of Joy:
Simple? Why this is the old woe o' the world;
Tune, to whose rise and fall we live and die.
Rise with it, then! Rejoice that man is hurled
From change to change unceasingly,
His soul's wings never furled!
(11. 217-221)
But the wind replies, "Nothing endures," and the fact that
God endures is a faint consolation at this point in the
development of James Lee's wife.

The paradox of change is

explicit in this poem, for if James Lee, by some strange
reversal, were to declare his love and their union be made
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complete, the resulting Joy would overpower her hold on
life:
You might turn myself!— should I know or care
When I should be dead of joy, James Lee? (11. 371-372)
The speaker of "Childe Roland" expresses the same fear after
the old cripple points out to him the Dark Tower which he
had sought for so long:
What with my search drawn out thro* years, my hope
Dwindled into a ghost not fit to cope
With that obstreperous joy success would bring. (11. 2022)
Joy deferred too long overwhelms the man's capacity for it.
These are inverse statements of the Queen's experience
in In a Balcony, for her death results from

the Joy tasted

but once and then lost. On the other hand,

too much Joy is

equally deadly.

Karshish, in "An Epistle," notes the

effect of Lazarus'
of the same paradox.

experience of eternity through the use
Lazarus'

restoration to life after

his death is compared to the experience of a middle-aged
beggar who is suddenly given a treasure:
With straitened habits and with tastes starved small,
And take at once to his impoverished brain
The sudden element that changes things,
That sets the undreamed-of rapture at his hand
And puts the cheap old joy in the scorned dust? (11. 128132)
The imperfection of human Joy is, paradoxically, its very
perfection, and "the cheap old joy" of life, nevertheless.
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is the Joy designed for an imperfect creation.
Joy in human life, even the Joy of human love, is at
best a fleeting and tenuous experience.

Browning reinforces

this quality of human Joy by associating the experience of
Joy with the image of a thread.

Wordsworth characteristical

ly associates Joy with a ladder or with a scale, and he is
confident that all men can mount this ladder, although the
poet will climb highest.

Browning, too, uses the ladder

image in his discussion of Joy in his earlier poems, as we
have seen in the last chapter.

The sturdy image of the

ladder, however, is replaced by the fragile image of the
thread in several of the poems of Men and Women and Dramatis
Personae, a change in imagery which indicates the difficulties
that Browning sees human beings experiencing as they attempt
to maintain the idea of Joy.

Lazarus, for example, is

described by Karshish in "An Epistle" as holding on "to some
thread of life" which runs between the spiritual and the
physical realms and which separates him from full enjoyment
of either state.
In "Two in the Campagna," the speaker seems to seize
the thread that will explain the paradox of love, but it
eludes his grasp and winds through the champaign which is
associated with the Joy of the past.

The lovers do not

achieve union, separated, as it were, by only a slight
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thread, a moment:
Just when I seemed about to learn!
Where is the thread now? Off again!
The old trick! Only I discern—
Infinite passion, and the pain
Of finite hearts that yearn.
(11. 56-60)
What the speaker discerns in this last stanza is not "only"
man's finite capacity for Joy as compared to an infinite
desire:

it is actually an ironic understatement of the

highest truth of human life as Browning sees it.
Browning uses the image of the thread again in "Too
Late."

The speaker of the poem did not declare his love,

and Edith, whom he once loved, married another man and is
now dead.

The speaker says that, as a young man, he had

delayed taking any decisive action, waiting as if for some
special revelation to direct the course of his life.

His

life was thus stopped, as if by a huge stone, at midcurrent,
and he rested apart from the sea of human struggle.

He

considers the stone which symbolizes his own incapacity
for action, but does nothing to remove it:
But either I thought, 'They may churn and chide
Awhile, my waves which came for their joy
And found this horrible stone full-tide:
Yet I see just a thread escape, deploy
Through the evening-country, silent and safe,
And it suffers no more till it finds the sea.' (11.
25-30)
His capacity for Joy has dwindled until his life can be
compared to a tiny thread of water which wanders through
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old age, the evening-country, to eventual death.

He is

secure and safe, but incapable of the Joy which rises from
the struggle in the open sea of life.
Browning also employs the image of the thread to
symbolize the life-choking tyranny of one soul over another,
as it does in "Mesmerism."

The speaker recognizes that

his power to conjure up and to invade the very soul of the
lady is like the "sudden thread" which the spider weaves
around his prey.

His psychic power is similar to an "iron

nerve" which he has knitted for the purpose of trapping her
very soul's essence.

He winds her spirit in the toils of his

leaden line and is drawn out into the night:
Swifter and still more swift,
As the crowding peace
Doth to joy increase
In the wide blind eyes uplift,
Thro' the darkness and the drift!

(11. 91-95)

The fact that "peace" increases to "joy" as the speaker
winds his thread closer and closer indicates that this "joy"
of his dream is actually only frenzied emotion.

The usual

progression of Joy in Browning's poetry, as it is in the
earlier Romantic tradition, is from Joy to peace.

In "A

Grammarian's Funeral," for example, as the old scholar is
buried atop the mountain, his students ask that Joy, and
then peace, bless the dead Grammarian:
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Here— here's his place, where meteors shoot, clouds form,
Lightnings are loosened,
Stars come and go! Let joy break with the storm,
Peace let the dew send!
(11. 141-144)
Browning associates Joy with life and peace with death.

The

joy of the storm signals the Grammarian's triumphant strug
gle and the peace of the dew his reward for that struggle.
The subtle inversion of this development in "Mesmerism"
demonstrates Browning's distrust of the powers of the
spiritualists.
It is in "Cleon" that Browning centers his most im
portant discussion of the idea of Joy in Men and Women and
Dramatis Personae.

Cleon, a Greek poet, philosopher, and

artist, now residing on an island off the mainland, writes
in reply to a letter from the Greek king, Protus.

He begins

his letter by thanking the king for his generous gifts
which indicate to all men that the wise king recognizes the
artist as the chief Joy-giver to men, and that Joy is the
"use of life":
Well-counselled, king, in hhy munificence!
For so shall men remark, in such an act
Of love for him whose song gives life its joy.
Thy recognition of the use of life. (11. 19-22)
The king's work, in contrast to the poet's, is the wise rule
of the vulgar, Cleon says, but the king demonstrates his
spirit's power in the gifts bestowed upon the poet and in
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the tall burial tower which he is having built for his
final resting place.

The towerr significantly, faces East,

symbolizing the king's desire for immortality and the chief
questions which he has asked Cleon.

After these initial

compliments, Cleon next attempts to answer the king's
questions.
The king has asked if Cleon is indeed the accomplished
artist that men say that he is.

Cleon replies that he is

the author of an epic poem, which the king has had engraved
on one hundred golden plates; that he is the composer of a
popular chant, a favorite of Greek fishermen; that he
carved the image of the sun-god on the lighthouse; that he
designed and provided paintings for a magnificent portico
in Athens; that he has written three philosophical tracts
on the nature of the soul; and that he has made important
contributions to music theory.
arts are mine."

"In brief," Cleon says, "all

That one man can incorporate such achieve

ment into a brief lifetime indicates, Cleon maintains, the
progress of the race:
So, first the perfect separate forms were made,
The portions of mankind; and after, so.
Occurred the combination of the same.
For where had been a progress,-otherwise?
Mankind, made up of all the single men,—
In such a synthesis the labour ends. (11. 89-94)
But when one man, a man such as Cleon, reaches this great
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synthesis, the king might ask, what then is the purpose of
life?

Cleon replies that the purpose of life is growth,

the struggle of the soul to create new and better syntheses
of past achievements.
Cleon explains that he had long before considered the
possibility of direct revelation from Zeus as to the use
of life.

He had even written out a story of the incarnation

of Zeus, or some other god, who came into human history and
showed once and for all, "the worth both absolute and re
lative / Of all his children from the birth of time"
120-121).

(11.

Now he goes on to imagine that this revelation

might be extended to show the presence of Zeus latent in all
things.

However, Cleon says, this last is but an empty

dream while man knows that progress occurs:

the fields now

yield richer grapes, the grapes richer wine, and even the
king's mistress is more beautiful than were the women of
Cleon's time.

The soul is not immortal, Cleon tells the

king, but this is no cause for despair.

Cleon himself, for

example, is no Homer, nor Terpander, nor Phidias, but he
has encompassed their separate arts of poetry, music, and
sculpture into one lifetime; his life thus shows "a better
flower if not so large."
The king wonders if Cleon, who, as an artist, will
attain immortality through his work, fears death as he
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himself fears it.

Cleon quotes from the king's letter at

this point in the poem:
'Thy life stays in the poems men shall sing,
The pictures men shall study? while my life,
Complete and whole now in its power and joy,
Dies altogether with my brain and arm,
Is lost indeed; since, what survives myself?1 (11.
170-174)
The king thinks that his memory will be effaced when his
progeny are eventually driven from the throne; the artist'£
works, however, will never be driven from men's hearts.
Cleon answers this question of the king with the assurance
that "imperfection means perfection hid."
to imagine himself present in the

Heasks the

king

distant past when Zeus

was preparing the world for man's appearance.

If Zeus had

asked him how he might improve upon his creation, the king
would have replied to him that he should grant self-con
sciousness to his creatures, for the Joy of the natural
world is wasted on creatures who are "mere matter":
'And all this joy in natural life is put
Like fire from off thy finger into each,
So exquisitely perfect is thesame.
But 't is pure fire, and they mere matter are;
It has them, not they it: and so I choose
For man, thy last premeditated work
(If I might add a glory to the scheme)
That a third thing should stand apart from both,
A quality arise within his soul.
Which, intro-active, made to supervise
And feel the force it has, may view itself,
And so be happy'.. . . (11. 203-214)
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The "intro-active" power of the soul is man's self-conscious
ness, a power which reflects upon the force of Joy and
judges itself conscious of happiness.

The more man experi

ences the "intro-active" power, the more "joy-giving" is
life:
The more joy-giving will his life become.
Thus man, who hath this quality, is best.

(11. 219-220)

Cleon, however, next shows that self-consciousness is not
the blessing that it appears to be.
He tells Protus that in such a hypothetical situation
he would have more reasonably requested Zeus not to endow
man with reflective self-consciousness.

Browning employs

the contrasting imagery of ladder and thread to support
this part of Cleon's argument.

Self-consciousness is

imaged as the ladder of a tower which man climbs to greater
and greater awareness of the Joy of life:
The soul now climbs it just to perish there 1
For thence we have discovered ('t is no dream—
We know this, which we had not else perceived)
That there's a world of capability
For joy, spread round about us, meant for us,
Inviting us; and still the soul craves all.
(11. 236241)
Man's capacity for Joy is not equal to the Joy which his
soul can imagine.

Cleon thus exclaims that an increasing

measure of self-consciousness does not really increase life's
"joy-giving" power after all:
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It skills not! Life's inadequate to joy
As the soul sees joy, tempting life to take.
249-250)

(11.

Man's capacity for Joy is better imaged as a thread.

A

fountain in his garden, Cleon says, could spout oceans of
water, but it is designed to be supplied by a thread of
water from the river.

It would do the Naiad, who reigns

supreme over the thread of water in the fountain, no good
to know that vast oceans exist:
She cannot lift beyond
her first thin thread:
And so a man can use but a man's joy
While he sees God's. .
. .(11. 260-262)
Cleon thus reverses his former statement about the glory of
human progress and concludes that the discouraged King
Protus is right.

Wider vision means deeper disappointment;

self-consciousness is man's curse— "Most progress is most
failure:

thou sayest well."

Cleon now moves to answer the king's last question.
The king supposes that the

Joy of the artist is thehighest

Joy available to man, that

the artist is an exception to

the disappointment which life holds in store for the general
run of mankind:
Holding joy not impossible to one
With artist-gifts— to such a man as I
Who leave behind me living works indeed.

(11. 274-276)

Cleon replies that the king is mistaken in his assumption
that poems and paintings "live":
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What? dost thou verily trip upon a word.
Confound the accurate view of what joy is
(Caught somewhat clearer by my eyes than thine)
With feeling joy? Confound the knowing how
And showing how to live (my faculty)
With actual living?—
(11. 278-283)
The artist sees and feels Joy more ihtensely than other men,
but this does not mean that he "lives" its power more
deeply.

To show men's actions in an epic poem does not

mean that the poet himself has performed great deeds, or
to paint a young god does not restore the artist's youth.
No, Cleon says, the artist's Joy is as inadequate as is any
other man's:
Indeed, to know is something, and to prove
How all this beauty might be enjoyed, is more:
But, knowing nought, to enjoy is something too.
291-293)

(11.

Cleon concludes that though he knows "the joy of kingship,"
Protus, nevertheless, is king.
Protus, however, would insist that Sappho and Aeschylus
live in their songs and plays.

Cleon sarcastically replies

that if they live they should come forward and enjoy life,
drink his wine and speak his speech.

He maintains that his

fate, the fate of all artists, is actually far worse thap
the fate of the king, for the artist is endowed with a
greater sensibility and with greater self-awareness:
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Say rather that my fate is deadlier still,
In this, that every day my sense of joy
Grows more acute, my soul (intensified
By power and insight) more enlarged, more keen.
309-312)

(11.

But physical weakness and advancing age dictate that Cleon
will; never be able to exploit this increased capability for
Joy.

This is such a horrible fate, Cleon says, that he

sometimes imagines a life-after-death:
I dare at times imagine to my need
Some future state revealed to us by Zeus,
Unlimited in capability
For joy, as this is in desire for joy,
— To seek which, the joy-hunger forces us.
328)

(11.324-

Such immortality of soul is not revealed, Cleon says, and
were such a state possible to man, Zeus would have made
it known to the Greek mind.

Cleon thus closes his letter

with a caution to Protus not to attempt to contact Paul,
the leader of the Christians, for "their doctrine could be
held by no sane man."
"Cleon" is accepted by most scholars as Browning's
fullest reply to Matthew Arnold's Empedocles on Etna.
W. C. DeVane points out that "Browning thought of Empedocles'
condition as illustrating the logical result of Greek
paganism, and created Cleon as a later philosopher and poet
who

represented the final product of Greek culture, and who

in the blindness of his pride rejected the

Christianity
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which fulfilled every one of the needs already recognized
by his own superb mind."4

Browning admired Arnold's poem,

and he persuaded Arnold to republish Empedocles in his New
Poems of 1867.

Arnold's Empedocles, like Browning's Cleon,

is much concerned with the source and the power of Joy.
He too feels the inadequacy of human Joy:
The world hath fail'd to impart
The joy our youth forebodes,
Fail'd to fill up the void which in our breasts we bear.
(I. ii. 374-376)
Empedocles concludes that man should, therefore, "trust
the joys there are," and "nurse no extravagant hope."

This

solution is not enough for his own desperate situation,
however.

Empedocles determines that suicide is the only

possibility; he must return to the elements before his
power of Joy is completely dead.

He must release his soul,

which is now the prisoner of his consciousness:
Before the soul lose all her solemn joys,
And awe be dead, and hope impossible,
And the soul's deep eternal night come on—
Receive me, hide me, quench me, take me homel
33-36)

(II,

Empedocles insists that man is isolated and that the artist
is the victim of even greater alienation because his power

4Ibid., p. 274
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of self-consciousness is greater.

In his later essays,

as has been seen, Arnold suggests that partial Joy is
possible to man in the Christian spirit of purity, charity,
and self-renouncement.

Browning also explores the myth

of the alienated artist in "Cleon," and rejects isolation
by implicitly positing the divine out-soul as the basis and
promise of m a n ’s Joy.

Browning maintains that man can

achieve communion with the out-soul, if only for a moment,
and if only a communion maintained by a tenuous thread.
Furthermore, Browning believes that the very imper
fection of human Joy leads to the logical conclusion that
perfect Joy must exist.

He rejoices, for example, in the

imperfection of his own age and insists that it is "worthy”
of reproduction in art.

In a letter written in 1846,

Browning credits Carlyle with this aspect of his thought:
Carlyle has turned and forged, reforged on
his anvil that fact "that no age ever ap
peared heroic to itself” . . . and so,
worthy of reproduction in art by itself. .
. . I thought after Carlyle's endeavors
nobody could be ignorant of that,— nobody who
was obliged to seek the proof of it out of
his own experience. The cant is, that "an
age of transition" is the melancholy thing
to contemplate and delineate— whereas the
worst thing of all to look back on are times
of comparative standing still, rounded in their
important completeness.^

5,,The Letters of Robert Browning and Elizabeth Barrett
Barrett, II, 159.
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Browning thus enjoys living in "an age of transition" and
rejects the ideal of perfection represented by Hellenic
culture.

Arnold, however, in a letter written in 1849,

expresses longing for the perfection and calm of the Greek
world and damns the nineteenth century and Carlyle:
My dearest Clough these are damned times—
everything is against one— the height to which
knowledge is come, the spread of luxury, our
physical enervation, the absence of great
natures, the unavoidable contact with millions
of small ones, newspapers, cities, light
profligate friends, moral desperadoes like
Carlyle, our own selves, and the sickening
consciousness of our difficulties. . . .6
It is ironic, in the light of these two passages, that
Arnold's final position on the idea of Joy, that in self
renouncement there is "a fount of joy," is much closer to
Carlyle's thought than is Browning's claim that Joy must
be seized in time as in eternity.
Arnold laments the imperfection and change that
debilitate Joy in many of his poems other than Empedocles,
although it is the fullest embodiment of the idea.

In

"The Scholar-Gipsy," for example, he says that change wears
out man's capacity for life:
For what wears out the life of mortal men?
'T is that from change to change their being rolls;
'T is that repeated shocks, again, again,

6
Arnold, p. 520.
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Exhaust the energy of strongest souls
And numb the elastic powers.
(11. 142-146)
Browning, however, finds strength and power in change.

The

following passage from "James Lee's Wife," quoted earlier
in this chapter, seems to be a point-for-point refutation
of these lines from Arnold's "Scholar-Gipsy"s
Simple? Why this is the old woe o' the world;
Tune, to whose rise and fall we live and die.
Rise with it, then! Rejoice that man is hurled
From change to change unceasingly,
His soul's wings never furled!
(11. 217-221)
To be rolled "from change to change" in Arnold's poem
exhausts the soul's energy and numbs its elasticity; to be
hurled "from change to change" in Browning's poem, however,
is a source of strength and Joy, exercise for the soul's
wings.

Man should, Browning says, rejoice in change and

imperfection.
There is concrete evidence that Browning means "Rabbi
Ben Ezra" to serve not only as an answer to FitzGerald's
Rubaiyat, but also as another reply to Arnold's Empedocles.
Browning employs the same stanza which Arnold uses in his
poem, but with a strident assertion of the immortality of
the soul.^

The speaker of the poem declares that life would

'The crosscurrents of debate in Browning's poetry are
one of its most interesting sidelights. DeVane believes
that Arnold replies in turn to "Rabbi Ben Ezra" in "Growing
Old,'1 in A Browning Handbook, p. 295.
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be no challenge if man were "but formed to feed / On joy,
to soley seek and find and feast"

(11. 20-21).

being is united to God's by a "spark" of love.

Man's
Cleon had

imagined such a possibility, but the Rabbi, like Saul, is
certain of its truth:
Rejoice we are allied
To That which doth provide
And not partake, effect and not receive!

(11. 25-27)

The soul's hunger for Joy is a manifestation of its immortal
destiny.

The Joy attained in human life, therefore, is

necessarily "three-parts pain."
Browning develops this facet of the idea of Joy even
further in "A Death in the Desert."

Life, John declares,

is a testing ground, and "all it yields of joy and woe"
is just man's chance to learn the fact of immortal love.
It is the condition of man's "creatureship" that the com
pletion of Joy be delayed beyond the present life.

If man

"renounces this pact of creatureship" with God, he will
not taste the ultimate Joy:
'If ye demur, this judgment on your head.
Never to reach the ultimate, angels' law,
Indulging every instinct of the soul
There where law, life, joy, impulse are one thing!'
630-633)

(11.

In The Prelude, Wordsworth ascribes the greatest Joy experi
enced in his life to his seventeenth year, when, from a kind
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of revelation, he had an intimation of the unity of life
and Joy that Browning's John describes here.

Wordsworth

says that he saw one life "and felt that it was joy."
Browning, however, firmly attaches the unity of Joy and life
to the Incarnation in the gloss added to the account of
John's dying speech.

The gloss says that if Christ is not

the son of God, then he is the most wretched of men:
'For see; Himself conceived of life as love.
Conceived of love as what must enter in.
Fill up, make one with His each soul He loved:
Thus much for man's joy, all men's joy for Himl' (11.
670-673)
Browning thus employs again the paradox which he applies
to the artist in "Cleon."

Like the artist in that poem,

Christ, if he is only a supreme man, has a greater capacity
for Joy than do other men.

He requires not just "man's

joy," but "all men's joy."

If he does not, indeed, share

in the Godhead, all men are the slaves of Cleon's "horrible
fate," but Christ, the highest man, suffers most because
he possesses the greatest share of self-consciousness.
Browning both extends and modifies most of the aspects
of the idea of Joy which have been seen in the Wordsworthian
Romantic tradition.

The Joy of the artist is the most

intense Joy possible to man, it sets the artist apart, and
it grows as his consciousness expands with greater
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universality and energy.

The experience of Joy is most

supreme, however, if the artist nurtures the essential
purity that holds his reflective powers in check.

Joy

is the power which destroys the artist's alienation from
the rest of men, for the experience of Joy is conclusive
proof of a spiritual realm that includes all men.

The

artist must attempt to share his Joy, the "use of life,"
with those men, who, like Protus in "Cleon," are capable
of such experience.

Joy transforms the pleasures of sex

so that love between human out-souls is a sacramental and
redemptive relationship indicative of and leading to the
love of the divine
evitably leads

out-soul.

Theexperience of Joy in

man to intimations of immortality.

Browning,

however, makes explicit what the earlier Romantics imply.
The concept of

Joy depends, in Browning's poetry, not upon

intimations of

the immortality of the human soul, but upon

a faith in God's revelation of this immortality as a fact
of human history.

The Incarnation is the ultimate test of

Joy.
In "Cleon," Browning describes three main sources of
Joy— the Joy of art, the Joy of knowledge, and the Joy of
experience.

Cleon judges all three to be inadequate to man,

whose imaginative faculties give him unlimited capability
for Joy.

If these three categories are applied to one of
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Browning's notoriously obscure poems, "Women and Roses,"
this poem can be seen as a symbolic statement of Cleon's
idea of Joy.

The speaker of "Women and Roses " says that

he dreams of a red-rose tree around which three groups of
women dance.

The circling figures of the women about the

rose tree call to mind the circling figures which Keats
sees in the "Ode on a Grecian Urn" and in the "Ode on
Indolence," and the longing for permanence in a world of
change which Browning describes in this poem is not unlike
that which Keats embodies in the "Ode on a Grecian Urn":
Round and round, like a dance of snow
In a dazzling drift, as its guardians, go
Floating the women, faded for ages,
Sculptured in stone, on the poet's pages. (11. 4-7)
These women symbolize the Joy of knowledge gleaned from
the study of the past.

The next group belongs to the

present, to the Joy of experience:
Then follow women fresh and gay,
Living and loving and loved to-day.

(11. B-9)

The third and final group is symbolic of the Joy of art, for
these women belong to the incipient future and are created
by the poetic imagination:
Last, in the rear, flee the multitude of maidens,
Beauties yet unborn. And all, to one cadence.
They circle their rose on my rose tree.
(11.10-12)
The circling groups of women embody the Joy that should
inhere in the continuity of human life from the past to the
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future, but their relentless circular movement only under
scores the inevitability of the life-death cycle.

The

speaker of the poem now addresses each of the three groups
in turn.

him.

The women

from the past are known, but their Joy eludes

He cannot

"fix," "fire," or "freeze" them in the

present.

The women of the present, who image the Joy of

experience, are

living, and their "joy's undimmed," but

this present Joy also escapes his

grasp:

Prison all my soul in eternities of pleasure,
Girdle me for once!
But no— the old measure,
They circle their rose on my rose tree. (11. 34-36)
The speaker of the poem then thinks that the women yet un
created can insure that his Joy shall live on in his art;
the works of his imagination will embody Joy in the future:
Hoses will bloom nor want beholders,
Sprung from the dust where our flesh moulders.
What shall arrive with the cycle's change?
A novel grace and a beauty strange. (11. 42-45)
This beauty and grace of art will survive the life-death
cycle.

He will create an image of Joy that surmounts

change:
I will make an Eve, be the artist that began her,
Shaped her to his mind!—
(11. 46-47)
But the Joy of creation is also doomed by the relentless
cycle of time:

"— Alas! in like manner / They circle their

rose on my rose tree."
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The Joy of knowledge, the Joy of experience, and the
Joy of art which Cleon defines are given symbolic projection
in "Women and Roses" in the figures of the women from the
past, the women of the present, and the women of the future*
The moment of perfect union eludes the speaker of "Women and
Roses," as it eludes the speakers of "James Lee's Wife,"
"Two in the Campagna," and "Too Late."

His state is com

parable to that of Lazarus, who is described by Karshish as
being a man torn by the consciousness of two realms:
heart and brain move there, his feet stay here"

"His

(1. 185).

This speaker's heart and brain long for the permanence of
the rose tree, but his feet must move to the "one cadence"
of time.

He has the power to re-create the Joy of the past,

to experience Joy in the present, and to project imagina
tively the Joy of the future, but he, like all men, is
bound by the conditions of "creatureship," and is thus
subject to the flux of a temporal realm.

The stationary

rose tree around which the women circle indicates, however,
that perfect Joy is a possibility outside the dimension
time.
The restrained lyrical intensity given the idea of
Joy in "Women and Roses" is unique in Browning's poetry.
Joy characteristically "explodes," as it does in In a
Balcony, or it appears, as in "The Worst of It," as "a

of
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blaze of joy and a crash of song."

Joy comes with the

recognition that man is "hurled from change to change," as
in "James Lee's Wife," or Joy is manifested by the wild
outbreak of a storm, as it is in "A Grammarian's Funeral."
In "The Last Ride Together," Browning again returns
to the theme of the man's Joy versus the artist's sorrow,
a theme which he first explores in Sordello.

The speaker

of the poem feels "joy and fear" as the woman he loves
leans against him— Joy for the union that could be, and
fear because he senses that this moment is the end of love.
The speaker of the poem says that one moment of union with
his companion is worth more than all the glory of states
men, soldiers, poets, sculptors, or musicians.

Like

Cleon, he admits that the poet can tell the use of life,
while other men can only mutely feel it, but, also like
Cleon, he maintains that living is better:
'T is something, nay 't is much: but then,
Have you yourself what's best for men?
Are you— poor, sick, old ere your time—
Nearer one whit your sublime
Than we who have never turned a rhyme?
(11. 72-76)
The poet's ability to imagine and to express the beauty of
the world is a great gift, this speaker says, but his
consciousness envisages a sublimity he himself is incapable
of enjoying.

The speaker of "The Last Ride Together" thus
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dismisses the poet.

Sing, he says, but realize that the

real Joy of life lies

in action:

"Sing, riding's

a joy;

For me, I

ride."

The Joy of the ride issymbolic of the

guest for

the eternal that also haunts Cleon and the speaker

of "Women

and Roses," the quest for what Browning calls in

this poem,

"the instant made eternity."

It is an instant

which contains a foretaste of man's eventual transition
to a state beyond the temporal realm where his unlimited
capacity for Joy will be infinitely fulfilled.
The man's Joy versus the artist's sorrow is also a
motif of the concluding poem of Men and Women.

In "One

Word More," Browning dedicates the fifty poems of the
volume to his wife.

He says that, like Dante and Raphael,

he would like to express his love, if only- once, in another
artistic medium:
What of Rafael's sonnets, Dante's pictures?
This: no artist lives and loves, that longs not
Once, and only once, and for one only,
(Ah, the prize!)
to find his love a language
Fit and fair and simple and sufficient—
Using nature that 's an art to others,
Not, this one time, art that 's turned his nature.
58-64)

(11.

When the painter makes a poem or the poet makes a painting,
he escapes the demands of his natural talents and abhieves
a pure expression of the love that is Joy:
So to be the man and leave the artist,
Gain the man's joy, miss the artist's sorrow.
72)

(11. 71-
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Browning, however, is no Cleon.

He admits that painting,

sculpture, and music are all beyond his powers.

His one

perfect gift, therefore, must be his fifty men and women:
Hardly shall I tell my joys and sorrows,
Hopes and fears, belief and disbelieving:
I am mine and yours— the rest be all men's,
Karshish, Cleon, Norbert and the fifty. (11. 133-136)
It is in this sense only that Browning maintains that the
Joy of both man and poet can be achieved simultaneously.
The Joys, sorrows, hopes, fears, beliefs, and disbeliefs
that his imaginative vision perceives in the life around
him are expressed in his poetic creations.

The fifty men

and women enable him to achieve a universality that both
deepens and restrains his own Joy-hunger.

In a very real

sense, Browning's characters are the poetic images that
implicitly assert the artist-man's "capability for joy."

CHAPTER V

JOY, ENERGY, AND THE GROTESQUE:
THE RING AND THE BOOK

Robert Browning's acknowledged masterpiece is The
Ring and the Book, and in this poem, first published in
1868, Browning demonstrates his full artistic maturity and
embodies his moral and aesthetic theories in their most
complete expression.

The Ring and the Book is his most

searching analysis of human character and the nature of
human truth.

The twelve books of the poem re-create a

seventeenth-century murder case from the varying points
of view of both its protagonists and imaginary citizens
of Rome.

Henry James describes the complexity of the

poem and indicates the difficulty inherent in any criti
cal discussion of its characteristics:
"The Ring and the Book" is so vast and so
essentially Gothic a structure, spreading
and soaring and branching at such a rate,
covering such groupd, putting forth such
pinnacles and towers and brave excrescences,
planting its transepts and chapels and
porticoes, its clustered hugeness or in
ordinate muchness, that with any first
approach we but walk vaguely and slowly,
rather bewilderedly, round and round it,
wondering at what point we had best attempt
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such entrance as will save our steps and
light our uncertainty. . .
One possible "entrance" to The Ring and the Book is from
the standpoint of the relationship between what James calls
the "Gothic" nature of the poem and the idea of Joy.
In the Romantic tradition, the power of Joy is said
to enable a man to exist universally in the life around
him.

Coleridge says that "in joy individuality is lost,"

and that "to have genius is to live in the universal, to
know no self but that which is reflected not only from
the faces of all around us, our fellow creatures, but
reflected from the flowers, the trees, the beasts. . . .
Browning also maintains that the poetic consciousness must
envelop the imperfection of the world with a universal
and energetic response, a response that rises above both
the formal demands of the traditional literary genres and
the claims of conventional morality.

Imperfection, energy,

and universality are three keynotes of the idea of Joy?
these three factors result in the grotesque or Gothic
texture of Browning's mature poetry, for imperfection,
energy, and universality are also the keynotes of the

^Henry James, "The Novel in 'The Ring and the Book,'
The Quarterly Review, CCXVII (1912), 68.
2Coleridge, p. 179.
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nineteenth-century concept of the grotesque.

The grotesque

is manifest throughout Browning's poetry, but it is
especially evident in The Ring and the Book.

Before that

poem is discussed, however, Browning's own view of the
grotesque should be examined and the term itself defined.
Some of Browning's fullest expressions of his concept
of the grotesque occur in Fifine at the Fair and Aristo
phanes ' Apology.

In the first place, the grotesque is the

price that man pays for his imperfect humanity.

It results

from the working of spiritual energy outward to the physical
form.

The ability to perceive the grotesque as an integral

part of human life is a result of the poet's joyous
universality of vision.

The speaker of Fifine at the Fair

says:
I want, put down in black and
white,
What compensating joy, unknown and infinite,
Turns lawlessness to law, makes destitution—
wealth,
Vice— virtue, and disease of soul and body—
health?
(11. 140-143)
Th& fact that Browning ultimately denies this "compensating
joy" to the morally marginal character who speaks the poem
reinforces the fact that the Joy that transmutes the
illusion of vice into the reality of virtue, or the illusion
of disease into health, is the universal Joy of the poetic
imagination, that aspect of the idea of Joy that enables the
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poet to celebrate the imperfection of human existence in
all of its paradoxical reality.
Don Juan, the speaker of Fifine, describes his disgust
when he first observed the carnival-like atmosphere of the
Venice streets:
'T was easy to infer what meant my late disgust
At the brute-pageant, each grotesque of greed and
lust
And idle hate, and love as impotent for good. (11. 18611863)
This is, however, a hasty reaction; it results from a
distorted perspective.

Since "the proper goal for wisdom"

is "the ground / And not the sky" (11. 1866-1867), Don Juan
next describes his view of Venice from a different vantage
point.

He is now able to see that what was formerly con

sidered ugly is actually beautiful:
Enough and not too much of hate, love, greed
and lust,
Could one discerningly but hold the balance, shift
The weight from scale to scale, do justice to the drift
Of nature, and explain the glories by the shames
Mixed up in man, one stuff miscalled by different
names
According to what stage i 1 the process turned his
rough
Even as I gazed, to smooth— only get close enough! (11.
1871-1877)
If justice is done "to the drift of nature," incongruity
and imperfection are seen to be the law of life:
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A love, a hate, a hope, a fear, each soul a-strain
Some way through the flesh— the face, an evidence
O' the soul at work inside; and, all the more
intense,
So much the more grotesque.
(11. 1718-1721)
The energy of human passion stamps every human soul with the
intense evidence of the grotesque.

The "compensating joy,

unknown and infinite," which is the reward of the poetic
consciousness, as well as the source of its power, enables
the poet to see "the soul at work inside."
Furthermore, the experience of Joy enables the poet
to rise above the traditional claims of comedy and tragedy
to a new poetry which combines both, a poetry which Browning
calls "complex."

He describes this ideal poetry in

Aristophanes1 Apology,

and his description is an indication

of the effect which he attempted to achieve in The Ring and
the Book.
Ay, the
She who
Triumph
And all

First, he presents the claim of comedy:
Good Genius I To the Comic Muse,
evolves superiority.
and joy from sorrow, unsuccess
that's incomplete in human life.

(11. 1353-1356)

Man's apparent physical and spiritual deformities are
cured and made whole again by the power of the comic vision:

3

C. N. Wenger, in The Aesthetics of Robert Browning
(Ann Arbor, 1925), pp. 202-203, says that "it is safe to say?
that the theory of the tragi-comic advanced by the speakers
of this poem is Browning's own. The present discussion is
based upon the assumption that this poem is indeed a reliable
statement of Browning's own idea of "complex poetry."
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Since out of body uncouth, halt and maimed—
Since out of soul grotesque, corrupt or blank—
Fancy, uplifted by the Muse, can flit
To soul and body, re-instate them Man.
(11. 1358-1361)
The comic grotesque emerges through the poet's use of both
exaggeration and contrast:
Hail who accept no deformity
In man as normal and remediless,
But rather pushed it to such gross extreme
That, outraged, we protest by eye's recoil.
1378)

(11. 1375-

Browning relegates the prime role of comedy to the worldly
pretensions of man, while the tragic vision concerns itself
with his spiritual aspirations and with his will:
She who instructs her poet, bids man's soul
Play man's part merely nor attempt the gods'
Ill-guessed ofj Task humanity to height,
Put passion to prime use, urge will, unshamed
When will’s last effort breaks in impotence!
(11. 13941398)
The comic mode should not be separated from tragedy, however,
any more than man's physical nature can be sundered from
his spirit.

Either mode of vision is incomplete without the

other, but blended together into "complex poetry," the
tragi-comic adequately reflects the complexities of the
human personality.
Browning, therefore, advocates a poetry which combines
both the comic and the tragic, the "complex poetry" that is
his term for what is commonly called the tragi-comic.
describes this "complex poetry" as follows:

He
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Priest, do thou, president alike o'er each,
Tragic and Comic function of the god,
Help with libation to the blended twain!
Either of which who serving, only serves—
Proclaims himself disqualified to pour
To that Good Genius— complex Poetry,
Uniting each god-grace, including both.
(11. 1468-1474)
The tragic-comic vision enables the poet to see the whole man;
it unites man's disparate faculties through a resolution
which recognizes his necessary state of perfection-inimperfection:
For, when our folly ventures on the freak,
Would fain abolish joy and fruitfulness,
Mutilate nature— what avails the Head
Left solitary predominant,—
Unbodied soul,— not Hermes, both in one? (11. 14871491)
Hermes, the winged god, symbolizes the coalescence of body
and soul, each a "god-grace" of the whole man.

It is only

man's folly. Browning says, that judges any created thing
as "freak"; the freak is an integral component in the joy
and fruitfulness of nature which the universal vision of
the poet embodies in "complex poetry."
This tragi-comic vision would remove not only the
traditional barriers between comedy and tragedy, but also
the artificial duality of body and soul, as well as the wall
between past and present:
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And so, re-ordinating outworn rule,
Make Comedy and Tragedy combine,
Prove some new Both-yet-neither, all one bard,
Euripides with Aristophanes
Cooperanti this, reproducing Now,
As that gave Then existence: Life today.
This, as that other— Life dead long ago!
(11. 3439-3445)
The universal vision of the complex poet would destroy all
conventional classifications of the beautiful and the ugly.
This poet would glory in the total reality of life, what
Wordsworth calls life's "coarse nature and truth."

Browning

sdys that any other view of human life cheapens its complex
tangibility:
No, this were unreality! the real
He wants, not falsehood,— truth alone he seeks,
Truth, for all beauty! Beauty, in all truth—
That 's certain somehow! Must the eagle lilt
Lark-like, needs fir-tree blossom rose-like? No!
Strength and utility charm more than grace,
And what is most ugly proves most beautiful. (11. 21662172)
It is the "compensating joy, unknown and infinite," which is
described in Fifine at the Fair, that enables the poet to
strip away the illusion of ugliness which surrounds the
actual beauty of the imperfect creation and to fathom Keats's
mystery of Beauty-in-Truth and Truth-in-Beauty.

The grotesque

arises from the poet's ability to exist universally in the
life around him, in the eagle as well as in the lark, in
the fir tree as well as in the rose bush.

This universal

vision shatters the conventional molds of life, literature,
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and language.

The tragi-comic is grotesque because it is

an expression of a rebellion against an assumed perfection
of aesthetic form.
John Ruskin was among the first to perceive the re
lationship between the concept of Joy, energy, universality,
imperfection, and the spirit of Gothic art, a relationship
which he describes in The Stones of Venice and which he
makes a cultural goal for the nineteenth century.

Modern

critics apply some of these same qualities of the Gothic
spirit to the grotesque, and the latter is the term used
most often to describe the peculiar quality of Browning's
work, as the following survey of critical opinion will
demonstrate.
Walter Bagehot, for example, identifies the grotesque
as Robert Browning's distinguishing poetic characteristic.
He maintains that grotesque art "takes the type, so to say,
in difficulties.

It gives a representation of it in its

minimum development, amid the circumstances least favorable
to it, just while it is struggling with obstacles, just where
it is encumbered with incongruities.

It deals, to use the

language of science, not with normal types but with abnormal
specimens; to use the language of old philosophy, not with
what Nature is striving to be, but with what by some lapse
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she has happened to become."^

We have just seen in Browning's

own description of the grotesque his argument that the diffi
culties and incongruities which Bagehot cites are endemic to
the human condition, and that to overlook them in poetry is
to "mutilate" the very "drift of nature."

Bagehot further

argues that Browning has not made his grotesquely medieval
subject matter pleasant, and that the poet has chosen topics
which he could not "charm."

Browning, Bagehot concludes,

estranges the reading public by his use of the grotesque.
It is obvious, then, that the term "grotesque" has a pejora
tive connotation in Bagehot's critique of Browning's poetry.
Most critics, however, see the grotesque as a necessary
and quite legitimate aesthetic strategy.
Lily Bess Campbell's study, The Grotesque in the Poetry
of Robert Browning, is more thorough and more sympathetic
than is Bagehot's.

She concludes that the grotesque can be

4
Walter Bagehot, "Wordsworth, Tennyson, and Browning;
Or Pure, Ornate, and Grotesque Art in English Poetry," in
Literary Studies (London, 1895), II, 366. John M. Hinter,
in "Browning's Grotesque Period," VP, IV (Winter, 1966), 1-13,
offers a convenient summary of Browning's use of the word
"grotesque." Hinter, however, employs as the basis of his
study a biographical argument that is somewhat questionable.
He traces Browning's use of the grotesque in the 1840's and
the 1870's to the "bursts of bile" which the poet experienced
when writing for the stage and again after his wife's death.
"Grotesque" thus has an implicit pejorative connotation in
Hinter's discussion, just as it does in Bagehot's.
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placed into three broad categories:

the artificial

grotesque, the fanciful grotesque, and the great grotesque.
Browning's work exemplifies all three of these classes, but
he excells in the great grotesque, which Miss Campbell de
fines as "the attempt of the mind through the imagination
to remove its limitations.
of strength."

It is the result of activity and

She argues, further, that the grotesque

arises naturally from Browning's vision of life:

"It was,

then, in this struggle between his idealism and his realism
that he became the poet of the grotesque.

An ever constant

struggle thus to attain the absolute through the finite, to
reconcile fact and truth, to comprehend the infinite ordering
of things through the finite, this made Robert Browning the
poet of the great grotesque."

5

Miss Campbell thus posits

for the grotesque in Browning's poetry an intellectual and
philosophical basis that touches the very core of his most
deeply held convictions.
G. K. Chesterton, however, reaches a somewhat different
conclusion:
They [Browning's admirers] believe that
what is ordinarily called the grotesque
style of Browning was a kind of necessity

5

Lily Bess Campbell, The Grotesque in the Poetry of
Robert Browning, Bulletin of the University of Texas,
Humanistic Series No. 5 (April, 1907), pp. 15, 17.

160
boldly adopted by a great genius in order
to express novel and profound ideas. But
this is an entire mistake. What is called
ugliness was to Browning not in the least
a necessary evil, but a quite unnecessary
luxury, which he enjoyed for its own
sake. . . . He had a love of the grotesque
of the nature of art for art's sake.6
Chesterton stresses the link which exists between energy
and the grotesque; he says that "the element of the
grotesque in nature, means, in the main, energy, the
energy which takes its own forms and goes its own way."
Chesterton, furthermore, hints at the relationship between
the idea of Joy and the grotesque, the thesis of thb present
discussion, although he does not develop the idea.

"Energy.

and joy," Chesterton writes, are "the father and the mother
of the grotesque."

7

Chesterton's view of the grotesque in

Robert Browning's poetry presages the opinions of more
recent critics.
W. O. Raymond, for example, notes that allied with
the "love of energy in the physical world is Browning's keen
perception of the grotesque.

For the grotesque is the bold
Q

and premptory shattering of conventional molds."

J. Hillis

^G. K. Chesterton, Robert Browning (London, 1903), p.
139.
7Ibid., pp. 149, 148.
g

W. O. Raymond, "The Infinite Moment," in The Infinite
Moment (Toronto, 1965), p. 16.
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Miller, like Chesterton and Raymond, also stresses the role
of energy in grotesque art.

Miller contends that all men

are grotesque in Browning's world, because each man is an
imperfect expression of a Divine perfection.

Miller explains

that "grotesque visible forms and grotesque language are
really the same, for both are the result of the pushing out
of a novel internal energy, an energy which may express it
self in appearance or in speech.

. . .

Inside, the intense

energy, the eccentric seal of life— outside, the grotesque
visible form.

Each person, by doing what comes naturally,

becomes just that self God intended him to be, and in that
process becomes g r o t e s q u e . These last four critical
opinions are consonant with Browning's own view of the
grotesque as he expresses it in Fifine at the Fair and
Aristophanes 1 Apology.
Wolfgang Kayser's provocative attempt to define the
grotesque should be briefly mentioned, although it is de
voted to continental art and literature and contains only a
brief reference to Lily Bess Campbell's study of the grotes
que in Browning.

Kayser's conclusions, moreover, are of

limited value to a study of Browning.

Kayser finds that

the grotesque is basically a structure; it is the estranged

9Miller, pp. 135-136.
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world; it instills a fear of life; it is a play with the
absurd; and, finally, that the grotesque is "an attempt to
invoke and subdue the demonic aspects of the world.
This definition has some validity for Browning's poetry,
but is does not provide the necessary critical vocabulary
which will concretely specify the uniquely grotesque quality
of the poetry.

These studies, however, are the chief aids

that twentieth-century criticism offers for the exploration
of Browning's use of the grotesque.
Chesterton says that the grotesque springs from joy
and energy; Campbell, Raymond, and Miller echo this judgment
with similar assertions.

Victorian criticism is even more

enlightening on this point.

John Ruskin explains the re

lationship between energy and the concept of Joy that emerges
in the grotesque in The Stones of Venice, and his chapters on
"The Nature of Gothic" and "Grotesque Renaissance” provide
just the critical vocabulary needed for a discussion of the
grotesque quality of The Ring and the Book.
The universality and energy that are central to the
Romantic idea of Joy are equally crucial to Ruskin's defini
tion of the nature of Gothic.

The moral and imaginative

10Wolfgang Kayser, The Grotesque in Art and Literature,
trans. Ulrich Weisstein (Bloomington, 1963), p. 188.
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qualities which Ruskin finds in the Gothic spirit are
savageness, changefulness, naturalism, grotesqueness,
rigidity, and redundance.

Savageness, the most important

of these six characteristics, manifests itself in the quality
of imperfection.

Ruskin says that "in all things that live

there are certain irregularities and deficiences which are
not only signs of life, but sources of beauty.

. . .

All

admit irregularity as they imply change; and to banish im
perfection is to destroy expression, to check exertion, to
paralyze v i t a l i t y . T h i s

is Ruskin's statement of the

"philosophy of the imperfect," which so appeals to Browning
and which he also expresses in "Old Pictures in Florence,"
"Fra Lippo Lippi," "Andrea del Sarto," and in numerous other
poems, including the passages from Fifine and Aristophanes1
Apology cited above.

Imperfection, according to Ruskin and

Browning, is a source of beauty because it indicates that

John Ruskin, "The Nature of Gothic," in The Genius of
John Ruskin, ed. John Rosenberg (Boston, 1963), p. 184. It
seems impossible to determine if Browning is indebted to
Ruskin for the "philosophy of the imperfect." DeVane, in A
Browning Handbook, p. 271, points out that the Brownings read
The Stones of Venice in 1854, but concludes that "the idea,
of course, is as truly the expression of Browning's personality
as it is of Ruskin's." Furthermore, Lawrence Poston has
noted that any discussion of the theories of Ruskin and
Browning must proceed from an analogical point of view, since
"we can make no final decision as to where the indebtedness
lies; it may be that both were proceeding quite independently,"
in "Ruskin and Browning's Artists," English Miscellany, XV,
(1964), 196.
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incompletion is the fundamental law of life and that progress
is a real possibility.

All other qualities of the Gothic

spirit rest upon the principle of imperfection.
The second characteristic of the Gothic spirit, as
Ruskin defines it, is changefulness.

Ruskin

says that the

love of variety manifests itself in "culminating energy,"
and he defines this "changefulness" as follows:

"It is that

strange disquietude of the Gothic spirit that is its great
ness; that restlessness of the dreaming mind, that wanders
hither and thither among the niches, and flickers feverishly
around the pinnacles, and frets and fades in labyrinthine
knots and shadows along wall and roof, and yet is not satis
fied, nor shall be s a t i s f i e d . T h i s passage could be
applied, without even altering the architectural metaphors,
to the peculiar quality of Browning's verse in poems such as
Fifine or "Caliban," which critics, for lack of suitable
terminology, usually label "difficult" or "grotesque."^3

In

12Ibid., p. 190.
13

Robert Preyer, for example, in "Two Styles in the
Verse of Robert Browning," ELH, XXXII (March, 1965), 84,
notes that in Byron, Dickens, and Browning, "sensibility
operates at an abnormal speed and intensity.
I have not
found a way of formulating these similarities. One gets
the impression that there is a literary form or intention
that they share." The "changefulness" of the Gothic spirit,
as Ruskin defines it in The Stones of Venice, is perhaps
the formulation which Preyer seeks. Henry James, in the
passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter, employs
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Pauline, Browning's narrator describes the dominating quality
of his own mind as "restlessness."

He says that he possesses

a most "clear idea of consciousness," dominated by "a
principle of restlessness / Which would be all, have, see,
know, taste, feel, all— " (11. 277-278).

This "restlessness"

is analogous to the Gothic quality of changefulness, the
disquietude of the mind in its search for the universality
of vision which Ruskin describes.
Naturalism, the third quality of the Gothic mind,
Ruskin defines as the love of objects for their own sakes
and the careful, factual description of those objects.

This

factor is analogous to Browning's poetic objectivity, that
quality of his poetry which dwells on the perception of out
ward forms without imputing human feelings to them as
Wordsworth, for example, characteristically does.

Further

more, Ruskin says that the rigidity of the Gothic spirit
manifests itself in "an elastic tension and communication of
force from part to part," while the quality of redundance
results from a "love of decorative accumulation:

a magnifi

cent enthusiasm, which feels as if it could never do enough to
reach the fulness of its ideal."^

The twelve books of The

Gothic architectural metaphors similar to Ruskin's to des
cribe The Ring and the Book.
14

Ruskin, The Genius of John Ruskin, pp. 194, 195.
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Ring and the Book embody both Ruskin's idea of rigidity and
redundance, essentially in Browning's choice of the multiple
presentation of the same facts, a poetic dramatization that
results in a tension between the monologues and an accumu
lation of, specific detail which communicates the force of
Browning's own judgments.
The sixth characteristic of the Gothic spirit is the
grotesque, which Ruskin describes in his chapter on the
"Grotesque Renaissance."

He argues that the grotesque is

composed of two elements:
First, then, it seems to me that the grotesque
is, in almost all cases, composed of two elements,
one ludicrous, the other fearful; that, as one or
the other of these elements prevails, the grotesque
falls into two branches, sportive grotesque and
terrible grotesque; but that we cannot legitimately
consider it under these two aspects, because there
are hardly any examples which do not in some degree
combine both elements: there are few grotesques
so utterly playful as to be overcast with no shade
of fearfulness, and few so fearful as absolutely to
exclude all ideas of jest.-*-^
Ruskin contends that the grotesque appears wherever and
whenever there exists in the cultural climate a "joyful
energy of the mind."

In the Romantic tradition, Joy is

said to result when intellect and emotion exist in a state
of equipoise.

The concept of Joy manifests itself in the

15Ibid., p. 207.
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universal poetic vision which enables the artist to exist
imaginatively in an Ancient Mariner, a Betty Foy, or a
Guido Franceschini, as well as in a Christabel, a Michael,
or a Pompilia.

Ruskin maintains that this cultural con

dition, which the earlier Romantic tradition identifies as
an aspect of the idea of Joy, provides the necessary basis
for the grotesque.

He explains that "wherever the human

mind is healthy and vigorous in all its proportions, great
in imagination and emotion no less than in intellect, and
not overborne by an undue or hardened pre-eminence of the
mere reasoning faculties, there the grotesque will exist
in full energy.
Dante, Ruskin says, exhibits this balance more than
any other artist, partly because "he was born both in the
country and at the time which furnished the most stern
opposition of Horror and B e a u t y . N i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y
artists attempt to revive this stern opposition.

Browning

praises Dante in "One Word More," and he describes his
genius in much the same way as does Ruskin:
Dante, who loved well because he hated.
Hated wickedness that hinders loving.
(11. 42-43)

16Ibid., p. 214.
17Ibid., p. 213.
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Wylie Sypher points out a passage from Victor Hugo, which
is applicable to the grotesque in Browning, and which also
contains the same elements of the grotesque that Ruskin
employs in his definition.

Sypher writes that many

nineteenth-century artists "discovered the grotesque as
Hugo understood it and as Browning, a retarded romantic,
exploited it.

Hugo insisted that romantic drama would

present the 'abnormal and the horrible, the comic and the
burlesque,' the beast as well as the beauty."^-8

The

grotesque grows out of this opposition, an opposition which
Browning encompasses in his characterization of Guido and
Pompilia in The Ring and the Book.
John Ruskin, therefore, sees the grotesque as a dis
tinguishing quality of the Gothic spirit.

Modern critics,

however, often use the term "grotesque" for the sum of the
characteristics which Ruskin defines as Gothic.

This dif

ference in terminology makes little actual difference;
whether one calls them grotesque or Gothic, the six charac
teristics which Ruskin enumerates in The Stones of Venice
provide the most meaningful set of criteria for the analysis
of what modern critics usually term Browning's grotesque.
When The Ring and the Book is examined as a whole, the

18

Wylie Sypher, Rococo to Cubism in Art and Literature
(New York, 1960), p. 66.

elements which Ruskin describes— savageness, changefulness,
naturalism, redundance, rigidity, and grotesgueness— are
seen to develop chiefly from Browning's use of a classic,
twelve-book epic structure to tell an obscure seventeenthcentury murder story.

This is a juxtaposition of form and

content which shatters the conventional expectations of epic
form and which emphasizes the grotesque texture of the poem.
The structure of the poem, moreover, exhibits both the
rigidity and the redundance that Ruskin describes.

The

quality of rigidity in the poem, "the tension and communi
cation of force from part to part," appears as the facts of
the Roman murder case gather greater and greater force and
meaning as they are repeated and ramified by each speaker
in turn.

The tension of the poem arises not from one

particular monologue, but from the cumulative force of the
details of the case as they are variously interpreted by
each of the speakers.

Tension operates on a second level

in Browning's poem in that the speakers actually reveal their
own motivations and their own strengths and weaknesses as
they ostensibly relate the story of Guido and Pompilia; this
individual revelation is inextricably tied to Browning's own
judgment of each of the speakers, which he has already
presented in the first book of the poem.
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Furthermore, the structure of the poem indicates the
Gothic quality of redundance.

The virtuoso enthusiasm that

Browning demonstrates, the "love of decorative accumulation,"
appears, for example, as Guido is given not one, but two
separate opportunities to present his version of the case.
The naturalism of the Gothic spirit is evident in Browning's
delight in "the pure crude fact" of the poem's sources,
fact which he insists that each speaker presents as ob
jectively as is consonant with his character.

Ruskin's

description of the Gothic quality of changefulness, or
variety, is seen in Browning's presentation of ten different
speakers, who present as many interpretations of the same
essential facts.

The murder of Pompilia and her parents,

for example, is described twice by Browning himself in Book
One, and each of the nine other speakers also renders a
version of this central episode, as does Fra Celestino in
the transcript of his sermon given in the final book of the
poem.
The content of The Ring and the Book indicates its
savageness, the most important of the six characteristics
of the Gothic spirit which Ruskin describes in The Stones of
Venice.

The murder case appeals to Browning because its

very savagery demonstrates not only man's imperfection, not
only the imperfection of man's truth, but also their essential
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vitality and endurance.

Thomas Carlyle, like Elizabeth

Barrett Browning, felt that Browning had wasted his powers
on an "Old Bailey" story, but Carlyle failed to see that the
fact that an "Old Bailey" story can be transformed by the
poetic imagination is precisely Browning's point.

Further

more, The Ring and the Book exhibits the grotesqueness which
Ruskin describes in the sharp contrast between the horror
of Guido's violence and the beauty of Pompilia's suffering.
The poem is grotesque, finally, in that it represents an en
deavor to fuse the conventional comic and tragic modes into
the tragi-comedy that Browning calls "complex poetry."
In the final book of the poem. Fra Celestino warns
the people of Rome against the too facile belief that per
fect truth always triumphs.

He recalls once again the facts

of the case and reinforces its grotesque character in the
following description:
'Be otherwise instructed, youl
And preferably ponder, ere ye judge,
Each incident of this strange human play
Privily acted on a theatre
That seemed secure from every gaze but God's—
Till, of a sudden, earthquake laid wall low
And let the world perceive wild work inside
And how, in petrifaction of surprise,
The actors stood, — raised arm and planted foot,—
Mouth as it made, eye as it evidenced,
Despairing shriek, triumphant hate, — transfixed,
Both he who takes and she who yields the life.'
(XII,
542-553)
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Savagery, surprise, rigidity, and redundance— these are the
elements which are of central importance to the priest's
description of the frozen moment of Guido's crime and to
the poem as a whole.

Consider, for example, that Browning

has Bottini enclose the priest's sermon in a letter to an
unnamed friend.

The unprincipled Bottini is preparing to

turn against Pompilia in order that he might seize her
property; his judgment of the sermon is, therefore, a
grotesque travesty of the priest's intention.
is evident.

This much

But Browning provides still another accumu

lation of tension, for the priest himself doubts his own
ability to judge the case.
Significantly, since Fra Celestino is performing not
only a priestly role but also a poetic role as he interprets
the facts of the case in his sermon, his doubts about himself
turn on his experience of Joy:
'I answer, at the urgency of truth:
As this world seems, I dare not say I know
— Apart from Christ's assurance which decides—
Whether I have not failed to taste much joy,
For many a doubt will fain perturb my choice— .' (XII,
621-625)
Thus, we have Bottini, whom we know not to trust, harshly
judging Fra Celestino*s judgment, and the priest in turn
doubting himself.

Browning certainly intends for us to

accept Fra Celestino as a reliable interpreter— Christ's
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assurance of his Joy is, after all, the ultimate endorse
ment of its probity— but the twistings and the turnings of
this one passage, the communication of tension and force
from one speaker to the next, with the consciousness of
Browning himself behind the sermon-within-the-letter-withinthe-monologue and the Old Yellow Book behind all three,
indicate Ruskin's description of the Gothic spirit as surely
as if the poem were concluded with an image of a grinning
gargoyle.
An attempt to trace these grotesque, or Gothic,
elements through each of the twelve books of the poem would
be an impossible task, and perhaps even a self-defeating one,
for these qualities are palpably present in the first book
and in Browning's presentation of the dramatic conflict.
Browning relishes the pure fact of the case as he considers
it in Book One, and he delights in the joyous creative
response that it elicits from him:
The Book! I turn its medicinable leaves
In London now till, as in Florence erst,
A spirit laughs and leaps through every limb,
And lights my eye, and lifts me by the hair,
Letting me have my will with these.
(I, 774-778)
In the naturalistic spirit of Ruskin's nature of Gothic, he
rejoices in the case in and for itself; it is said to be
"medicinable."

He denies that having his "will" with the
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old murder case means that he "creates" the resulting poem:
Creates, no, but resuscitates, perhaps,
Inalienable, the arch-prerogative
Which turns thought, act— conceives, expresses too!
719-721)

(I,

The energy of the creative spirit "resuscitates" and reinvigorates imperfect forms; the poet projects this energy
into the already created object:
Something with too much life or not enough,
Which, either way imperfect, ended once*
An end whereat man's impulse intervenes,
Makes new beginning,starts the dead alive,
Completes the incomplete and saves the thing.
734)

(I, 730-

The poet can bring the dead facts to life again:
The life in me abolished the death of things,
Deep calling unto deep: as then and there
Acted itself over again once more
The tragic piece. (I, 520-523)
The "tragic piece," however, is made tragic, Browning insists,
only by virtue of the imaginative alloy of the poetic vision:
A book in shape but, really, pure crude fact
Secreted from man's life when heart beat hard.
And brains, high-blooded, ticked two centuries since.

(I,

86 - 88 )

The rudeness, the savagery, the imperfection of the "pure
crude fact" is the domain of the poet, who, like a goldsmith,
"repristinates," or restores, reality with the alloy of his
creative energy.
The changefulness which marks the Gothic spirit as it
is described by Ruskin, that culminating energy which manifests
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itself in the love of variety, is also given explicit ex
pression in this first book of The Ring and the Book.
Browning prepares his readers for the monologues to follow
by an analogy with the infinite variety of the seasons of
the year.

Any attempt to freeze any one aspect of the year

into some perfect landscape would only abolish the life of
that season:
The land dwarfed to one likeness of the land,
Life cramped corpse-fashion. Rather learn and love
Each facet-flash of the revolving year!—
Red, green and blue that whirl into a white,
The variance now, the eventual unity,
Which makes the miracle.
(I, 1359-1364)
Just as the seasons of the year admit life through change,
man demonstrates the same vital principle of changefulness:
See it for yourselves.
This man's act, changeable because alive!
Action now shrouds, nor shows the forming thought;
Man, like a glass ball with a spark a-top,
Out of the magic fire that lurks inside.
Shows one tint at a time to take the eye.
(I, 13641369)
If the glass ball that is Guido, Browning says,is tilted only
a little, he flashes forth an entirely different color and
baffles man's absolutes.

It is the poetic vision alone that

can stay the merging of this changeable rainbow of human life.
Rigidity, or elastic tension and communication of force,
as well as redundance, or love of decorative accumulation,
grow out of the changefulness which marks the Gothic spirit
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of this first book.

Without the energy of the poetic vision,

which imparts tension and force to the facts of the case, the
Old Yellow Book is worthless; it contains, Browning says,
no "truth of force":
Was this truth of force?
Able to take its own part as truth should,
Sufficient, self-sustaining? Why, if so—
Yonder*s a fire, into it goes my book,
As who shall say me nay, and what the loss?
You know the tale already.
(I, 372-377)
To know only the facts of the tale is not enough.

In the

thirty-two verse paragraphs of this first book, Browning
repeats the essential facts of the case no fewer than five
times.

This repetition reinforces his view of the essential

meaninglessness of fact without the alloy of imagination.
Furthermore, in his presentation of the nine speakers in
turn, Browning establishes a tension between the monologues
that each will deliver and the judgments that he would have
the reader make of each of the speakers.
The opposition between horror and beauty provides the
polarities out of which the grotesque character of the poem
emerges.

Browning evokes this opposition through the use of

imagery, especially the imagery of sheep and wolves, which
he first introduces in the initial book of the poem and which
accumulates greater and greater force with the variation and
repetition of it in the subsequent monologues.

Horror and
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beauty, Guido and Pompilia, sheep and wolves— the distinc
tion between these should be as obvious to the human mind
as if they were marked off from each other by a granite
pillar:
The fact that, wolves or sheep, such creatures were,—
Which hitherto, however men supposed,
Had somehow plain and pillar-like prevailed
I' the midst of them, indisputably fact,
Granite, time's tooth should grate against, not graze.
(I, 662-666)
The granite of indisputable fact proves to be only sandstone,
however, and the horror and the beauty merge with the passage
of time.

The poet who chances upon the square Old Yellow Book

renews the tension of their opposition; the book itself is
like an "abacus" which the poet uses to calculate the style
of the granite pillar which formerly separated the sheep
from the wolves, the beauty from the horror.

The ensuing poem

is to be a metaphorical granite pillar against which, now
that the poetic repristination is complete, time's tooth can
only grate, leaving the poet's judgments of Guido and Pompilia
clearly and finally set off from each other.
The Ring and the Book is Browning's most extended at
tempt to produce the "complex," or tragi-comic, poetry that
he describes in Aristophanes' Apology.

It is not Browning's

mingling of the burlesque and comic machinations of Dominus
Hyacinthus and Bottinius with the anguished, soul-searching
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utterances of the Pope or Pompilia that gives the poem its
tragi-comic character.
itself.

It is, rather, the dramatic conflict

Now the dramatic conflict in the poem arises osten

sibly out of the opposition of Pompilia to Guido's tyranny,
but in actuality it arises out of the struggle of the central
characters to be true to their own imperfections.

It is this

interior conflict that takes the poem out of the realm of
melodrama and into the realm of the tragi-comic.

C. N.

Wenger, who notes that Browning believes that comedy and
tragedy must be combined to some extent in any great modern
poem, suggests that the dramatic struggle in Browning "is
always the struggle of the spirit to be true to a loyalty
to some person, or cause, or ideal, always an aspiration
within the individual soul in any case, and against the
limitations imposed by the individual's own forms and by the
outward forms in the way of circumstances and institutions.
. .

.

The struggle merely becomes comic or tragic as one sees

it from the standpoint of the freedom attained by spirit
over forms or from the standpoint of the limitations
suffered."

19

If Wenger's observation is applied to Pompilia,

Caponsacchi, and the Pope, the tragi-comic nature of their

■^Wenger, pp. 202-203.
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respective conflicts will emerge.
Pompilia, for example, struggles to be true to the
glorious promise of her unborn child, and it is only the
necessity of loyalty to the spirit of new life that prompts
her flight from Guido.

In turn, Caponsacchi's conflict is

embedded in his struggle to maintain a human loyalty to
Pompilia, a loyalty which has a prerogative over the loyalty
which is due the church.

Pope Innocent is caught up within

a struggle to be loyal to not only the duties of his office,
but also to the church and to Pompilia, as well as to Guido.
Ruskin writes that "all things are literally better,
lovelier, and more beloved for the imperfections which have
been divinely appointed, that the law of human life may be
Effort, and the law of human judgment, Mercy."

20

and the Book obliquely embodies the same truth.

The Ring
The tragic-

comic vision which Browning employs demonstrates both the
freedom and the limitation of each character, their individ
ual efforts and the mercy due those efforts,

Pompilia,

Caponsacchi, and the Pope are as imperfect, and therefore as
grotesque, as is Guido, but they struggle against their im
perfection and grow in that struggle, while Guido remains a

20

Ruskin, The Genius of John Ruskin, p. 184.
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stunted animal, a frightened wolf.
Coleridge says that Joy is given "only to the pure
and in their purest hour."

Pompilia is the embodiment of

this innocence that characterizes the idea of Joy.

It is

an innocence that does not assert the self or demand abso
lutes.

It is content to accept and to rejoice in the

complexities of human life.

Guido describes Pompilia's

self-possession in his last speech:
This self-possession to the uttermost,
How does it differ in aught, save degree,
From the terrible patience of God.
(XI, 1378-1380)
Coleridge describes the highest Joy as the perfect peace of
God, and Pompilia's self-possession, her "terrible patience,"
is analogous to this perfect peace that joyously embraces
whatever indignities the human condition may merit.

Pompilia,

however, when the life of her unborn child is threatened,
demonstrates the energy that also characterizes the idea of
Joy, and her flight with Caponsacchi is the expression of
this creative energy.

When Guido overtakes the fleeing pair

at the inn, his entrance blots out "all peace and joy and
light and life" (VI, 1526).

Pompilia moves quickly to stop

him from inflicting injury to Caponsacchi, and the full
energy of her Joy is manifested:
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She sprang at the sword that hung beside him, seized,
Drew, brandished it, the sunrise burned for joy. (VI,
1544-1545)
The Pope judges Pompilia's drawing the sword— surely her
most uncharacteristic act— as the noblest expression of her
character, precisely because it does require such an act of
will.
Through Pompilia, furthermore. Browning gives expres
sion to the idea of kindred Joy.

When Guido claims her as

his wife, his loveless lust burns the Joy from her life:
He laid a hand on me that burned all peace.
All joy, all hope, and last all fear away,
Dipping the bough of life, so pleasant once,
In fire which shrivelled leaf and bud alike.

(VI,776-779)

The promise of her unborn child, however, restores her to
energy, and the planned flight from Guido is a flight to Joy.
She hears again the building-sparrows above her singing with
one voice, a voice of Joy, and the chance that Caponsacchi
will not aid her is a "doubt that first paled joy" (VII,
1365) .

During one stage of the flight, the priest brings to

her a new-born child in the hope of distracting her troubled
thoughts for a moment:
A new-born babe?— and I saw faces beam
Of the young mother proud to teach me joy,
And gossips round expecting my surprise
At the sudden hole through earth that lets in heaven.
(VII, 1556-1559)
This image of heaven flashing suddenly through to earth serves
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a double function in Pompilia's characterization.

The

supreme Joy experienced by Pompilia is the birth of her son,
and Browning describes the home of the Comparini after the
birth of Gaetano in images of Joy.
"the great joy was for"

He is the infant that

(I, 404), and the Joy of Pompilia

is explicitly compared to the Joy of Christ's mother.
Gaetano is born two weeks before Christmas, and
heaven's Joy manifests itself both in his birth and in the
celebration of the Incarnation that follows:

Gaetano's

birth is thus an expression of kindred Joy, and Pompilia
is able to judge her entire life on the basis of this ex
perience :
All has been right; I have gained my gain, enjoyed
As well as suffered,— nay, got foretaste too
Of better life beginning where this ends— . (VII, 166 81670)
Kindred Joy in Browning's poetry is again manifested on two
planes:

the infant "the great joy was for" is both Gaetano,

a human out-soul who redeems Pompilia from Guido's tyranny,
and Christ, the divine out-soul, whose incarnation she cele
brates and towards whom she moves.

The Joyful and Glorious

mysteries of the Christian tradition are centered upon Maryfe
divine motherhood, from the annunciation of God's choice of
her to bear his son to Christ's assumption of her into
heaven.

Pompilia's life evidences the same implicit pattern.
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from her joy in the discovery of her pregnancy to the last
words of both her monologue and of her life, "And I rise"
(VII, 1845).
Furthermore, Pompilia is also an out-soul to
Caponsacchi.

She compares herself to a flower whose growth

is stinted by the lack of the sun's warmth:
But if meanwhile some insect with a heart
Worth floods of lazy music, spendthrift joy—
Some fire-fly renounced Spring for my dwarfed cup,
Crept close to me, brought lustre for the dark,
Comfort against the cold— what though excess
Of comfort should miscall the creature— sun?
(VII,
1519-1524)
The "spendthrift joy" of Caponsacchi enables her to save her
unborn son, and she recognizes Caponsacchi in his role as the
"sun," her out-soul.
conclusion:

Caponsacchi, in turn, reaches the same

"I assuredly did bow, was blessed / By the

revelation of Pompilia"

(VI, 1864-1865).

He decides that his

agreement to aid her in her escape is obedience to God's
command through the agency of Pompilia:
Sirs, I obeyed. Obedience was too strange,—
This new thing that had been struck into me
By the look o' the lady, — to dare disobey
The first authoritative word.
'T was God's
I had been lifted to the level of her.
(VI, 1010-1014)
The human out-soul is thus a channel of God's continuing
revelation in the world.
Caponsacchi's judgment.
also a revelation to him:

The Pope reinforces the truth of
He says that Pompilia's life is
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I see in the world the intellect of man,
That sword, the energy his subtle spear,
The knowledge which defends him like a shield—
Everywhere; but they make not up, I think,
The marvel of a soul like thine, earth's flower
She holds up to the softened gaze of GodI
(X, 10141019)
Her life is "perfect in whiteness"

(X, 1006), the Pope says,

and she thus presages the condition to come when the whole
world itself will blaze with Joy:

"So should the frail be

come the perfect, rapt / From glory of pain to the glory of
joy"

(X, 1801-1802).
Guido's hatred of Pompilia centers on the self-possess

ion of her Joy.

In this respect, Guido's character is

similar to that of the Duke in Browning's 'My Last Duchess."
The Duke, for example, hates the "spot of Joy"

(11. 14-15)

that shines through his wife's face, a Joy that his presence
does not evoke.

The Duchess, the Duke reiterates, is too

liberal with her inner Joy.

The slightest courtesy, he says,

is "cause enough / For calling up that spot of joy" (11. 2021).

The pure and peaceful self-possession of Joy eludes the

attempts of both the Duke and Guido to dominate their wives'
very souls. Both men take drastic action to destroy the Joy
they cannot possess, and both decide that violence is the
only weapon effective against such Joy.
It is significant that the images of Joy associated
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with Pompilia's innocence, Caponsacchi's energy, and the
Pope's universal vision are not associated with Guido.
Guido speaks in images of pleasure, and he voices a
Utilitarian ethic:
For, pleasure being the sole good in the world
Any one's pleasure turns to some one's pain,
So law must watch for everyone, — say we.
Who call things wicked that give too much joy,
And nickname mere reprisal, envy made,
Punishment: quite right! thus the world goes round.
(XI, 529-534)
Guido gives Joy the connotation of sensual pleasure.

The

Pope recognizes this aspect of Guido's mind in his descrip
tion of him:
'I have my taste too, and tread no such step!
You choose the glorious life, and may, for me!
I like the lowest of life's appetites,—
So you judge, — but the very truth of joy
To my own apprehension which decides.'
(X, 1932-1936)
The "very truth of joy" is, for Guido, simply the enjoyment
of "the lowest of life's appetites," and he scorns the Joy
that he does not understand and cannot possess.
The images of the Joy of nature, the Joy of new life,
the Joy of creative energy, and the Joy of Christ are denied
Guido.

The Joy of Christmas, for example, only goads Guido

t© greater fury in his planned revenge upon Pompilia and her
parents.

In Guido's mind,the image of Christ's face becomes

merged with Satan's, old and wrinkled, as the Joy "withers"
off:
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But, day by day, joy waned and withered off:
The Babe's face, premature with peak and pine,
Sank into wrinkled ruinous old age,
Suffering and death, then mist-like disappeared.
1602-1605)

(V,

Guido cannot move beyond the limitation of pleasure to the
freedom of Joy.

For Guido, therefore, Joy remains simply

indulgence in "wicked" pleasures of sense which merits the
reprisal of law.

His conflict is thus more "tragic," as

Browning uses the term, than are those of Pompilia, Capon
sacchi, or the Pope, for their struggle partakes of the
freedom of Joy, of a "divine" comedy.
Browning embodies in The Ring and the Book both the
Gothic spirit and the idea of Joy in their greatest
Victorian expression.

John Ruskin's "The Nature of Gothic"

is not so much an accurate historical description as it is
the presentation of an ideal toward which he felt his own
age should

aspire.

His desperate struggle to instill this

spirit into all aspects of English life was eventually given
up in despair of the architectural horrors that it spawned.
Perhaps, however, the Gothic spirit is better conveyed in
other media than architecture, for the idea of Joy, which is
really the poetic manifestation of the Gothic spirit,
flourishes in both Wordsworth and Browning and survives the
nineteenth century.

The grotesque quality of Browning's poe

try, especially of The Ring and the Book, influenced the
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Pre-Raphaelites and paved the way to the idea of Joy in W.
B. Yeats.

Wordsworth perceived the Gothic quality of his

own work, and he describes the relationship of The Prelude
to his other poems as that of an ante-chapel to a Gothic
church.

The Ring and the Book is the other great nineteenth-

century poem that embodies the Gothic spirit, for although
they are certainly vastly different kinds of poems, both
Wordsworth and Browning attempt to encompass on an epic
scale the energy, the universality, and the perfection-inimperfection that marks Ruskin*s Gothic spirit.
The idea of Joy, like the spirit of Gothic, is an at
tempt to tap a source of traditional cultural energy which
could rejuvenate a mechanized society.

Ruskin praises Gothic

art because it indicates a culture that possesses a "joyful
energy of the mind."

The cultural conditions that produce

Gothic art (whether they are historically justified is not
the point) are the cultural conditions that produce Joy,
and when these conditions are absent or unavailable to or
dinary men, poets like Wordsworth and Browning must re-create
the "compensating joy, unknown and infinite" in their poetry.

CHAPTER VI

JOY, STRUGGLE AND EQUIPOISE:
SELECTED POEMS OF THE 1870's AND 1880's

The Romantic tradition of Joy emphasizes the equipoise
or equilibrium of the human intelligence and the human
emotions within the individual consciousness as the source
and the result of the highest Joy.

This condition of equi

poise, however, does not occupy a significant place in
Browning's idea of Joy.

In The Ring and the Book, the

Other Half-Rome makes a statement which is a convenient
summation of Browning's position.

The speaker of the mono

logue describes the life of Pietro and violante as a happy
one:
All at the mean where joy's components
So again, in the couple's very souls
You saw the adequate half with half to
Each having and each lacking somewhat,
Making a whole that had all and lacked
130)

mix.
match,
both
nought.

(Ill, 126-

But such a condition is not natural to human life as Browning
sees it; the Other Half-Rome explains that perfect equipoise
is as debilitating to the soul as it is to the body:
But, as 't is said a body, rightly mixed.
Each element in equipoise, would last
188
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Too long and live forever,— accordingly
Holds a germ— sand-grain weight too much i ' the scale—
Ordained to get predominance one day
And so bring all to ruin and release,— . (Ill, 137-142)
Equipoise destroys an otherwise healthy imbalance in the
human soul, and the moment when perfect union is attained,
"the mean where joy's components mix," can be only a
fleeting experience at best.

Browning says in Sordello

that "Joy comes when so much Soul is wreaked in Time / On
Matter."

His attempt to express the nature of the struggle

for Joy occupies as prominent a position in several of the
late poems of the 1870's and 1880's as it does in the
earliest poems of the 1830's and 1840's.
The keynote of the idea of Joy in Browning's late
poems is struck in "St. Martin's Summer":
For, would we but avow the truth,
Sober is genuine joy. No jesting!
Ask else Penelope, Ulysses—
Old in youth!
(11. 69-72)
The speaker of this poem recognizes the awe and fear that
Wordsworth also associates with the experience of Joy.
Genuine Joy is sober because it reminds man of an immortal
destiny whose attainment requires a tremendous effort of
the human will.

Genuine Joy is sober because it is the

means by which the artist overcomes his alienation, but
it also imposes unique responsibilities.

Genuine Joy is

sober because it brands the human soul with the innocent
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humility that enables it to embrace joyously the pact of
creatureship with God.

Genuine Joy is sober because it

transforms and transcends the otherwise irreconcilable
antinomies of the human condition.

Finally, genuine Joy

is sober because it is so tenuous, so fleeting an experi
ence, as to almost persuade the man that it is actually
only an illusion.

Browning insists, indeed, that the

experience of Joy is a kind of divine illusion that pre
sages the reality of eternity.
The speaker of Browning's "Numpholeptos" embodies
the vain search of the human soul to be completely ful
filled in time by the Joy of eternity.

Shelley says in

"Adonais" that "Life, like a dome of many-colored glass, /
Stains the white radiance of eternity"; Browning makes some
what different use of a similar metaphor as the basis of
"Numpholeptos."
enchanted.

The speaker of the poem is nymph-

He would be, as the Pope says of Pompilia,

"perfect in whiteness," for the nymph who holds him in
thrall is moon-beam white and demands the same of him.
She requires that he experience all of the kaleidoscopic
colors of the seven orbs without absorbing their stain and
that he return to her as white as she herself is:
Your own permission— your command, indeed,
That who would worthily retain the love

191
Must share the knowledge shrined those eyes
above,
Go boldly on adventure, break through bonds
O' the quintessential whiteness that surrounds
Your feet, obtain experience of each tinge.
(11. 95100)
He returns to the nymph stained from his quest but neverthe
less desirous of the reward of perfect Joy.
The speaker of the poem longs to find in the nymph's
eyes some acknowledgment of a love that overcomes death:
My eyes, acquainted with the dust, dare probe
Your eyes above for— what, if born, would blind
Mine with redundant bliss, as flash may find
The inert nerve, sting awake the palsied limb,
Bid with life's ectasy sense overbrim
And suck back death in the resurging joy—
Love, the love whole and sole without alloy!
(11. 28-34)
The "resurging joy" of perfect love is denied the man who
must traverse the stained and merging colors of human
experience.

The "resurging joy" thus withers off, and the

speaker renews his vain quest:
You dwell there, hearted; from your midmost
home
Rays forth— through that fantastic world I roam
Ever— from centre to circumference,
Shaft upon coloured shaft: this crimsons thence
That purples out its precinct through the waste. (11.
61-65)
He stands before her again, suffused "with crocus, saffron,
orange."

He receives, however, no hint of approval from

his quest in the yellow orb:
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As before, you show
Scarce recognition, no approval, some
Mistrust, more wonder at a man become
Monstrous in garb, nay— flesh disguised as well,
Through his adventure.
(11. 85-89)
Life, this speaker implies, should be a guest which includes
all of the tints of the "quintessential whiteness"; man
should struggle to "obtain experience of each tinge."

But

such experience will inevitably stain the man, who is,
after all, "flesh disguised."
The speaker of "Numpholeptos" rebels against the vain
adventure which is imposed upon him, but finally submits
and begins again, this time "the crimson-quest."

He,

like Andrea del Sarto, has gained the realization that he
is wedded to an ideal of human conduct beyond the resources
of his own humanity.

The nymph resembles the silver-grey,

placid perfection that Browning rejects in "Andrea del
Sarto," and like Andrea, this speaker cannot break the bond
with the achromatic, cold, but nevertheless enchanting
ideal of perfection represented by the nymph.

In Browning's

world, it is good and necessary that life stain "the white
radiance of eternity," and he embodies in this poem the
actual beauty of the chromatic stains of experience and the
futility of life on any other terms than the fully human.
Like the speaker of "Women and Roses," the speaker of
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"Numpholeptos" finds himself ineffectually circling the
whiteness of perfect Joy while vividly stained with the
exigencies of his own humanity.
As far as it goes, this is a legitimate reading of
"Numpholeptos," consonant with Browning’s statements in
other poems, but this poem is a rich artistic achievement
and embodies several levels of meaning.

W. C. DeVane,

for example, endorses Betty Miller's interpretation of the
poem as a biographical allegory of Browning's bondage to
the memory of his dead wife.^ However, if the poem is seen
as another ramification of Browning's concept of the grotes
que, still another level of meaning will emerge.

The

grotesque signals imperfection, universality, energy, and
Joy.

It determines the necessity of human struggle.

Ruskin

justifies the imperfection that marks the grotesque from
both a human and a divine point of view:

he says that im

perfection is divinely appointed so that "the law of human
life may be Effort, and the law of human judgment, Mercy."
In The Ring and the Book, the grotesque quality of human

^DeVane, A Browning Handbook, p. 405. W. O. Raymond
sees "Numpholeptos" as a presentation of the contrast between
the "abstract idealism" of the feminine nature and the
"masculine realism" of Browning's own humanism, in"'The
Jewelled Bow': A Study in Browning's Imagery and Humanism,"
The Infinite Moment, p. 209.
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life is viewed from a divine perspective and is judged a
positive good.

The poet, in other words, has a godlike,

universal vantage point and an omnipotent control over the
characters in the poem.

Their imperfect struggles are said

to partake of the freedom of Joy.

But the human values of

effort and mercy are equally important in the poem.

From

their internal points of view, Pompilia and Caponsacchi, for
example, acknowledge their own imperfection, and their
struggles against it become a source of Joy as soul is
wreaked on matter in time.

They are out-souls and their Joy

is thus truly reciprocal and kindred, for it moves each of
them closer to a knowledge of the divine out-soul.

The

perfection they struggle for is, therefore, initially a
manifestly human ideal.
When seen from the vantage point of what Ruskin
describes as the rationale of the imperfect, the grotesque
is a source of Joy, but when seen from the point of view
of the coldly perfect, it is an ugly and frightening
quality of human life.

The speaker of "Numpholeptos" is

mesmerized by a false out-soul who represents an inhuman
ideal of perfection.

By her very nature, the nymph cannot

reciprocate in the kindred Joy of humanity, but the colors
of human experience are seen from her deadly perfect per
spective.

She possesses a "blank pure soul, alike the
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source / And tomb of that prismatic glow" (11... 73-74).

The

polychromatic colors' which stain him are vividly and grotes
quely human, but from an inhuman point of view, the strong
and Vibrant hues of the crimson, purple, topaz, saffron,
orange, and scarlet merit only "forebearance, then re
pulsion, then disdain"

(1. 40).

The speaker of this poem is bound by what Ruskin
calls the condition of effort, for he must achieve the
experience of each color, but he is not judged with the
correlative mercy due his humanity.

He thus comes to

see his own condition from the nymph's perspective and
judges it "absurd":
Who trusts your word
Tries the adventure: and returns— absurd
As frightful— in that sulphur-steeped disguise.
124-126)

(11.

His very soul is mesmerized by the nymph, however, and he
relapses and acquiesces in the vain struggle which yields
no Joy.

His recidivism is comparable to that of Paracelsus,

but Paracelsus achieves a final freedom that is denied this
speaker.

By viewing the human struggle from the point of

view of the equipoise of the nymph, Browning effects a quite
different expression of his concept of the grotesque, ex
tending and enriching its meaning beyond his statements in
Fifine at the Fair.
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In La Saisiaz. Browning, speaking in his own person,
again returns to the Joy theme which he dramatized in
"Cleon."

"Does the soul survive the body?"— this is the

blunt and insidious question that the sudden death of a
friend brings forth again from the depths of his conscious
ness, clamoring for an answer.

Without a firm belief in the

immortality of the soul, man's experience of human Joy is
an inadequate and wholly futile process:
Life thus owned unhappy, is there supplemental
happiness
Possible and probable in life to come? or must
we count
Life a curse and not a blessing, summed-up in its
whole amount,
Help and hindrance, joy and sorrow?
(11. 204-207)
If the experience of Joy has to be computed as one would add
a column of figures, it would be found to be totally lacking
in spiritual import.

Such computations of man's Joy without

the consideration of eternity, Browning says, make human life
"brutish."

It is the desire for immortality which makes

human life worthy of man's own reflective self-consciousness:
This life has its hopes for this life, hopes that
promise joy: life done—
Out of all the hopes, how many had complete
fulfilment? none.
(11. 245-246)
Browning argues that human Joy is necessarily incomplete, and
if this incompletion does not signal potential completion,
life becomes futile and joyless.

As in "Saul," Browning
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demands that the present life be seen as only a "prelude"
to the full and complete harmony of eternity.
Browning says that if he would set aside all human
desires and examine his life solely on the terms of his own
human experience, he still finds the same inadequacy in his
experience of Joy, an inadequacy which Cleon also finds.
Browning maintains that the sorrow of life far outweighs
its Joy:
Still— with no more Nature, no more Man as
riddle to be read,
Only my own joys and sorrows now to reckon
real instead,—
I must say— or choke in silence— 'Howsoever
came my fate,
Sorrow did and joy did nowise,— life well weighed,
— preponderate.1 (11. 330-333)
In this poem, as in "Numpholeptos," man's life is envisioned
as being stained by the vivid and variegated colors of his
"flesh disguise," and if death is to result in the perfect
whiteness that man is capable of imagining, there must be a
promise of future life in which to attain that condition of
perfection.
In an attempt to resolve the problem of his belief in
immortality, Browning introduces into the poem a debate be
tween the Reason and the Fancy.

F. E. L. Priestley, who

provides the most incisive reading of La Saisiaz, points
out that Browning, by placing the debate between these two

193
human faculties at this point in the poem, returns to the
ring metaphor of The Ring and the Book.

In that poem,

Browning images the imagination as the repristinating alloy
which cooperates with the "pure crude fact" to arrive at
truth.

Priestley writes that, as in The Ring and the Book,

Browning selects "the vulgar (and empiricist) opposition
of Reason and Fancy (vulgarly concerned with 'truth' and
'fiction',

'fact' and 'surmise'). . . .

in actuality cooperate

Reason and Fancy

in thesearch for truth, as the dia-

logue that follows suggests."

Browning maintains that

Fancy conducts Reason to the ultimate knowledge that man
can grasp.

An important part of the recognition which the

cooperating human faculties achieve lies in the realization
of the nature of Joy.
The Reason accepts the Fancy’s assertion of three
"facts" of human existence:
soul survives death.

God is, the soul is, and the

The Reason then proceeds to build upon

these propositions a superstructure of belief:
Life to come will be improvement on the life
that's now; destroy
Body's thwartings,there's no longer
screen be
twixt soul and
soul's joy.
(11. 411-412)

2
F. E. L. Priestley,
XXV (October, 1955), 53.

"A Reading of 'La Saisiaz,'" UTQ,

The "screen" that separates the soul from its Joy is man's
finite, physical nature.

Browning consistently utilizes the

screen image for this concept.

In "By the Fire-Side," for

example, he images the human body as the "fine flesh-stuff"
t

and as the "mortal screen" that impedes more than a momentary
achievement of the perfect union of out-souls, while in
"The Last Ride Together," the body is imaged as a "fleshly
screen" which the speaker of the poem cannot transcend.

The

perfect transcendence of the "fine flesh-stuff" comes only
in eternity, where all barriers between "soul and soul's
joy" are removed.

The Reason thus concludes that man can do

little more than "wait" for the translation to eternity;
the soul must "take the joys and bear the sorrows— neither
with extreme concern!"

(1. 467).

The Fancy, however, leads

the Reason to comprehend the fact that man must do more than
simply "bear" the Joys and sorrows of life:
Life has worth incalculable, every moment that
he spends
So much gain or loss for that next life which on
this life depends.
(11. 477-478)
The Fancy employs the concrete imagery of commerce in order
to appeal to the Reason which insists upon "fact."

Browning

confronts the Gradgrinds of the nineteenth-century Coketowns
with the imagery that appeals to them, and in its very use
demonstrates its inadequacies.

The experience of Joy, as
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Browning has already shown, cannot be computed on the basis
of losses and gains.
In La Saisiaz, Browning insists upon the Joy of
life, no matter how imperfect that Joy appears to

human

be; with

a tenacity like that of his own Fra Lippo Lippi, he asserts
that "life means intensely and means good."

The poet's

business is to find and to convey that meaning, but in this
markedly personal utterance. Browning still maintains that
the poet's meaning is not to be identified with the individu
al's belief.

Each man, he says, must build his own faith

upon the substructural propositions of knowledge,

and his

faith must find its ultimate truth and meaning in

the facts

of his individual experience.
F. E. L. Priestley notes that in the short envoi which
concludes La Saisiaz, Browning describes the poem as a
chain of thoughts, and Priestley discusses the "obliqueness"
of this conclusion and the questions that it raises in
relation to the poem as a whole.3

However, the envoi can

be clarified somewhat if it is realized that Browning uses
in his conclusion imagery similar to the ladder and thread
images that are found in several of the poems of Men and

3Ibid., 59.
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Women and Dramatis Personae.

In "Cleon," for example, the

climb up the ladder of the tower represents man's increasing
power of Joy-consciousness, but Cleon rejects the ladder
imagery in favor of the image of the thread of water, which
signifies man's finite capability for Joy in contrast to
the infinite oceans which his soul can envisage from its
vantage point at the top of the ladder of consciousness.
In La Saisiaz, Browning similarly employs the imagery of
mountain climbing as a contrast to the image of the "fleshly
chain" that binds man to earth. The struggle up the mountain
is analogous to the climb up the ladder of Joy-consciousness,
while the chain image is analogous to the thread that signi
fies at once man's finitude and the tenuity of his separation
from infinitude.
The poem begins with a description of the climb that
the poet makes in memory of his dead friend.

As he stands

at the top of Mt. Saleve, he is face to face with the
mightiest possible symbol of infinity in Romantic poetry:
(As I climbed or paused from climbing, now
o'erbranched by shrub and tree,
Now built round by rock and boulder, now at
just a turn set free.
Stationed face to face with— Nature? rather with
Infinitude). (11. 9-11)
The mountain signals to his consciousness not only an aware
ness of infinitude, but also an awareness of the profound
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vastness of the separation between life and death.

The

poet and his friend had climbed together prior to her death
only five short days before this one, and the climb had
seemed to be a joyous experience:
Up and up we went, how careless— nay, how
joyous! All was new.
All was strange.
'Call progress toilsome? that
were just insulting you!' (11. 41-42)
As in "Cleon," however, this joyous progress is interrupted,
this time by the chilling reality of sudden death, and
again in this poem. Browning sees increasing progress in
Joy-consciousness issuing in despair.

Browning now intro

duces the contrasting image of the chain just as he had
introduced the thread image in "Cleon" after a similar
perception.
He wonders if perhaps immortality means only that man
is linked to succeeding generations by the power of the
human memory.

His friend survives death as long as he keeps

her memory alive, and they both are linked beyond his own
life in the memories of his friends.

This is, however,

an unsatisfactory supposition, Browning concludes, for in
actuality it means that "both memories dwindle, youxs and
mine together linked" (1. 185) .

They are linked more firmly

by the "fleshly chain" of their own humanity, and the
mountain climb only reinforces their bondage:
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Stalwart body idly yoked to stunted spirit, powers,
that fain
Else would soar, condemned to grovel, ground
lings through the fleshly chain,— . (11. 199-200)
The profundity of their separation no longer seems so vast
as it did from the perspective of the mountain top; even
after death, he is yet bound to her by the fleshly chain,
and he must attempt to judge the chances of the eventual
transcendence of the fleshly chain while still remaining
a finite link.

When Browning comes to the envoi of the poem,

he includes the imagery of the mountain climb and the fleshly
chain as symbolic indications of the experiences which they
shared.

If these aspects of the contracting imagery of

mountain climb and fleshly chain are kept in mind, the envoi
seems less oblique and can be understood as a meaningful and
organic part of the poem.
In the envoi, Browning first describes his exaltation
as he descended the mountain.

From the vantage point of

infinity, all things had taken on the illusion of solidity
and purpose:
Not so loosely
thoughts were linked,
Six weeks since as I, descending in the sunset
from Saleve,
Found the chain, I seemed to forge there, flawless
till it reached your grave,— . (11. 606-608)
This is the chain of their humanity which seems "flawless"
from the mountain top.

The realization of the vulnerability
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of the fleshly chain, however, coming so soon after the
mountain climb which indicates his capacity for infinitude,
only hurls him into a recognition of the terrible "flaws"
that death rends in any comfortable metaphysical system:
Not so filmy was the texture, but I bore it in my
breast
Safe thus far. And since I found a something in
me would not rest
Till I, link by link, unravelled any tangle of the
chain.
(11. 609-611)
The deeper consciousness of infinitude is the "something"
in him, and his mastery of the mountain is indissolubly
linked to the fact of human mortality.

The poem is a "chain

of thoughts," as Priestley points out, but it is also the
poet's recognition that he is bound to all humanity by the
fleshly chain.

The poem is a tribute to, and an acknowledg

ment of, the link that exists between the poet, his friend,
and, by extension, all humanity.

La Saisiaz is at once a

"memory evoked from slumber" and the poet's realization that
both the memory and the slumber have meaning.

However loose

and vulnerable the links may seem as they wind down the
mountain to the grave, the soul has gained a memory of Joyconsciousness that lies beyond the dimension of time, a
dimension which the poet now sees to be as fragile as the
life-breath of the human links.
Browning maintains that although the fleshly chain
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must be broken and eventually transcended, it must not be
rejected.

When stated as baldly as this, this belief would

appear to make Browning another drab Victorian prophet of
the possible, but his idea of Joy runs far deeper than the
simple exploitation of the prosaic possibilities of the Joy
that resides in sensory pleasures.

James Benziger, who

observes that beauty and joy are really what Romantic poetry
is all about, has noted this aspect of Browning's poetry.
Benziger writes that it is indeed a "religious truism that
the thought of heavenly joy means little to one who has no
vivid experience of its earthly counterpart.

Truisms like

this are what original poets infuse with new life and vigor.
The experiences of beauty and joy are what the Romantic
poets most seriously explore, and they explore them precisely
as they intimate some truth of great significance."^
Browning's idea of Joy imbues the life of man in the tangible
universe with a Vigorous raison d'etre and dignifies flesh
as well as spirit.
An example of the originality of Browning's approach
to the truism which Benziger notes is found in one of his
most striking metaphors for the human body, the "fine
flesh-stuff" of "By the Fire-Side."

4

Benziger, p. 271

Browning's diction is

206
not without its Empsonian ambiguities, and the connotations
of the word "fine" in this metaphor yield a rich and com
plex texture of meanings to this aspect of Browning's idea
of Joy.

Through the use of the word "fine" in this image,

Browning indicates that although the human body is only a
thin barrier between the perfect union of out-souls, it is
also the subtle, sensitive, and refined medium of man's
earthly life.

The word "fine" indicates that the human body

is, indeed, superior in quality to any other created thing
in the evolutionary scale, and that human love both purifies
and clarifies the body's use, a use which is diminished as
the spiritual union between out-souls grows and develops.
This image, moreover, partakes of still further connotations
of the word "fine," for Browning sees the limitations of the
flesh as a kind of probationary penalty imposed upon man's
life on earth, but he also maintains that while the "fine
flesh-stuff" will have an end in death, the soul will sur
vive into eternity.

The image of the "fine flesh-stuff"

thus opens out, as it were, into a viable and striking
summation of Browning's belief in the probity of human Joy
together with his equally firm belief that man is capable
of infinite Joy.
Browning continues to explore the idea of Joy in
several of the poems of Ferishtah's Fancies, a volume
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published in 1884.

Ferishtah is a "soul-starved" Persian,

hungry for a philosophical and psychological framework
which will renew his present moral inertia.

He chances

upon a melon-seller, whom he recognizes to be the Shah's
former prime minister.

He is shocked by the transformation

in the man and wonders if the melon-seller curses God for
the twelve years of Joy which he has tasted, since they
would seem to make his present status all the more bitter.
The melon-seller incredulously listens and then mordantly
replies to Ferishtah's question:
'Fool, does thy folly think my foolishness
Dwells rather on the fact that God appoints
A day of woe to the unworthy one,
Than that the unworthy one, by God's award,
Tasted joy twelve years long?'
(11. 27-31)
No man is "worthy" of Joy, the once prominent melon-seller
tells Ferishtah, and he advises the youth to return to school
to remedy his ignorance of the basic foundations of human
life.

Ferishtah does so, but the melon-seller's speech on

Joy remains the basis of his wisdom, his "stock-in-trade"
whose paradoxical and deceptive simplicity makes "great wits
jump."
In "Two Camels," Browning recalls the problems of
asceticism which he first explored in Paracelsus and Sordello.
The poet's ability to embody concretely the Joy that his
consciousness can imagine would seem to dictate that the
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poet mortify his human desires in an attempt to save his
"peculiar joy," as Browning calls it in Paracelsus, from
a possibly debilitating contact with the mundane life of
ordinary men.

Browning rejects this idea in his earlier

poems, and his rejection of it is even more explicit in
"Two Camels."

Ferishtah tells his disciple that the sage

must experience all facets of Joy:
'Put case I never have myself enjoyed,
Known by experience what enjoyment means,
How shall I— share enjoyment? — no, indeed!—
Supply it to my fellows, — ignorant.
As so I should be of the thing they crave.'
(11. 66-70)
Like Fra Celestino in The Ring and the Book, like Cleon, and
like Paracelsus, Ferishtah questions the ability of any man
to know Joy unless he himself has experienced it.

He insists

that the alienated sage is actually dwelling in an anachro
nistic world of illusion.

His stress upon the absolute

necessity of experience in the world of men bears out more
incisively than perhaps any other passage in Browning's
poetry Robert Langbaum's contention that the poetry of the
nineteenth century is a "poetry of experience."

In The

Poetry of Experience, Langbaum correlates the rise of the
dramatic monologue through the Victorians to its prominence
in m o d e m poetry with the rise of the experimental spirit.
Langbaum contends that the most essential idea of Romanticism
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is the doctrine of experience, which he defines as "the
doctrine that the imaginative apprehension gained through
immediate experience is primary and certain, whereas the
analytic reflection that follows is secondary and problematical."

5

Ferishtah's insistence that Joy be "known by

experience" is a capsule statement of Langbaum's thesis.
Ferishtah further maintains that the sage must know
Joy as he knows his own mind:
'Just as I cannot, till myself convinced,
Impart conviction, so, to deal forth joy
Adroitly, needs must I know joy myself.'

(11. 77-79)

The sage may suppose that a legitimate reason for the re
jection of human Joy lies in his desire to improve the Joyconsciousness of his fellow-men:
'Renounce joy for my fellows' sake? That's joy
Beyond joy; but renounced for mine, not theirs?'
80-81)

(11.

For the sage to renounce Joy in order to increase its power,
Ferishtah says, were analogous to the physician's rejection
of health in order to heal disease.

Asceticism is not a

condition for Joy; it is actually a hindrance to creative
productivity:
No, Son: the richness hearted in such Joy
Is in the knowing what are gifts we give,

5

Robert Langbaum, The Poetry of Experience (London,
1957), p. 35.
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Not in a vain endeavor not to know!
Therefore, desire joy and thank God for it!

(11. 84-87)

Joy is a part of man's "creatureship," Ferishtah concludes,
for just as Job learned the necessity of independent human
effort and work, all men must, recalling the words of
Paracelsus again, "painfully attain to joy."
In "A Pillar at Sebzevar," Ferishtah reiterates the
necessity of what John in "A Death in the Desert" calls
man's "pact of creatureship" with God, as well as the reality
of human Joy despite its illusory appearance that Browning
embodies in La Saisiaz.
of Joy.

Human love is again made the test

Ferishtah employs a parable to drive hone his point.

Suppose, he says, that a child grasps an orange, mistakenly
thinking it to be the sum.

This pitiable mistake does not

dim his Joy in the reality of the orange:
'What if soon he finds
The foolish fruit unworthy grasping? Joy
In shape and color,— that was joy as true—
Worthy in its degree of love— as grasp
Of sun were, which had singed his hand beside.'
36)

(11. 32-

Ferishtah maintains that man must "enjoy the present gift,"
trusting to a beneficent and providential ordering of the
future.

Man cannot achieve the pure trust of the child,

Ferishtah argues, because he would attempt to "circumscribe
omnipotence."

Man's power of love, an analogue of his power
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of Joy, is imaged as a tether line linking God and man, a
line which gains at "first leap" an understanding of God's
providence that the human mind alone can never achieve:
'Frankly accept the creatureship: ask good
To love for: press bold to the tether's end
Allotted to this life's intelligence!'
(11. 136-138)
In "A Bean-Stripe:

Also, Apple-Eating," Ferishtah

voices the insight of "St. Martin's Summer" that genuine
Joy is indeed a sober and inextricable mixture of both
pleasure and sorrow:
'Choose a joy!
Bettered it was by sorrow gone before.
And sobered somewhat by the shadowy sense
Of sorrow which came after or might come.
Joy, sorrow, — by precedence, subsequence—
Either on each, make fusion, mix in life.'

(11. 66-71)

Mem can see only man's world, Ferishtah says, and that world
seems to be swallowed up in pain and sorrow, but God's
larger purpose must be trusted:
'God's care be God's! 'T is mine— to boast no joy
Unsobered by such sorrows of ray kind
As sully with their shade my life that shines.' (11. 187189)
God permits such "black" shades to sully the "whiteness" of
human experience, Ferishtah explains, in order to prepare
man for the tremors of doubt that inevitably must intrude.
Some men would be jealous of Ferishtah's power of Joy; they
would judge it an unfair and excessive gift:
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'Who is Ferishtah, hitherto exempt
From black experience? Why, if God be just.
Were sundry fellow-mortals singled out
To undergo experience for his sake,
Just that the gift of pain, bestowed on them,
In him might temper to the due degree
Joy's else-excessive largess?'
(11. 208-214)
Ferishtah admits that he does not know why he is granted
Joy's largess.

He can only maintain that such insolvable

questions point again to "man's impotency, God's omnipotence"
(1. 216) .
Browning obviously delights in the exotic Persian
holiday that is mirrored in the colorful imagery of
Ferishtah's Fancies, but readers object to the strident
optimism voiced by Ferishtah but not made meaningful in the
poetic experience itself.

Thomas Hardy, for example, com

plains that Browning evidences a Christian optimism "worthy
of a dissenting grocer."

Maisie Ward implicitly replies

to Hardy's charge in her explanation of Browning's purpose
in Christmas-Eve and Easter-Pay, an explanation that also
applies to these poems from Ferishtah's Fancies:
Psychology is a modern science. Had it been
developed earlier mapy of the worst evils of
the more-or-less Christian centuries would
have been avoided. Browning was ahead of his
age when he recognized what his contemporary,
the scientist Pasteur, also saw when he claimed
to have the faith of a Breton peasant— and
hoped one day to have that of a Breton pea
sant's wife. This does not mean (any more
than does Newman's saying that all men have
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a reason, though not all men can give a
reason) that he despised the mind's pro
cesses. Still less does it mean what
Browning in his later years sometimes
appeared to say— that love can be a
substitute for mind.6
Mrs. Ward contends that Browning sees what his age generally
did not see, that the Godhead must be perceived by the
response of the total human person, not by "mind" or
"emotion" in isolation.

This total human response manifests

itself in Joy, and Browning's poetic embodiment of the idea
of Joy needs no elaborate defense.
Furthermore, the "Epilogue" to Ferishtah1s Fancies
also dispels any suspicion that Browning achieves his idea
of Joy as smoothly and easily as Ferishtah's glib and con
fident rhetoric would seem to imply.

Morse Peckham has

pointed out in an introduction to The Ring and the Book
that "Browning is far from being the witless optimist most
people imagine him.

He is an objectist, as deeply engaged

with penetrating illusion as were Baudelaire and Flaubert,
but with a tougher mind.

He was one of the most subtle and

complex of nineteenth-century writers.

The meaning of his

6Maisie Ward, Robert Browning and His World: The Private
Face, 1812-1861 (New York, 1967), p. 188.
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dramatic monologues is so structured that every position—
even his own . . .

is ironically destroyed."

7

The irony

that Peckham finds at the heart of Browning's poetic method
is abundantly present in the "Epilogue" to this volume,
where the experience of Joy itself is again imaged as a
kini of illusion:
Only, at heart's utmost joy and triumph, terror
Sudden turns the blood to ice: a chill wind
disencharms
All the lateenchantment! What if all be error—
If the halo irised round my head were. Love,
thine arms?
(11. 25-28)
This final stanza of the "Epilogue," which follows upon a
vivid description of the good, beauty, and wonder of the
universe, ironically undercuts both the "utmost joy" of
that description and the idea of Joy which is a motif of
the entire volume.

Browning, indeed,, most painfully at

tains to Joy.
In the "Parleying With Christopher Smart," Browning
admits that his late poetry is often "mere grey argument"
(1. 200).

In several of these later poems, however, there

is a reconciliation of youth and old age that relates to
Browning's idea of Joy and thus merits some attention.

In

7
Morse Peckham, ed.. Romanticism: The Culture of the
Nineteenth Century (New York, 1965), p. 218.
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"Christopher Smart," Browning delineates one aspect of his
poetic theory.

As in "Cleon," the poet's first responsibil

ity is said to be the Joy that encompasses the "use of life":
Nature was made to be by Man enjoyed
First; followed duly by enjoyment's fruit,
Instruction— haply leaving joy behind:
And you, the instructor, would you slack pursuit
Of the main prize, as poet help mankind
Just to enjoy, there leave them? Play the fool,
Abjuring a superior privilege?
(11. 225-231)
In its contemporary setting, this passage is Browning's ad
verse comment on the "art for art's sake" movement of the
1880's, but in its more universal application, it is as
succinct and searching an examination of the place of Joy
in his own poetic theory and of the poetic vocation itself
as are Paracelsus and Sordello.

Browning again sees Joy

as the primary poetic value, and he again denies that the
artist's idea of Joy can be made an end in itself, with no
thought of the communication of that Joy's meaning to other
men.
Browning recalls the ladder image, pervasive in his
early poetry, to indicate the necessity of the poet's firm
foundation in the reality of the human situation:
The other method's favored in our day!
The end ere the beginning: as you may.
Master the heavens before you study earth,
Make you familiar with the meteor's birth
Ere you descend to scrutinize the rose!
I say, o'erstep no least one of the rows
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That lead man from the bottom where he plants
Foot first of all, to life's last ladder-top.
247)

(11. 240-

The poet should, Browning says, "learn earth" as the first
step up the metaphorical ladder of poetry that leads eventu
ally to the heavens themselves.

This ladder imagery of

"Christopher Smart" is strikingly similar to that employed
by W. B. Yeats for an analogous purpose in "The Circus
Animals' Desertion."

Yeats concludes this poem, which is a

survey of his poetic career, with the following passage:
Those masterful images because complete
Grew in pure mind, but out of what began?
A mound of refuse or the sweepings of a street,
Old kettles, old bottles, and a broken can,
Old iron, old bones, old rags, that raving slut
Who keeps the till. Now that my ladder's gone,
I must lie down where all the ladders start.
In the foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart.
(11. 33-40)
The ascent of any spiritual-aesthetic ladder, both Yeats
and Browning say, starts in the earth and in man's own
complex and contradictory emotional and psychological strate
gies.

J. Hillis Miller sums up Browning's poetic achievement

with a reference to the final line of this stanza of Yeats's
poem.

Miller writes that, of the five writers discussed in

The Disappearance of God, "Browning alone seems to have
glimpsed the fact that the sad alternations of nihilism and
escape beyond the world could be evaded if man would only
reject twenty-five hundred years of belief in the dualism of
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heaven and earth.

If man could do this he might come to see

that being and value lie in this world, in what is immediate,
tangible, present to man, in earth, sun, sea, in the stars
in their courses, and in what Yeats was to call 'the foul
Q

rag-and-bone shop of the heart; "

Browning advises young

poets to “study earth," "learn earth," and "scrutinize the
rose," as he himself has studied, learned, and scrutinized
the innermost conflicts of men and women; only this know
ledge enables poetry to encompass Joy, to "master the
heavens."
Browning, as Wordsworth does before him and Yeats
after him, points out the antithetical aspects of human life
and demonstrates that the idea of Joy is an important aspect
of the power that overcomes these antinomies.

In "Pisgah-

Sights, I," written when Browning was sixty-three, the
speaker of the poem notes the apparently discordant elements
of human life:
Over the ball of it,
Peering and prying,
How I see all of it,
Life there, outlying,
Roughness and smoothness,
Shine and defilement,
Grace and uncouthness:
One reconcilement.
(11. 1-8)

8
Miller, p. 359.
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This "one reconcilement" is the only aspect of the Romantic
ideal of equipoise that Browning holds tenable.

The wisdom

of old age and approaching death can see the reconcilement
that lies in the wedding of opposites:
All's lend-and-borrow;
Good, see, wants evil,
Joy demands sorrow,
Angel weds devilI
(11. 13-16)
The speaker of the poem rejoices in the "rough-smooth"
texture of man's "mixed" existence, and his Joy is also
mixed, for this earthly Joy, so briefly tasted, must be left
behind for the unknown Joy of eternity:
Honey yet gall of it!
There's the life lying,
And I see all of it
Only, I'm dying. (11. 29-32)
As in the "Epilogue" to Ferishtah's Fancies, the poetic
pattern of "Pisgaiv-Sights,.I" is a reconciliation of op
posites followed by an ironic conclusion which undercuts
that reconciliation.
This pattern also appears in a similar poem of
reconciliation written by Yeats in his sixty-seventh year.
Yeats begins "Vacillation" with this stanza:
Between extremities
Man runs his course;
A brand, or flaming breath.
Comes to destroy
All those antinomies
Of day and night;
The body calls it death,

The heart remorse.
But if these be right
What is joy?
(11. 1-10)
With Yeats's question, this exploration of the idea of Joy
is brought full circle.

Almost one hundred years before

Yeats asks "What is joy?" in this poem, Browning had asked
the same question in Sordello, and he spent a large part of
his poetic career delineating the answer:
For what is joy? — to heave
Up one obstruction more, and common leave
What was peculiar, by such act destroy
Itself; a partial death is every joy.
(VI, 261-264)
The struggle for Joy in the poetry of Robert Browning ulti
mately encompasses this "one reconcilement," but since his
best poetry is dramatic rather than contemplative or
reflective, the concept receives its most intense expression
in the inner conflicts of speakers such as Cleon, Pompilia,
and Paracelsus as they embody the interplay of the complex
components of the idea of Joy.

The experience of these

speakers demonstrates that central to Robert Browning's
concept of Joy is William Blake's proverb, "Excess of joy
weeps."
"What is joy?”— the answer to this question is a con
cern of the major poets of the nineteenth century.
Wordsworth, Coleridge, Arnold, and Browning each contributes
to the developing notion of the idea of Joy as a unifying

force within a pluralistic culture.

The particular mark of

Browning's concept of Joy lies in his presentment of kindred
Joy, in the inexorable movement of the human out-souls to
wards the divine out-soul in the "infinite moment" of union.
Another important facet of his idea of Joy is manifested in
his use of the grotesque as an integral part of his poetic
method.

Finally, Browning's ability to embody man's "cap

ability for joy" in his poetic characters enables him to
extend the metaphysical and psychological abstractions that
are associated with the concept of Joy through concrete
dramatizations.

F. A. Pottle's cautionary remarks quoted

earlier should be recalled in this conclusion; Pottle says
that it is essential to remember in Wordsworth's poetry that
it is the poetic imagery that conveys the emotion of Joy.
The same caution is applicable to the idea of Joy in the
poetry of Robert Browning.

In his best poems, it is the

poetic character who conveys the idea of Joy and who impli
citly asserts man's capability for Joy.
The idea of Joy touches some of the most important
aspects of nineteenth-century English literature.

I have

attempted to show that it is not, however, a portmanteau
emotion, but that the concept of Joy is a serious attempt .
to provide both an intellectual and spiritual embodiment of
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crucial cultural aspirations.

Browning's struggle to main

tain the idea of Joy is an attempt to merge the "innocence"
of the poet's idea of Joy with the inevitably conflicting
"experience" of his position in society.

Wordsworth and

Browning continued to explore this paradoxical union in
their poetry, while Coleridge and Arnold attempted to es
tablish a new concept of culture as a dynamic force in
English life.

Since the idea of Joy is so intimately re

lated to the desire for totality, wholeness, and unity which
characterizes nineteenth-century English literature, perhaps
Browning's concept of Joy should be viewed with these stan
dards in mind.

Robert Langbaum's recent comments on this

aspect of Browning's poetry are sane and judicious.
Langbaum notes that "his best dramatic monologues entitle
Browning to his rank among the two or three best Victorian
poets.

But is he also— as he certainly aimed to be— one of

the great poets of English literature?"

Langbaum contends

that even Browning's best dramatic monologues "do not add up
to what Browning called 'the pure white light,' the total
vision of life that the greatest poets give us, and that
Browning from the start— from the time of Sordello— intended
to give us."

Langbaum thus concludes that Browning "is a

poet of enduring interest— partly because his very faults
show that he was turning analytic thought against itself,
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that he understood what had to be done."

g

Whatever the

final verdict may be of his total poetic achievement, the
idea of Joy is certainly one of Browning's most effective
attempts to turn "analytic thought against itself."
Henry Adams charged the nineteenth century with an
unceasing dynamism that found expression in no adequate
human symbol, and he reluctantly accepts the image of the
dynamo as the modern equivalent of the twelfth-century
symbol of the virgin of Chartres.

From the time of Matthew

Arnold's judgment of "confused multitudinousness," the
same charge of struggling, undirected energy has often been
leveled against the poetry of Robert Browning.

Browning,

however, is a part of the nineteenth century, and unifying
symbols of experience had given way to the diversity of ex
perience itself.

It was impossible for the nineteenth-

century consciousness to acquiesce in a single image of
cultural experience as powerful as the Virgin; the age was
too complex in its development for that.

But with the idea

of Joy, Browning continues a Romantic tradition that im
plicitly denies the symbolic import of the dynamo.

9

The idea

Robert Langbaum, "Browning and the Question of Myth,"
PMLA, LXXXI (December, 1966), 577, 582.

of Joy in Robert Browning, as it is in Wordsworth and in
Yeats, is not so much a poetic symbol as it is the embodi
ment of the most powerful experience that the poetic vision
can discern and the struggle to channel human energy into
and through the unifying experience of Joy.
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